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Why has the agricultural water system in China been slipping towards a crisis, despite its 
economy growing leaps and bounds in the past four decades (1978-2016)? This 
dissertation investigates the institutions of agricultural water use and various actors 
involved in the water system at national, local and community levels.  It situates the crisis 
in the context of the country’s neoliberal shift in the post-reform period and argues that 
the agricultural water system has caught between a structural dilemma between 
profitability and food security. Guided by the relational-comparative method and layered 
analysis, the author collected rich archival, statistical and ethnographic data and 
conducted two county case studies: one county is located in Hunan Province and the 
other in Inner Mongolia. After analyzing water policy, water problems, changing patterns 
of water use and grain production, and the incentives and actions of local officials, 
farmers and agribusiness companies, the dissertation reaches three conclusions:  
 
First, the agricultural water crisis in China has its roots in the capitalist logic of profit 
maximization. In the post-reform period, state and non-state actors tend to allocate 
human, material and financial resources to sectors and activities that would generate 
greater economic returns, while neglecting the long-term sustainability of the agricultural 
water system. Second, although the concern over food security increased government 
funding in agricultural water, it has also facilitated the geographical movement of grain 
production from South to North, which exacerbates the mismatch between water 
resources and grain production. Finally, capitalist transformation and social 
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differentiation in the countryside have undermined the capability of rural communities to 
take collective actions to solve water problems. Although the newly emerged large farms 
are able to invest more resources in agricultural water, their behavior is also based on 
profitability rather than the health of the agricultural water system. Additionally, the 
differentiation of the rural society has made the distribution of water resources 
increasingly unequal, favoring agribusiness and large farms over farming households.  
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Chapter 1     Introduction 
 
As China rises, its food demand has soared. In 2014, grain production in China reached a 
record high, 607 million metric tons, but it nonetheless imported another 95 million 
metric tons of grains (NBS 2015: tables 12-2, 11-8). Most of the imports were soybeans, 
weighing 71 million metric tons, which were used to produce edible oil and animal feed. 
In addition, rising standards of consumption have increased demand for resource-
intensive products such as meat and dairy products, turning China into a net importer of 
pork, beef and milk in recent years (Huang 2016; Schneider 2017; Weis 2013). As the 
country relies on the global market for an increasing share of its food supply, scholars 
and policy analysts are worried that it could lead to rising food prices and food shortages 
(Bello 2009; Brown 2011; McMichael 2012). As early as 1995, Lester Brown (1995) 
predicted that China would not be able to feed its vast population through domestic 
production and must import food from abroad. Recent food crises in 2007/8 and in 
2011/12, though not caused by China, nonetheless added a new sense of unease about 
China’s food demand and its global impact (Moseley 2013). 
 
China has been largely pursuing a food self-sufficiency policy since the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) took power in 1949. Despite increasing food imports in the 
recent decade, the central government has reiterated that China must feed itself mainly 
through domestic production. This strategy, called grain self-sufficiency (liangshi ziji粮
食自给) or grain security (liangshi anquan 粮食安全), is regarded as the bedrock of 
China’s food sovereignty and national security. According to a national plan released in 
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2008, China will try to keep the rate of grain output to consumption around 95 percent 
between 2008 and 2020.
1
 The current president, Xi Jinping, reaffirmed in 2013 that grain 
security will be a top priority of the government.
2
 However, the question is whether 
China can maintain the capacity of grain production to produce sufficient food. The 
answer to this question matters a great deal, given China’s rising economic power.   
 
This dissertation addresses the question by examining agricultural water use in China. 
Water is vital for agricultural production and food security in the country, which depends 
on irrigation for 70 percent of its grain output (Khan, Hanjra and Mu 2009). Lester 
Brown’s argument that China would be unable to feed itself is partly dependent on the 
unsustainability of agricultural water use, which includes water scarcity, depletion of 
aquifers, water pollution, and the diversion of agricultural water for urban and industrial 
uses (Brown 1995; Brown and Halweil 1998). Although some scholars contended that 
Brown might have exaggerated the magnitude of water crisis in China, the worsening 
water problems have caught wide attention in the past two decades (Ma 1999; Nickum 
1998; Economy 2011; Wang et al 2009; Watts 2010).  
 
This dissertation examines the political economy of agricultural water use in China. It 
reveals how the supply of agricultural water in China has been caught between food 
                                                        
1
 The document can be accessed at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2008-11/13/content_1148414.htm 
2
 It should be noted that China has made the policy of grain self-sufficiency more flexible recently. 
According to its 13
th
 Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), which was released in October 2015, grain security refers 
to the self-sufficiency of cereals, which mainly include rice, wheat and corn. In addition, the Plan stresses 
that a major way to guarantee grain security is to maintain the sufficient amount of land and adequate 
technologies for grain production. In other words, grain output may fluctuate from year to year, but the 
country will be able to produce sufficient grains if it must. This change is obviously intended to address the 
new reality that China has increasingly relied on imports for certain grains, most notably, soybeans (Honby 




security, which is commonly known as grain security (liangshi anquan) in China, and the 
neoliberal principle of profit maximization in the past four decades. On the one hand, the 
Chinese state has attached much importance to grain security and striven to produce 
sufficient grains to feed the nation. The commitment to grain security entails consistent 
efforts by both state and non-state actors to maintain a sustainable agricultural water 
system. On the other hand, however, the state and various economic actors, even 
including farmers themselves, have been subjected to the neoliberal principle of profit 
maximization, resulting in either the poor maintenance of agricultural water facilities or 
the over-extraction of water resources. I will examine this contradiction at the multiple 
levels—national, local and community, and investigate the incentives and actions of state 
and non-state actors. The goal is to achieve an adequate understanding of the causes and 
consequences of agricultural water problems, and assess the future trajectory of the 
agricultural water system against the backdrop of rapid economic growth and rural 
transformations in China.  
 
The introduction comprises five sections. The first section describes how the water 
problems have correlated with regional economic development within China, particularly 
the South-North divide in the use of land and water. The second section reviews the 
existing theories on agricultural water problems. The third section discusses the structural 
dilemma in Chinese economic development and the neoliberal shift in the past four 
decades. The fourth section offers a theoretical framework to understand the agricultural 
water crisis in China. The last section details methodology, data collection and the 
organization of the dissertation.  
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1.1 Water Problems and the South-North Divide in China 
Agricultural water problems in China can be classified into two categories. One is related 
to surface water and comprises the breakdown of irrigation facilities, water pollution and 
the diversion of water from agriculture to urban-industrial sectors. According to a 2009 
report released by the National People’s Congress of China, more than half of large 
irrigation zones were not functioning well, and more than 85 percent of large pumping 
stations were in urgent need of thorough repair or even reconstruction (NPCC 2009). The 
conditions of small-scale irrigation facilities were probably even worse. The breakdown 
of these facilities is dubbed as the problem of “last mile” (zuihou yigongli), suggesting 
that water cannot flow into farm fields without the proper functioning of these facilities 
even though large irrigation facilities are fixed (Wei and Zhu 2012). Water pollution, 
which has been widely studied, poses a serious threat to the safety of food products 
(Economy 2011; Lu et al. 2015; Ma 1999: 159-164). The diversion of water from 
agriculture to urban-industrial sectors will also undermine agricultural production. The 
South-North Water Transfer Project (nanshui beidiao) is a good example of how the 
Chinese government has invested enormously to divert water from the South to meet 
urban-industrial demand in the north (Berkoff 2003; Yan, Wang and Huang 2015).  
 
The other category is related to underground water, which mainly refers to the over-
pumping for irrigation, leading to the falling of groundwater tables and the depletion of 
aquifers, though the use of underground water would also lead to the problems of 
pollution and the diversion to urban-industrial uses. According to Brown and others, the 
water table in the North China Plain has been falling 1.5 meters per year since the 1990s, 
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and even two meters in some regions. Due to over-pumping and water diversion, the 
downstream of the Huai River and the Yellow River would see no flows for much of a 
year. In addition, the over-pumping has caused saltwater intrusion, soil salinization, soil 
compaction and land subsidence (Brown and Halweil 1998; Shalizi 2006; Zhen and 
Routray 2002; Wang et al 2006).      
 
Figure 1-1 The north-south division of China 
 
 
Although the two types of problems can exist in any region of China, surface-water 
problems are more serious in the south while groundwater problems more pressing in the 
north. This is due to the patterns of precipitation and the availability of water resources. 
In the south, the level of precipitation is high and surface water is relatively abundant. 
Thus the main way of agricultural water use is to harness surface water through reservoirs, 
dams, canals, aqueducts, ponds, etc. By contrast, low precipitation in the north has forced 
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farmers to rely heavily on underground water for irrigation. Figure 1-1 shows the south-
north division. Annual precipitation is usually more than 800 mm in the south while less 
than 800 mm in the north, excluding the Qinghai-Tibetan plateau. In northern areas 
which are close to the sea, for example, some parts of Hebei, Shandong and Liaoning 
provinces, annual precipitation might exceed 800 mm. Nevertheless, in general, the level 
of annual precipitation decreases as moving northward. This geographical division holds 
important implications for the analysis of agricultural water and grain security in China.  
 
The reform in China in the late 1970s unleashed decades of rapid economic growth. 
Partly as a result, grain production has been pushed from the south to the north as land 
and other resources in the south were allocated for more profitable uses such as industrial 
production (Chen 2009; Qu and Su 2003; Zhong and Qin 2010). This change is in line 
with the economic theory of comparative advantage, that is, it is rational for southern 
regions to concentrate resources on economic activities with the lowest opportunity cost 
(Hendrischke and Feng eds. 1999; Lin, Cai and Li 2003).  
 
While the relocation of grain production makes perfect sense in the logic of economic 
growth, it appears problematic in terms of grain security. In China, the south is better 
endowed with natural resources such as water and soil for grain production. Prior to the 
mid-1980s, it was the major site of grain production with surplus grains exported to 
northern regions and elsewhere. Although the north has a larger cultivated area as 
compared with the south, it is severely short of water due to low precipitation. The 
relocation of grain production has exacerbated the problems of agricultural water use. In 
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the north, intensified agricultural production has led to the over-pumping of groundwater, 
resulting in a rapid drop in the water table (Cao et al 2011). In the south, resources and 
efforts were concentrated on non-agricultural sectors for the sake of economic growth 
while those for agriculture and irrigation were undercut, leading to the breakdown of 
irrigation facilities. In other words, the south-north divide in grain production and water 
problems have been closely associated with the regional patterns of economic 
development in the reform period. 
 
The Chinese government has recognized the gravity of agricultural water problems. In 
1998, huge summer floods in major rivers such as the Yangtze River inflicted tremendous 
damages to agriculture and urban infrastructure, revealing the vulnerability of the system 
of water control and conservancy. The disaster deeply alarmed the central government 
and prompted it to increase investment in the water system thereafter. As the conditions 
of the agricultural water system continued to slide, the government has taken a number of 
measures to counter the trend in the last 10 years. For example, it called to improve 
agricultural infrastructure including the agricultural water system in its annual No.1 
policy document in 2008, a document that signals government priority. In 2011, it used 
the entire No. 1 document to address the issues of agricultural water use, and reiterated 




However, state agencies at both central and local levels tend to prioritize GDP and 
revenue growth, which directs financial and administrative resources to more profitable 
                                                        
3
 The No.1 documents are issued jointly by the CCP Central Committee and the State Council at the 
beginning of every year to signal Chinese central government’s policy priorities. 
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economic sectors in some regions while intensifying agricultural production in others. 
This tendency has exacerbated agricultural water problems and would continue to 
undermine the system in the future. Thus it remains an open question whether increased 
state efforts can solve the aforementioned problems and build a sustainable system of 
agricultural water. In addition, the agricultural water system involves not only state actors 
but also non-state actors. Thus it is equally important to investigate the incentive and 
action of these actors and their impacts on the system.  
 
This dissertation tackles three sets of questions. The first set of questions pertains to state 
policy. How have the national policies of agricultural water use in China evolved in the 
past six to seven decades (1949 to present)? To what extent were water problems in 
China affected by state policies? What factors have been driving water policy changes?  
 
The second set of questions regards policy implementation. Whether have state policies 
that are aimed to improve the agricultural water system been effectively implemented? 
What are the determinants of effective policy implementation at the local level? How 
have center-local relations in China shaped policy implementation? 
 
The third set of questions is related to non-state actors including rural communities, 
households and private enterprises. How are these actors affected by state policies on 
agricultural water? How have their incentives and actions shaped the efforts in building 




1.2 A Review of the Literature 
The problems of agricultural water use, which includes the breakdown of irrigation 
facilities and over-extraction of groundwater, has been a global phenomenon in the last 
four decades. Postel (1999: 54) divides the period after the Second World War into two 
contrasting phases in terms of irrigation development: “the boom years from 1950 to 
1980, and the slowing of irrigation’s expansion since then.” In the boom years, 
governments and international donors had committed large amounts of investment and 
efforts to irrigation, leading to the rapid expansion of irrigated area worldwide except for 
Africa. The irrigation development provided a crucial condition for the success of the 
Green Revolution and contributed greatly to the increase in agricultural output (Bramall 
2000: 133-4; Evenson and Gollin 2003).  
 
Postel’s periodization has correlated with the two distinct phases in post-war economic 
development: the developmentalist era and the neoliberal era (McMichael 2011). The 
developmentalist era was characterized by large governmental investments in 
infrastructure and public services, whereas the neoliberal era witnessed the withdrawal of 
the state from economy, and consequently state investment in infrastructure and public 
services was reduced. Thus the slowing of irrigation expansion in the second phase 
should be primarily attributed to the neoliberal shift since the 1980s.
4
 Irrigation 
development in China largely fitted into this global trend. After decades of intense efforts 
in irrigation and water projects, the Chinese state cut irrigation investment drastically in 
                                                        
4
 The decline in irrigation investment was also due to falling crop prices in the 1980s, which has diminished 
the returns to agricultural water investment considerably, leading to the reduction in efforts after 1980 
(Postel 1999: 60-64). The decreased efforts in irrigation and agriculture may have contributed to the recent 
food crises in 2007/8 (Timmer 2010). 
10 
 
the 1980s, and consequently, irrigation facilities started to crumble and irrigated area 
stagnated.  
 
However, the trend at the global level in the neoliberal era does not suggest the universal 
decline in irrigation in all geographical locations or at all times. As a matter of fact, there 
have been great variations in irrigation and agriculture across time and space. The 
neoliberal doctrine shifted the responsibility of agricultural water investment to private 
owners. In areas where the production of agricultural commodities is profitable or when 
there is a high market demand for these commodities, private owners would have 
increased irrigation investment. However, the expansion of irrigation does not necessarily 
indicate a positive development of the agricultural water system. The profit-motivated 
irrigation investment would overburden the water system and produce harmful social and 
environmental impacts. This can also be seen from the Chinese case. As I will detail in 
this dissertation, irrigated area started to rise again in China in the 1990s (Naughton 2007, 
259-60), but this was achieved mainly by extracting groundwater in the north, which 
increased rather than lessened the stress on the agricultural water system.   
 
The parallel trajectories of China and other countries in agricultural water development 
suggest that the Chinese case holds implications for understanding agricultural water 
problems in general. On the other hand, the studies that examined agricultural water 
problems in other countries can also offer insights for this study. In explaining the 
occurrence of agricultural water problems, scholars have advanced theories at different 
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levels. In what follows, I will review micro-level theories, theories of capitalist 
transformation, and urban bias theory.  
 
Micro-level theories 
The popularity of micro-level theories rose in the neoliberal era following the criticism 
and negation of post-war state-led development. Instead of focusing on the state, scholars 
turned attention to the actors in the market and the civil society (Evans 1997a). There 
have been two main micro-level theories on the investment and management of 
agricultural water in China and elsewhere, which I call community organization theory 
and privatization theory respectively.  
 
The community organization theory argues that neoliberal marketization policies and 
practices have weakened rural community organizations, thus rendering them unable to 
effectively organize farmers to manage agricultural water use. Therefore, the solution is 
to rebuild community organizations such as water-user organizations, villages and 
farmers’ associations, which will involve farmers and manage irrigation projects in a 
community cooperative fashion (Uphoff 1986; Bruns 1993; Meinzen-Dick 1997; Trawick 
2003). This theory is premised on Elinor Ostrom’s argument that communal organizations 
are able to manage common resources based on indigenous practice and a clear definition 
of rights and responsibilities (Ostrom 1990; 1992).    
 
As far as China is concerned, William Hinton argued that the dismantling of the 
commune system was the main factor behind irrigation problems since the market reform 
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in the late 1970s. Concerned with the negative effects of the de-collectivization and 
marketization, he argued that the replacement of the collective system by the Household 
Responsibility System (HRS) had contributed to the breakdown of the irrigation system 
because, without collective organizations, self-interest oriented individuals could not take 
coordinated action to construct and maintain irrigation facilities (Hinton 1990: 144). 
Recent studies also argued that ineffective village organizations in the post-reform period 
prevented households from taking joint action to solve irrigation problems (Luo and He 
2004；Luo 2006a; Luo 2006b; Luo and Wang 2006).  
 
By contrast, the privatization theory, which has become a major discourse in social 
science research after the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s, argues that the problem is 
rooted in the vague property rights of irrigation facilities, many of which were owned by 
the community or the state. The public or collective ownership has made it difficult to 
draw private investment. In addition, irrigation water as a common resource would be 
exploited in an unsustainable fashion, leading to what Hardin calls “the tragedy of the 
commons” (1968). Thus it proposes that the government should privatize irrigation 
facilities, establish tradable property rights of irrigation water, and encourage private 
investment (Rosegrant and Binswanger 1994; Seckler 1993). In China, it has been argued 
that public ownership of irrigation facilities was responsible for their breakdown. Thus an 
effective method to solve this problem is to auction off or lease out the property rights of 
irrigation facilities to private investors, who in turn will take good care of irrigation 




Both community organization theory and privatization theory are a response to the 
neoliberal shift in the 1980s. By focusing on community organization or market 
mechanism, they offered partial explanations for the problems of agricultural water. 
However, neither has taken into account the factors beyond the community or the market. 
This oversight has raised questions about their explanatory power. For example, the 
perspective of community organizations cannot fully explain why peasants are unwilling 
to participate in water management even when effective community organizations are in 
place, as I will show in Chapter 5. In addition, the effectiveness of community 
organizations itself has often been a result of large forces. In the Mao period, it was not 
only community organizations but more importantly the state, which should take credit 
for mobilizing peasants for irrigation projects (more details in Chapter 2). The decline in 
peasant participation in the post-reform period was partly a result of changing state 
behavior, which in turn affected community organizations. In addition, water agencies in 
the reform period have pushed to transfer the responsibility of maintaining and managing 
water projects to villages, for example, establishing water users’ associations, in an effort 
to increase community participation in irrigation. However, such practice has not been 
very successful to increase peasants’ effort in irrigation (Luo 2006b; Luo 2011).  
 
As far as the privatization theory is concerned, the lack of private investment in 
agricultural water projects is not only a matter of public ownership but more importantly, 
the low profitability of such investments in some regions. In the early 1990s, the Chinese 
governments at both local and central levels started to privatize irrigation projects, 
particularly small ones. By 2008, irrigation projects that underwent ownership reform had 
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accounted for about 35 percent of the total (MOWR 2008). However, the privatization 
has not stalled the declining trend of the agricultural water system. In addition, the 
privatization of irrigation facilities would undermine the agricultural water system by 
over-tapping water resources for private profits, as I will show in Chapter 6.      
 
Theories of capitalist transformation  
Neoclassical economic theory that emphasizes comparative advantage and economies of 
scale argues that small farms will lose out to large farms in market competition (eg. 
Schmitt 1991; Hallam 1991). Thus they will either be taken over by large 
farms/agribusiness or use land for purposes other than agricultural production. Despite a 
fierce critic of neoclassical theory, the Marxist theory of capitalist transformation also 
predicts that capitalist large farms will take over small farms, but it advances a much 
nuanced class-centered analysis of the process.   
 
Marxist scholars posit that capitalism is a mighty transformative force that will create 
new class relations in the countryside. In this process, small-scale agricultural production 
will disappear and be replaced by capitalist large farms. Peasants, who usually own small 
pieces of land and are engaged in small-scale farming, will be proletarianized as 
capitalism transforms the countryside and turns peasants into landless rural laborers or 
urban workers (eg. Brenner 1976; Hobsbawn 1994: 288-291; Moyo and Yeros, 2005:19). 
In addition, capitalist transformation within one country will be facilitated by the 
expansion of transnational agribusiness companies and foreign investments (Engdahl 
2007; McMichael 2007, 2009; Pringle 2003: 13-15; Shiva 2000). Moreover, capitalism 
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(both national and global) weakens the peasantry through diverting resources, including 
land, labor, capital and water, from agriculture and the countryside to industry and the 
city. For example, with the expansion of urban-industrial capitalism in developing 
countries after the Second World War, many rural laborers left the countryside for cities, 
and more and more farmland was used for urban construction and industry (eg. Warren 
1973; Moyo and Yeros 2005:13, 27; Bernstein 2000:33, 39; Basu 2007).    
 
Theories of capitalist transformation hold implications for understanding the problems of 
the agricultural water system. As capitalism erodes peasant communities, the irrigation 
system that is based on and serve peasant communities would decline and be replaced by 
a new system that serves large capitalist farms. However, the transformation to capitalism 
would be a long process, particularly in countries like China where the peasant 
population is enormous. As I will show in this dissertation, the irrigation system based on 
peasant communities is still firmly in place, and the newly emerged capitalist large farms 
have to rely on this old system. The new irrigation system that specifically serves large 
farms has only begun to emerge, and its further expansion would require drastic 
intervention from the state.  
  
Another related theory, urban bias theory, deals with the issue how urban and industrial 
capitalism has diverted resources such as capital, labor, land and water away from rural 
sectors to urban-industrial sectors. Given that China is experiencing rapid urbanization in 




Urban bias theory 
Urban bias theory argues that state policy favoring urban-industrial sectors over the 
countryside has been the source of rural poverty and agricultural backwardness in the less 
developed countries (Lipton 1977; Bates 1981). Urban-biased policies undermine 
agriculture and irrigation because it reduces investments in rural infrastructure and drain 
human resources away from the countryside. Urban bias scholars observed that economic 
growth in the post-war period, which was associated with urbanization and 
industrialization, did not significantly improve the rural situation in many developing 
countries, and rural populations continued to suffer food shortages, malnutrition, poverty 
and short life expectancy (Lipton 1975, 1977, 1993; Bezemer and Headey 2008).  
 
Urban bias theory can account for many water problems in China. As I will show 
throughout the dissertation, the Chinese governments, at both central and local levels, 
have wholeheartedly embraced urbanization and regarded it as the synonym of 
development. With such a strong preference for urban expansion, urban and industrial 
sectors are given priority when the governments are allocating resources.   
 
One limitation of the theory is that it oversimplifies the role of the state in policy making, 
and fails to see that some national governments at certain times are also concerned with 
food security, food sovereignty, and protection of small rural producers. The debates over 
the existence of rural-bias policy, that is, state policy favors rural areas over the city, 
reveal the complicated role of the state in policy making (Varshney 1993). In addition, the 
governments of some East Asian societies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
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implemented policies that were much less urban biased and even pro-rural as compared 
with many countries in Africa and Latin America (Ho 1978; Wade 1990; Moore 1993; 
Mao and Chi 1995; Francks, Boestel and Kim 1999). As far as China is concerned, food 
security and food sovereignty pursued through food self-sufficiency, has also been an 
important goal of the Chinese state, particularly at the central level. This goal has 
periodically forced the state’s attention back to the agricultural water system as we can 
see from the pro-rural and pro-irrigation policies issued by the central government in the 
recent decade.  
 
1.3 Irrigation Expansion and the Neoliberal Shift 
The literature review reveals the complex interactions between factors at various levels. 
At the global level, the shift to neoliberalism has reduced agricultural water investment 
and slowed irrigation expansion while the expansion of capitalism worldwide would 
undermine agricultural water systems that serve small farms and peasant communities. At 
the national level, the state plays a very important role by distributing resources between 
agricultural water and urban-industrial sectors. At the local and community levels, 
community organizations and market mechanisms will shape individual actors’ interest 
and capability in coping with agricultural water problems. Therefore, it is an enormous 
task to capture the complex process of agricultural water development. This section 
introduces Chinese experiences in agricultural water development as it shifted from the 
developmentalist to the neoliberal era.  
 
The evolution of the agricultural water system in China has been closely associated with 
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political change. After taking national power in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party 
made great effort to build irrigation infrastructure. By 1978, 41 million hectares of 
farmland were irrigated in China, more than three times that in 1952 (Bramall 2000: 136-
8; Gu eds 1999: 7; Chapter 2). The irrigation expansion in the Mao period possessed the 
features of a developmentalist era when the state greatly invested in water projects.  
Furthermore, the US-led embargo forced China to rely on domestic production for food 
supply (Friedmann 1982; Perkins 1969; Yan, Chen and Ku 2016). Facing a rapidly 
growing population, the country had no option but to improve its agricultural water 
system as a main means to increase grain production. It was so fixated on grain 
production that it restricted peasants to divert land and other resources to non-grain crops 
(Friedman, Pickowicz and Selden 1991).  
 
Although the Chinese state was a major factor in the expansion of water infrastructure, 
other factors must not be overlooked. First of all, community organizations played an 
important role. In the Mao period, the Chinese state extended formal administration down 
to the village level, and established collective grassroots organizations such as production 
teams, brigades and communes (Schurmann 1968). Under the collective system, these 
community organizations were very effective in mobilizing rural laborers and households 
to construct and maintain irrigation projects during the slack winter period (Bramall 
2000: 137; Nickum 1978). This demonstrates that community organizations can be more 
effective if they are sanctioned, coordinated and supported by the state. The Chinese state 
mobilized human and material resources across communities, and coordinated hundreds 
of community organizations to work together on large irrigation projects, which could not 
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be done by any individual community organization alone. The effectiveness of the state-
community partnership in economic development was also observed in other societies, 
particularly in East Asia (1997b; Ostrom 1992).  
 
China also pursued industrialization in this developmentalist era, particularly the creation 
and expansion of heavy industries, in an attempt to catch up with developed countries. 
Without access to sufficient foreign capital, the Chinese state chose to transfer 
agricultural surplus to finance urban industry through “price scissors,” a policy which 
suppressed the prices of agricultural goods and undermined agricultural development and 
rural livelihoods (Oi 1993). This contradiction in Maoist policies stemmed from different 
development goals. On the one hand, the country desired to pursue industrialization. The 
motivation came from both developmentalist ideology and a competitive global capitalist 
system. Chinese elites believed that, to survive and compete in the system, the country 
must develop itself through industrialization (Bo 1991: 280-281). This goal entailed the 
concentration of resources in industrial sectors. On the other hand, however, the country 
must feed a vast and rapidly growing population; otherwise it would lead to disasters and 
shake the legitimacy of the rule, as seen in the famine following the Great Leap Forward 
(Bramall 2008: 118-141). The security of food supply requires allocating resources to 
agricultural production, particularly grain production. The tension between the goal of 
industrialization and food security had thus shaped Maoist policy and pulled it toward 
opposite directions.  
 
In the developmentalist era, the Maoist state was nearly in total control of the economy. 
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Thus it could to some extent balance these two contradictory goals. With regard to 
agricultural water, it devoted a significant share of public expenditure to agricultural 
water and managed to construct a large number of irrigation facilities by mobilizing both 
state and community resources (Fan, Zhang and Zhang 2004; Nolan and White 1984).  
 
However, after the shift to the market economy in the neoliberal era, the central 
government had withdrawn itself from much of irrigation investment in the 1980s (Qian 
and Ma 2009). The expenditure on the agricultural water system was cut in half in the 
1980s (NBS 2009: 74). This had led to the breakdown of irrigation facilities and exerted a 
negative effect on agricultural production (MOWR 2008). The central government 
increased irrigation investment from 5.02 billion yuan in 1991 to 25.88 billion yuan in 
1997 (NBS 2009: 74). However, the increase was modest at most as compared with the 
overall increase in infrastructure investment in the 1990s, a period when China started a 
high wave of fixed assets investment in coastal regions and large cities (NBS 2009: 74). 
Many scholars argued that the decline in state support had been a key factor causing 
agricultural water problems in the 1980s and 1990s (Muldavin 1997; Fan, Zhang and 
Zhan 2004; Bramall 2008: 341).  
 
However, the issue of food security did not go away. Without sufficient investments and 
efforts, the agricultural water system started to experience more and more problems in the 
1990s. Frequent natural disasters such as floods and droughts inflicted damages on 
farmland and infrastructure, culminating in disastrous summer floods in 1998. These 
events had forced the Chinese state to further increase investment in the agricultural 
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water system, particularly after 1998 (Gu eds 1999: 8-9). In the meantime, the pursuit of 
urban-industrial growth in the 1990s had severely undermined agricultural production, 
leading to the emergence of a rural crisis in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Li 2008). 
Grain production fell and the strategic grain reserve was depleted in the initial years of 
the new century, prompting the central government to take immediate actions (Fan, 
Zhang and Zhang 2004).     
 
To boost grain production, the Chinese state has devoted ever more resources to the 
agricultural water system after 1998, and the share of irrigation in total infrastructure 
investment has approached that in the Mao period in recent years. However, the social, 
economic and institutional contexts in the neoliberal era have been vastly different from 
those in the developmentalist era, that is, the Mao period. While the central government 
in the Mao period could mobilize human and material resources down to the village level 
through the centralized bureaucracy and the planning system, it was no longer possible in 
the recent decades due to the rise of neoliberal principles centering on the market and 
profits in the past four decades. The next section will construct an analytical framework 
to understand this new situation.  
 
1.4 Profitability and Food Security: Structural Dilemma in the Neoliberal Era 
The neoliberal shift coincided with the market reform in China, which replaced collective 
farming with household farming. Although farmland is still collectively owned in a 
village, its use rights are distributed to individual households. The market has become a 
main rule governing households’ resource allocation. In general, rural households tend to 
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allocate resources to economic activities that yield greater returns in the market (Luo and 
He 2004; Luo 2006a). Another significant change along with the neoliberal shift was the 
decentralization of the state, which gave much more freedom to local governments in 
making economic decisions. Jean Oi (1999) used “local state corporatism” to characterize 
the behavior of Chinese local governments which tend to maximize local revenue by 
supporting and promoting profitable economic activities such as rural industry.  
 
In short, as China has shifted to a market economy in the neoliberal era, a main principle 
that determines farmers’ behavior, private investors and local policy is economic returns. 
For farmers and rural laborers, it is household income; for private investors, it is profit; 
for the governments, it is revenue. I use the concept “profitability” to capture all three. 
Profitability refers to a principle that actors and organizations tend to choose or support 
sectors and economic activities that could generate greater economic returns. This 
principle is contextually based, and one kind of economic activity or sector would be 
highly profitable in one context but not in another. For instance, grain farming is not 
profitable in many southern provinces but is profitable in some northern provinces where 
the size of landholding is relatively large. The profitability principle is often at odds with 
the goal of food security because agricultural production in many cases is less 
remunerative than nonfarm activities. As a result, local actors including local 
governments tend to allocate resources and efforts to nonfarm sectors rather than invest in 
agricultural water, and this is particularly so in coastal and southern provinces where 




However, as a country that depends very much on irrigation for agricultural production, it 
must keep the agricultural water system functioning well to meet the growing food 
demand. The contradiction between profitability and food security thus constitutes the 
structural dilemma of agricultural water in the neoliberal era.  
 
The issue of food security is of crucial importance not only because it serves to reproduce 
the capitalist social order but also because it has much to do with the nature of state 
power. Scholars argued that the logic of state power is different from that of capital, 
though the two are interrelated. While the goal of capital is profit maximization and 
capital accumulation, the state pursues power and status in the international state system, 
and seeks to control home territories and populations, that is, to maintain internal rule and 
order (Arrighi 1994; Arrighi and Beverly 2001; Skocpol 1979: 22). In the case of China, 
food security serves both goals. Food security allows the country to maintain food 
sovereignty and exercise more power in the state system. In addition, sufficient food 
supply can maintain social stability and legitimize the rule of the state.  
 
The contradiction between profitability and the legitimacy of the state has also been 
discussed in the scholarship. For example, in examining mounting labor unrest in China, 
Ching Kwan Lee argued that Chinese political economy in the reform period was beset 
by the contradiction between profitability and legitimation (2007: 18-19). Economic 
growth resulted in intensified inequality and social dislocation that undermine regime 
legitimacy. To counter the trend, the state had to maintain basic livelihood protection for 
the unemployed and the poor.  
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This dissertation frames the agricultural water crisis in a similar fashion. It argues that the 
crisis and the measures taken to tackle it derive from the structural dilemma characterized 
by the contradiction between profitability and food security. The contradiction plays out 
most acutely at the center since the central government represents state power in the 
international state system and is concerned about regime legitimacy. As noted above, the 
central government has been shifting its stance on agricultural water. In the 1980s, it 
reduced irrigation investment substantially but was forced to increase it thereafter due to 
the gravity of emerging water problems. However, the increase in irrigation investment 
has not mitigated the contradiction effectively. Rather, it reinforces the South-North 
divide of agricultural water problems in China. As Chapter 3 will reveal, with the 
assistance of central funds, northern provinces have expanded irrigated area and 
increased grain production considerably, but this has exacerbated the problem of 
groundwater over-extraction and accelerated the depletion of aquifers. In the south, 
however, the arrival of central funds, as generous as they are, is unable to dampen the 
enthusiastic embrace of provincial and local governments for urban and industrial 
growth. As a result, increased irrigation investment might have slowed the breakdown of 
irrigation facilities in the south, but it has not reversed the declining trend of the 
agricultural water system.   
 
As local governments prioritize profitability over food security, the central government 
has to make efforts to bring them into the line through bureaucratic orders, market 
interventions, and material and non-material incentives. The intervention of the central 
government has been more successful in the north than in the south with regard to 
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shoring up grain production. This is because many northern regions depend on 
agriculture and central funds for a substantial proportion of local income and revenue. In 
recent years, however, many northern regions have also started to push for the expansion 
of industrial and urban sectors. Chapter 4 will reveal how central-local relations have 
affected the implementation of central policies.  
 
At the community level, the agricultural water system is affected by agrarian transition 
from household farming to capitalist farming, which in many cases has sharpened the 
contradiction between food security and profitability. The transition undermines the 
capability of rural communities to take collective action, and farmers are often left on 
their own to solve water problems. Large capitalist farms are much more capable than 
small farmers in gaining access to agricultural water, thus these farms would win out in 
competition for agricultural water in the future. In addition, the rural economy has been 
increasingly diversified. Rural laborers not only work in agriculture but also engage in 
non-farm activities. Millions of rural laborers have migrated out of the countryside into 
the city in search of employment and business opportunities. Chapters 5 and 6 will 
examine the contradiction and its impact on agriculture water development at the 
community level based on empirical case studies. Figure 1-2 illustrates how the 
contradiction has affected actors at the three levels and contributed to the emerging 






Figure 1-2 The contradiction of agricultural water development in China 
 
 
Based on the above analyses, this dissertation proposes three theses.  
 
First, the agricultural water crisis in China in the neoliberal era has its roots in the 
capitalist logic of profit maximization. To achieve higher rates of profit, state and non-
state actors in China tend to allocate human and material resources to sectors and 
activities that would generate greater economic returns, while neglecting the long-term 
sustainability of the agricultural water system. In south China where the economy is most 
industrialized and urbanized, it has led to the breakdown of irrigation facilities. In north 
China, the pursuit of profitability has led to the intensification of grain production and the 
over-extraction of groundwater.  
 
Second, although the concern over food security increased government funding in 
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agricultural water, it has also facilitated the geographical movement of grain production 
from South to North, which exacerbates the mismatch between water resources and grain 
production. In addition, the concern over food security has led to the governments 
supporting large farms based on a belief that these farms are more efficient in producing 
grains.  
 
Finally, capitalist transformation and social differentiation in the countryside have 
undermined the capability of rural communities to take collective action to solve water 
problems. Although the newly arisen large farms are able to invest more resources in 
agricultural water, their behavior is also based on profitability rather than the health of the 
agricultural water system. The case study in the north shows that profit-oriented large 
farms are most aggressive in extracting groundwater. In addition, the differentiation of 
the rural society has made the distribution of water resources increasingly unequal, 
favoring agribusiness and large farms over common farming households.  
 
1.5 Methodology, Data Collection and Organization of the Dissertation 
This study employs a multilevel analysis and the relational-comparative method to guide 
data collection and analysis. It has investigated the nature of the agricultural water crisis 
and the measures taken to tackle it at three levels: central, local and community (village). 
At the central level, it examines central policy changes on the agricultural water system 
before and after the neoliberal shift. At the local level, it focuses on the county 
government. As policy implementer and local policy maker, the county government can 
best represent local state interests, and its decision making will directly affect the 
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agricultural water system. The community/village level involves multiple actors, 
including official village organizations, informal social and economic groups, rural 
households and agribusiness companies.   
 
In addition, this study carried out two comparisons. One comparison is to compare two 
county cases—one county is located in the south of China and the other in the north. The 
relational-comparative method is similar to Charles Tilly’s categorization of 
“encompassing comparison” (1984: 81-84), but it pays more attention to the variation 
between cases than the latter. The relational-comparative method sees the cases being 
compared not as independent units, as the conventional comparative approach does, but 
as interdependent units, in which the changes in one case will affect others within the 
same system. The relational comparison aims to find variations between the southern 
county and the northern one, and to examine the linkages between them in the 
agricultural water system. The case study method is also used to examine policy 
implementation at the local levels, the changes in local policies, the roles of villages, 
households and agribusiness companies. In addition, it compares the agricultural water 
system with the rural road system, both of which belong to rural infrastructure. The water 
system mainly serves agriculture while roads are related more closely to nonagricultural 
activities. The comparison reveals the differences in local efforts devoted to agricultural 
water and roads.   
 
Case selection 
Of the two county cases, the southern county is located in Hunan Province and the 
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northern county in Inner Mongolia. They are psyedomized as Southern County and 
Northern County respectively. Figure 1-3 shows their approximate locations.   
 
Figure 1-3 Locations of the two counties 
 
 
The two counties represent two common systems of agriculture as well as reflect the 
South-North divide in the agricultural water system. Southern County, with a population 
of 1.38 million, represents many parts of south China in terms of agricultural production: 
farm size is small, with only 0.07 ha. per person; farmers grow water-loving crops such 
as rice and irrigate farms mainly with surface water. Flood control is a very important 
task for the water system. In addition, Southern County has experienced rapid 
industrialization and urbanization since the 1990s. Partly as a result, local efforts on the 
agricultural water system has been undercut, leading to the collapse of dams, the silting 
up of canals and the breakdown of pumping stations, while at the same time an increasing 




By contrast, Northern County, with a population of 600,000, represents many regions in 
north China, where farm size is relatively large, 0.4 ha. per person. Farmers grow 
drought-resistant crops and rely on groundwater for irrigation. In Northern County, 
industrial and urban sectors are less developed than those in Southern County, and 
agriculture still accounts for a significant share of the local economy. Local actors have 
intensified efforts to withdraw groundwater for agricultural production, and consequently 
grain output has been increased in the last two decades. The over-pumping of water from 
underground exacerbated water shortage problem and created a chronic water crisis.  
 
In each county, I selected a few villages for community-level investigation. The selection 
was aimed to diversify the factors at the village level, such as per capita land holding, 
accessibility to water, the quality of irrigation facilities, distance to the nearest city, etc. 
(more details in Chapters 5 and 6).  
   
Data collection 
Archival research and semi-structured interviews were employed to gather data.  
 
For the central level, I collected national policies and statistical data for both the Mao era 
and post-reform era in order to determine the causes and extent of the agricultural water 
crisis. The policies and statistics examined include those on public spending, taxation, 




For the county-level investigation, I combined archival research and in-depth interviews 
in data collection. I collected local policy documents and gazetteers from local 
government agencies. I also interviewed local officials at both county- and township 
levels. In Southern County, I have interviewed 32 local officials either in groups or 
individually. In Northern County, I have conducted 20 such interviews. These officials 
came from various government agencies, including the Bureau of Agriculture, the Bureau 
of Water Resources, the Bureau of Transportation, the Bureau of Finance and the 
Committee of Development and Reform. The interviews with local officials provided rich 
information on policy implementation, local policy priorities and officials’ personal 
experiences and opinions.  
 
In each village, I interviewed village officials for the information on irrigation facilities, 
water management, roads, agricultural production, non-agricultural activities and the 
changes over time. In addition, I selected 20 to 30 households for in-depth, semi-
structured interviews. In total I conducted 201 interviews, 102 in Southern County and 99 
in Northern County.  
 
Organization of the dissertation 
In addition to the introduction and conclusion, this dissertation comprises five chapters. 
Chapter 2 examines the expansion of the agricultural water system in the Mao period. It 
explains how the contradiction between the developmentalist project (industrialization) 
and food security were solved by mobilizing millions of rural labor for water projects. 
However, the success was achieved at heavy cost, that is, rural populations were subject 
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to the domination of the collective system and were forced to take part in these projects 
under the condition of food shortage and malnutrition while rural surplus was extracted 
and invested in urban and industrial sectors.  
 
Chapter 3 examines the mismatch between water resources and grain production in the 
post-reform period. The industrial and urban expansion in the south pushed grain 
production to the north while the central government promoted grain production in the 
north due to the concern for food security. As a result, the water-scarce north started to 
export surplus grain to the water-rich south, reversing the centuries-old trend. Chapter 4 
focuses on politics of water investment in the light of central-local relations. It reveals 
that, although the central government has greatly increased water investments in this 
century, the effects of the investment were diluted due to the actions of local government.    
 
Chapters 5 and 6 move down to the sub-county level and examine the impacts of rural 
transformations on the behavior of peasants and private investors in agricultural water 
use. Chapter 5 uses the southern case to illustrate how social differentiation of the rural 
society, the diversification of the rural economy in particular, has rendered villages 
unable to take collective actions on water management. Chapter 6 assesses the impact of 
intensified grain production and groundwater extraction on the environment in Northern 
County, and examines rising water demand from industrial and urban sectors. It shows 
that access to water is a crucial factor in social differentiation, and vice versa. Large 
farms and agribusiness companies are in a more advantageous position of controlling 
water, whereas small farmers tend to lose out and have to seek employment elsewhere.  
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Chapter 2     The Water-Food Nexus in the Mao Era 
 
Water control had been one of the most important tasks in imperial China (Wang and Hu 
2011:99; Zhang 2007:80; Wang & Zhang 1990:10-15). The country is home to a great 
number of rivers, of which more than 5,000 are relatively large, with a watershed area 
(including attached lakes, streams, etc.) more than 100 square km (Wang & Zhang 
1990:5-7). These rivers frequently flooded, often causing serious famine. Thus authorities 
and society were prompted to take actions to control and manage water. And these 
actions had in turn shaped social, political and economic institutions in the Chinese 
history. 
 
This chapter focuses on the water-food nexus in the Mao period (1949-1978). After 
offering a brief account of water control in the imperial history, the chapter will detail 
how China in the Mao period greatly expanded the irrigation capacity of its water system. 
The primary motivation for this expansion was the need to feed a large yet growing 
population. However, it was Maoist political institutions and rural collective 
organizations that made the expansion possible. In addition, the large-scale mobilization 
of rural laborers through collective organizations partly solved the contradiction in 
resource allocation to competing sectors: either to urban industry or to the agricultural 
water system.   
 




The popular legend of Yu the Great traces water control in China to over 4,000 years ago. 
Yu the Great, was a legendary ruler in ancient China and was famous for using drainage 
to control flood. His success lifted him to be the first ruler of the Xia dynasty, the very 
first dynasty recorded in Chinese history. Imperial China was an agrarian society 
vulnerable to frequent water-related disasters such as floods and droughts. Between 206 
BC and 1949, there were 1,029 severe floods and 1,056 severe droughts in the 2,155 
years, approximately a severe disaster every year on average (Zhu and Zhao 2002:16). To 
control floods and harness water resources, China built a number of impressive large-
scale water projects. One of these is the Dujiangyan irrigation system located in Sichuan 
Province in western China, which was constructed circa 256 BC for the purpose of flood 
control and irrigation. The irrigation system is still in use today and can irrigate more 
than 10 million mu of arable land (Gu, eds. 1999:38; Wang & Zhang 1990:18-19; Zhang 
2007:80).  
 
The success in water control allowed China to achieve relatively high levels of 
agricultural productivity even prior to the onset of agricultural modernization (Perkins 
1969; Wang and Zhang 1990: 28-32). In addition, water control profoundly shaped and 
was shaped by bureaucratic and social organizations in China. Karl Wittfogel (1957: 18-
22, 165) called imperial China a “hydraulic society.” He argued that the construction and 
maintenance of large-scale water works required an enormous labor force, and the need 
for a comprehensive organization of labor and other resources often resulted in despotic 
forms of central state control with total power. Wittfogel’s sweeping claim on the 
association between the hydraulic society and despotism has been disputed by scholars 
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(Geertz 1981; Lansing 1991; Perdue 1982; Will 1985). In the case of China, Will (1985) 
found that the development of hydraulic infrastructure in Hubei Province fell beyond the 
Wittfogelian model of oriental despotism. He proposed a cyclical pattern instead: 
development-(crisis)-recession, or phase A to phase B, and argued that the central state’s 
power for action on water control was rather limited, particularly so during the Phase B 
of maintenance period after the active (re)construction at the beginning of Phase A led by 
the state. The local and private interests got more involved in water control than 
suggested, and he critiqued Wittfogel for only focusing on the centralized hydraulic 
system. Peter Perdue (1982) also showed that important irrigation projects were often 
carried out by rural elites at the local level from his research of the Dongting Lake in 
Hunan Province. These local elites, rural gentry members in particular, took a prominent 
role in raising money, mobilizing and coordinating labor for the construction and 
maintenance of water projects, sometimes in conflict with central state’s interests. Will 
(1985) and Perdue’s (1982) critique of Wittfogel has drawn attention to the significant 
roles of local government and private investors, which I will also emphasize throughout 
this dissertation.  
 
While Wittfogel’s grand thesis undoubtedly simplified and exaggerated the connection 
between water control and political structures in China, it is evident that Chinese dynastic 
cycles had been closely associated with the expansion and breakdown of the system of 
water control (Wang & Zhang 1990:10-21). Irrigation led to population growth. This 
population was then dependent on the irrigation system and vulnerable to water shotages 
when this system deteriorated or failed to deliver the amount of water it required. When 
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the imperial state was unable to maintain the system of water control, floods and other 
water-related disasters would lead to food shortages and famines, giving rise to rebellions 
from below, which would eventually contribute to the downfall of the dynasty. The rulers 
of a new dynasty took great effort to improve the system of water control and improve 
irrigation conditions, leading to agricultural development and a new cycle of economic 
prosperity. Chi (1936) showed that the prosperity and importance of an economic region 
in China had been highly correlated with irrigation development. In addition, the ruling 
elites in China were often those who were able to control the regions where irrigation 
conditions were the best. The Chinese history witnessed impressive development spurts 
of water system in these three periods respectively: Qin and Han dynasties (221BC-220), 
Sui and Tang dynasties (581-907), and Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties (1271-1911), 
which were the three most prosperous periods prior to the onset of modernization in the 
19
th





Paradoxically, the onset of modernization in China in the 19th century was concurrent 
with another dynastic decline, which was associated with the breakdown of water 
facilities. Starting from the mid-19
th
 century, the Qing dynasty’s water system gradually 
                                                        
5
 There were similar cases in other parts of the world. Postel (1999:18) wrote: “We can only partially know 
the appropriate lessons to draw from the Akkadian demise. One overarching message is that a thriving, 
integrated, resourceful society can collapse abruptly from a cascade of ecological events. The irrigated 
agriculture that enabled this empire to expand well beyond anything previously known also became a 






declined, and was even severely damaged in some regions due to the negligence of the 
central state. Political corruption and fiscal deficiency inside the state apparatus, peasant 
rebellions from below and military invasion from outside, jointly led to this inability of 
the Qing empire. Although the encounter with the West brought new technologies, this 
did not prevent the water system from further declining (YRCC 1982: 319－365; Wang 
& Zhang 1990: 450-451; IWHR 1989: 256,390).  
 
During the late Qing Dynasty and Republican Era (1911-1949), the works of large rivers 
such as the Yellow River, the Yangtze River, the Huai River and the Pearl River, which 
are the backbone of the Chinese water system, experienced significant decline due to a 
lack of proper maintenance from the state and non-state actors (IWHR 1989: 390). Take 
the Yellow River, which is called the mother river of China, as an example. The lower 
part of the Yellow River was one of the most flooded areas during the late Qing and the 
Republican Era (IWHR 1989: 392). In the last sixty years of the Qing dynasty (1851-
1911), there were 32 years when the Yellow River embankment experienced serious 
collapses (juekou), often in multiple places (YRCC 1982: 358-365). The poor 
maintenance of river infrastructure reduced its capacity to fight floods and irrigate 
farmland, lowered agricultural productivity, and caused severe hunger in multiple regions 
(IWHR 1989: 262-265).  
 
In the Republican period, negligence, civil wars and the Sino-Japanese War jointly 
exacerbated the conditions of agricultural water systems. In the 38 years of 1911-49, the 
Yellow River suffered serious embankment collapses in 17 years, leading to widespread 
38 
 
hunger and outmigration in the affected regions (YRCC 1982: 370,378). For example, the 
collapse in 1929 displaced more than 34 million people, the highest record in the past 
three centuries (YRCC 1982: 389). The Yangtze River, the longest river in China, was 
also in a dire situation. There were many lakes associated with the river, including the 
Dongting Lake, a very large lake in Hunan Province. However, due to enclosure for 
farmland and a lack of proper maintenance and management, the storage capacity of 
these lakes and their capacity of flood control were greatly reduced. For instance, the 
Dongting lake region experienced a serious flood every 83 years before the Ming dynasty, 
once every 20 years in the Ming and Qing dynasties, and once every 5 years during the 
Republican era (IWHR 1989: 274).  
 
In sum, the water system underwent a secular decline in the late Qing. By 1949 when the 
CCP took over national power, the water control system was fraught with serious 
problems and unable to mitigate the impact of natural disasters effectively, and irrigation 
capacity was also extremely limited. 
 
2.2 Water Control and Irrigation Expansion (1949-1978) 
In 1949, the effective irrigated area in China was 15.93 million ha., only 16.3 percent of 
the total farmland nationwide (MOWR 1990: 633). The communist state took no respite 
and started immediately to rebuild the national water system. This commitment to water 
control and irrigation was in line with traditional practices in imperial times, as noted 
above. It was also due to the pressing need to recover agriculture production to feed 
China’s growing population and to develop the national economy (Wang 2012: 5-6). 
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China in the Mao period achieved a great success in rebuilding and improving its 
agricultural water system. It outpaced many other developing countries with regard to 
irrigation expansion in this period. In addition, the country built irrigation works mainly 
through its own efforts since it was unable to receive the aid from Western countries in 
the Cold War period (Bramall 2009: 221-222). Between 1949 and 1978, the country 
completed more than 50,000 large-scale water projects including 311 large reservoirs, 
and 20 million small-scale irrigation works, and established 5,600 large irrigated zones 
(MOF 2007; Gu, eds. 1999: 19). The effective irrigated area tripled, up from 15.93 








                                                        
6
 The numbers on irrigated area vary in different sources, but all sources pointed to the rapid expansion. 
Naughton (2007: 259) shows that the irrigated area had increased from less than 17 million hectares (255 
million mu) in 1952 to around 38 million hectares (around 570 million mu) in 1978; China Statistical 
Yearbook (NBS 1992: 343) shows that the irrigated land was 299 million mu in 1952 and 674 million mu in 
1978; Bramall (2009:225) shows that the irrigated area was only 200.4 million mu in 1952 and increased to 
614.2 million mu in 1978.  
7
 Data source: MOWR 1990 (633). The data for the year of 1970 was derived from China Compendium of 























The expansion of the agricultural water system in the Mao period can be divided into 
three phases, punctuated by the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Unlike 
many other policies, Maoist policies on water control and irrigation were highly 
consistent, characterized by the unwavering commitment to strengthening the water 
system to mitigate the impact of natural disasters and expand the nation’s capacity of 
irrigation and water control.  
 
The first phase (1949-1957) 
The first phase included the three years of economic recovery (1949-1952) and the First 
Five-Year Plan period (1952-1957). In October 1949, China established the Ministry of 
Water Resources as the national authority of water control and management, and held the 
first national meeting on irrigation in Beijing in November of the same year, which set an 
agenda prioritizing flood control and irrigation water provision for agriculture (Luo 2011; 
Wang and Hu 2011:105-106). Efforts were focused on major rivers and lakes, and the 
goal was to quickly restore the capacity of water control and irrigation. Major measures 
included repairing the embankments of large rivers, building large and medium-size 
irrigation projects along these rivers, and mobilizing peasants for small irrigation projects 
(MOWR 1999: 26).  
 
The first priority was to improve the conditions of major rivers such as the Yellow River, 
the Yangtze River, the Huai River and the Hai River (Gu eds. 1999: 143; Wang and Hu 
2011:106). Take the Huai River, which is located between the Yellow River and the 
Yangtze River, as an example. The river is approximately 1,000 km in length and covers 
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an area of around 190,000 square km. It runs through five provinces from west to east: 
Hubei, Henan, Shandong, Anhui and Jiangsu. The river is historically vulnerable to 
flooding.
8
 In 1950, the Huai River suffered a devastating embankment collapse, which 
caught Mao’s attention, and he subsequently called for a major action to improve the 
conditions of the river. The project on the Huai river was the first one that Communist 
China undertook to deal with the problems of a major river comprehensively. It took six 
years to complete the project, with more than 2,840 km of embankment repaired or 
rebuilt, along with many other measures (MOWR 1956:26-30). The Yangtze River and 
the Yellow River received similar attention in the same period. About 3,160 km of 
embankment was repaired or rebuilt for the Yangtze River and 1,820 km for the Yellow 
River (MOWR 1956: 16, 50).  
 
In addition, a number of projects were constructed to harness water for agricultural use 
from these major rivers, their branch rivers and attached lakes. The country built more 
than 100 large and medium-size reservoirs and many other major water projects in the 
1950s (Gu eds. 1999: 143). For example, a large canal was built to divert water from the 
Yellow River to the Wei River (later called the People’s Victory Canal) in Henan 
Province in 1951-1953. This increased irrigated area by 39,000 hectares, doubling the 
wheat production and producing extra 50 million kilograms of grains in the region 
(MOWR 1956: 18-19, 59).  
 
                                                        
8
 See the official website of the Huai River Water Resources Commission:  




The Chinese state also encouraged rural communities and peasants to build and improve 
small irrigation facilities (Wang 2012: 8; MOWR 1999:10-11). These include ponds, 
small dams, small reservoirs, canals and dikes in the south, and canals, wells and water 
wheels in the north. The government provided financial and technical support for 
peasants to build these irrigation projects. A useful practice that echoed other Maoist 
policies was that the state dispatched technicians and water engineers to the countryside 
to build demonstration projects and hold training programs for many peasants so that they 
could later work on the projects on their own. In the winter of 1954 alone, for instance, 
seven provinces including Sichuan and Zhejiang trained more than 48,000 peasant 
technicians through constructing demonstration irrigation projects (MOWR 1956: 57).   
 
As a result of these efforts, the capacity of the water system to mitigate water-related 
disasters was greatly enhanced and irrigated area was expanding at an annual rate of eight 
percent. The total irrigated area increased from around 15.93 million ha. in 1949 to 19.34 




The second phase (1958-1965) 
The second phase started with the Great Leap Forward and saw a great expansion of the 
agricultural water system. The majority of China’s large and medium-size dams and 
reservoirs and large irrigation zones that exist today were planned, started to be built or 
completed during this period, along with millions of small irrigation projects (MOWR 
                                                        
9
 According to Bramall (2000:136-138), irrigated area increased from 200.5 million mu (13.37 million ha.) 
in 1952 to 296 million mu (19.73 million ha.) in 1957.   
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1999: 13, 27). The construction of two large reservoirs in my two research sites, one in 
each site, were both started in 1958 and finished in 1965. 
 
In October 1957, China issued a Twelve-year (1956-1967) National Agricultural Plan 
(quanguo nongye fazhan gangyao),
 10
 which called to focus on building medium-size and 
small water projects with the contribution from rural collective organizations and 
households, while at the same time paying attention to large irrigation works 
(Renminribao 1957). Constructing these irrigation projects was stated as one of the 
reasons for the collectivization campaigns, which organized rural households into rural 
cooperatives and collectivized their assets including land. As I will show below, 
collectivization had a very positive effect on the construction and coordination of water 
projects (MOWR 1956: 66-67).  
 
On September 24, 1957, the Chinese state called to mobilize rural laborers nationwide to 
construct irrigation projects for winter 1957 and spring 1958 (Wang 2012:55; Li 
2010:113). It was estimated that rural laborers contributed more than 13 billion labor 
days in this winter-spring irrigation campaign alone, and they completed more than 25 
billion cubic meters of earth stonework (Li 2010: 114). This large campaign on irrigation 
was the prelude to the Great Leap Forward, and was only the beginning of a series of 
winter and spring irrigation campaigns in the following years in the Mao period (Wu 
2006:14; Wang 2008:123). 
                                                        
10
 The first draft of this national agricultural plan was proposed in January 1956 and was revised in 1957. 
The plan was officially approved in April 1960. See: Zhang 2009:8; Eckstein 1975:20.  
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The state hoped to use collective organizations to mobilize rural labors to construct 
public infrastructures, particularly water projects in order to enhance agricultural 
productivity (Bramall 2009:213; Naughton 2007: 69). Collective organizations such as 
rural cooperatives, brigades and communes made mobilization of peasants and other 
resources much easier for the construction of water works (Ji 2016:20). During the 
second phase, more than 900 large and medium-sized reservoirs were built, and many 
important water projects were constructed along the large rivers such as the Hai, Liao, 
Pearl Rivers (Gu eds. 1999: 216). The total number of large and medium-sized reservoirs 
increased to 1,400 in 1965 from less than 20 in 1949 (USDA 1976). Irrigated area 
increased to 32.04 million ha. in 1965 from 25 million ha. in 1957 (MOWR 1990:633).  
 
However, many irrigation works, particularly the large ones, were constructed hastily. As 
a result, some large projects were not completed, and some projects, though completed, 
were poorly planned and/or poorly built. Take the Huayuankou dam located in the lower 
part of the Yellow River as an example. The dam was aimed to divert water from the 
Yellow River for irrigation, but it was built without a proper drainage system. Thus it led 
to the widespread land salinization and alkalization in the region. In the end, the dam had 
to be removed (Gu eds. 1999:7, 129; MOWR 1999: 13). Due to the the famine in the 
wake of the Great Leap Forward, the government became cautious afterwards on starting 
new water works. The central state proposed to balance between large and small water 
works, between retaining and draining water, and between contributions by the 
government and by rural collectives. In 1961, the central state ordered to finish those 
incomplete works instead of building new ones and to build more auxiliary works and 
45 
 
facilities to make those existing water works function better (Zhang 2000:2; MOWR 
1999: 14,27). With these measures, approximately 80 percent of large water projects 
were completed and improved with supporting and complementary facilities between 
1962 and 1965. And this further improved the conditions for agricultural production. 
Between 1963 and 1965, irrigated area expanded even faster, with an annual increase of 
about 667,000 hectares (MOWR 1999:14).  
 
The third phase (1966-1978) 
A major feature of this phase was that water control and irrigation development 
nationwide were ordered to follow the “Dazhai model.” Dazhai (literally, big camp) was 
a brigade in Shanxi Province and made its fame for the heroic efforts to improve 
agricultural conditions, such as building terrace and irrigation canals. The Dazhai model 
in general emphasized collectivism, community self-reliance and hard work. With regard 
to agricultural water, it suggested that water control and irrigation development should 
focus on building small projects to serve rural communities, building complementary 
facilities for the existing large projects, and improving water management (Wang 
2012:174).
11
 As a result, the priority of water use changed gradually from flood control to 
a comprehensive use of water for agricultural production (Wang 2012: 175). This was a 
further correction to the policies that were implemented in the Great Leap Forward.  
 
In addition, the priority that the Chinese state gave to the agricultural water system was 
reflected in state investment. The share of agricultural water infrastructure in total 
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 Premier Zhou Enlai called the country to “learn from Dazhai model in the agriculture sector” (nongye 




infrastructure investment was 7.2 percent in 1966-70, 6.6 percent in 1971-75, and 6.7 
percent in 1976-80. In contrast, the number fell to only 2.7 percent in 1981-85 (Xu 2007: 
196). In the 1970s, the People’s Communes were mobilized to construct auxiliary water 
works and small projects while at the same time there was heavy state involvement, 
which concentrated on the systematic management of the agricultural water system and 
invested in capital-intensive projects (Nickum 1978: 282).  In the late 1970s, about 10 
billion yuan was invested in agricultural water each year, more than many other sectors 
received at the time (Qian and Ma 2009:15).  
 
The Dazhai model was premised on massive labor mobilization for water projects. 
Nickum (1978) estimated that the total number of laborers participated in the winter 
campaigns of farmland and water conservancy could be somewhere between 905 million 
and 1.05 billion between 1966 and 1977. And the average labor days that each laborer 
contributed were slightly over 30 days and in some cases 70 or even 100 days (Nickum 
1978: 282). In the case of the Hai River, the Chinese state mobilized more than five 
million laborers from local communes to improve the river’s conditions, with a total of 
more than 1.1 billion cubic meters’ earth and stonework finished in 1966-1976 (Qian and 
Ma 2009:14-15). 
 
The expansion of the agricultural water system significantly enhanced its capacity to 
mitigate the impacts of natural disasters. Xu (2007:186) found that the period from 1966 
to 1979 were the years when China had borne the least impact from floods and droughts 
through 1960s to the end of 1980s. In 1965-1975, the Hai River, which was located in 
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North China, was maintained regularly and its capacity for flood control was increased 
multiple times. The number of newly built tube wells between 1966 and 1971 for 13 
northern provinces was three times those built in 1949-1965. As a result, both irrigation 
capacity and agricultural productivity were increased in North China. The south made 
similar progress in water control and irrigation development (Xu 2007:182,188).  
 
In sum, China’s capacity of harnessing water for agriculture production greatly increased. 
In 1949, the total amount of water tapped in the countryside was 100 billion cubic meters. 
This number increased to 255 billion cubic meters in 1965 and to 390 billion cubic 
meters in 1980 (Xu 2007:180). The overall improvement of the agricultural water system 
increased the capacity of flood control, drought alleviation and grain production. Many 
regions in south China changed from single cropping to double cropping or even triple 
cropping. Some parts of North China started to grow rice for the first time due to the 
availability of water, which also expanded the sowing area for winter wheat and cotton 
(Gu eds. 1999:146). 
 
2.3 Agricultural Water, Food Supply and Industrialization 
The rapid expansion of the agricultural water system in the Mao period should be largely 
attributed to the Chinese state. The emphasis on water control and irrigation development 
directed state and non-state resources in a planned economic system to water sectors. The 
question is what motivated the Chinese state to do so. This section addresses the question 
by examining food supply and the strategy of industrialization, two factors that are 
central to my argument in this dissertation. It reveals that the Mao period was different 
48 
 
from the reform period in that it was under great pressure to supply food for a growing 
population, while the ambitious urban industrialization plans required the extraction of 
rural surplus at the same time.  
 
Food supply  
After years of wars’ devastations, the Communist state had to take great effort to control 
and harness water in order to produce enough food for its population. This was similar to 
what imperial powers of China usually did at the beginning of each new dynasty. 
However, the task of the Communist state was arguably more challenging not only 
because it inherited a very large population base but also because the population was 
growing rapidly. Bramall (2009:213) argued that the Mao period was “in many respects a 
history of the search for solutions to this overriding problem” of feeding people. Eckstein 
(1975:19) also stated that “these twin factors of agrarian backwardness and demographic 
pressure have profoundly conditioned the character of China’s economic development 
and its economic policies since 1949.” In the initial years, China’s food production 
capacity was low and a large population was at risk of starvation. In 1949, the total grain 
output was as low as 110 million metric tons with grain production per capita only 209 
kilograms (NBS 1992:358; MOA 2009:14,17).  
 
The rate of population growth was unprecedentedly high. Between 1949 and 1957, the 
population in China grew 2.2 percent a year and increased from 560 million to 647 
million. By 1978, the population reached 963 million, almost doubled in 30 years 
(Bramall 2009:243; NBS 1992:77), even though efforts had been taken to control high 
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birth rates starting in the 1960s. Domestic stability and an improved public health system 
mainly accounted for this growth (Eckstein 1975:17). The rapidly growing population 
exerted great pressure on the Chinese state to increase grain production. In addition, 
China was prevented from access to the US food aid system due to US-led embargo 
against it after the Korea War on the one hand (Friedmann 1982); and on the other hand, 
the good relationship with Soviet Union broke in 1959 and the assistance from it was cut 
off. Thus China had to mainly rely on domestic production for food supply. 
 
In addition to water control and irrigation, the Chinese state carried out land reform and 
then launched the collectivization campaigns, which exerted a significant impact on the 
agricultural water system, as I will detail in the next section. Furthermore, it took great 
effort to introduce modern industrial inputs such as chemical fertilizer and hybrid seeds 
in the 1960s and 1970s (Eckstein 1975:18-19).  
 
The Mao period achieved significant success in grain production. Figure 2-2 shows that 
total grain production increased from 113 million metric tons in 1949 to 305 million 
metric tons in 1978 (NBS 1992: 358) and grain production per capita increased from 209 
kilograms to 319 kilograms for the same period (MOA 2009: 14, 17). In other words, the 
growth of grain production had outpaced that of population growth. However, the 
population had not been completely shielded from the fear of food shortages since any 











In addition to increasing grain production, China was also motivated to pursue 
industrialization and saw it as a synonym of economic development. This national 
strategy of prioritizing industrial development, which was adopted from the experience of 
the Soviet Union, was commonly practiced by other developing countries at the time. In 
addition, the strategy of industrialization grew out of concerns for national defense. In the 
context of the Cold War, China felt the threat from both the United States and the Soviet 
Union, and this led it to attach much importance to defense industry. This could be seen 
from the fact that China devoted resources to developing nuclear weapons in the 1960s 
even when its industrial sectors were still in a nascent state (Lin et al. 2003:31-32, 36).  
                                                        














































































































































China was severely short of capital for its industrial projects, and heavy industry, which 
received priority, was capital intensive. The country was not able to access foreign capital 
or foreign markets due to the US-led embargo and its rupture with the Soviet Union. In 
addition, even though the Soviet Union provided assistance for China’s industrial 
development in the 1950s, the assistance was far from sufficient. To acquire capital and 
raw materials for industrial development, Chinese state decided to extract surplus from 
agriculture and transfer it to industrial sectors and urban areas. The extraction was done 
through the so-called price scissors mechanism, which intentionally set prices of 
industrial goods high and agricultural products low (Ash 2006; Lin et al. 2003: 45, 50). 
Moreover, the state established a system of compulsory grain procurement, which 
required peasants to sell a large percentage of the grain they produced to the state at low, 
fixed prices (Naughton 2007:60). This grain procurement policy on the one hand 
provided food for the urban population and some raw materials for industrial production, 
and on the other hand served as “price scissors” suppressing the prices of agricultural 
goods in order to be able to keep urban wages low. The “price scissors” were practiced as 
early as 1953 and continued until the late 1970s. As a result of the strategy of 
industrialization, industrial output grew at an average annual rate of 11.5 percent between 
1952 and 1978 while in the meantime the share of industry in GDP increased from 18 
percent to 44 percent (Naughton 2007: 56). 
 
The strategy of industrialization by extracting agricultural surplus to finance industrial 
sectors had mixed impacts on the agricultural water system. On the one hand, it made 
agriculture very important on the state’s agenda because agriculture not only supplied 
52 
 
surplus for industrial sectors but also provided necessary food and raw materials such as 
grain and cotton. As the importance of agriculture increased, the agricultural water 
system also received much attention. The total investment in irrigation was 1.03 billion 
yuan for the three years from 1950-1952, accounting for 13 percent of the total 
infrastructure investment (Wang 2012: 7). In addition to large water projects, the Chinese 
state set up a fund in 1954 to support the construction and maintenance of small water 
works (Gu eds. 1999: 69). In general, the share of agricultural water in total infrastructure 
investment in the Mao period was around seven percent, much higher than those in the 
1980s and 1990s, which was less than three percent on average (Fan, Zhang and Zhang 
2004; Gu eds. 1999:55).  
 
On the other hand, the strategy to prioritize industrial development allocated more 
resources to industrial sectors than to agriculture. The percentage of industry in 
infrastructure investment was more than 50 percent for most of the Mao period, whereas 
that of agriculture was around 10 percent (NBS 1992: 158). The fever for industrial 
development led to some disastrous outcomes as it extracted too many resources from 
agriculture. The Great Leap Forward is an example. In 1958-1960 the Chinese leaders 
reduced labor and land for direct agriculture production, and allocated them to industrial 
production (Naughton 2007: 70). This led to a significant fall in grain production, causing 
a widespread famine. Of course, we have to admit that the diversion of labor to dam 
construction was also a factor reducing the number of labor engaging in grain production 




In addition, the price scissors that suppressed the prices of agricultural products did not 
provide economic incentives for peasants and rural communities to devote efforts to 
agriculture and irrigation. This problem was salient in the reform period as low 
profitability of agriculture has discouraged peasants from investing in agricultural water. 
However, during the Mao period the state mitigated this problem by mobilizing rural 
laborers for water projects through collective organizations in the countryside, as I will 
show below.  
 
In summary, the need to feed a rapidly growing population and the strategy of 
transferring agricultural surplus to urban industry drew the attention of the Chinese state 
to the agricultural water system. However, the extraction of rural surplus diminished rural 
producers’ incentive and reduced their efforts in irrigation. The Chinese state solved this 
contradiction by mobilizing rural laborers for irrigation projects through its bureaucracy 
and the collective system in the countryside. This is the issue to which I now turn.  
 
2.4 Collective Organizations and Labor Mobilization 
Although the share of agricultural water in total infrastructure investment remained high 
in the Mao period, the investment still fell far short of the need due to the fact that China 
was among the poorest countries in the world at the time with a very limited fiscal means. 
Furthermore, as noted earlier, the majority of financial resources were allocated to 
industrial sectors in an attempt to catch up with developed countries. Thus China simply 
could not devote sufficient financial resources to the agricultural water system. This 
section will show that, besides fiscal investments from the state, another main factor 
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contributing to the increasing capacity of water control and irrigation was the effective 
mobilization of rural laborers through the state bureaucracy and collective organizations.  
 
Labor mobilization was employed in water control and infrastructure construction as 
soon as CCP took national power. In spring of 1950 alone, more than 5 million peasants 
were mobilized in the campaigns for water projects nationwide. In the three years from 
1949 to 1952, a total of 3.36 million of small canals, dams and ponds were built or 
repaired by peasants (Wang 2012:20). The state institutionalized the practice afterwards. 
This was made possible by the establishment of collective organizations, through which 
the ideological indoctrination and bureaucratic control of the communist state was able to 
reach the village level.  
 
By 1953, the land reform in the countryside was nearly completed, with each household 
receiving a farm plot on a relatively equal basis. However, individual households were 
difficult to mobilize, particularly for large projects. In 1955, the Chinese state started to 
first encourage and late force rural households to join rural cooperatives. By the end of 
1956, more than 98 percent of rural households became members of these cooperatives 
(Naughton 2007:67; Lin et al. 2003:57). As a result, household assets such as land and 
farm tools were collectivized, and rural households depended on collective organizations 
for both work assignments and income. However, the agricultural cooperatives were still 
considered to be too small to take on large-scale public projects. In 1958, the state pushed 
these rural cooperatives to form even larger units of collective organization: the people’s 
communes, which could consist of as many as 8,000 households (Lin et al. 2003:57). In 
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addition to the need for labor mobilization, the collectivization also derived from the 
belief that collective farming was more efficient than household farming. Eckstein (1975: 
52) argues that the institutional transformation of agriculture, mainly collectivization, 
“would not only assure a greater degree of state control over farm income and farm 
produce but that it would also provide a prime means for increasing agricultural output”. 
Bramall (2009:230) argues that collective organizations in Mao’s Era enabled grain 
yields to approximately double between 1955 and 1981 through mobilizing labor to 
participate in agriculture production on a scale unprecedented in China or any other 
country.  
 
According to the document of “the Decision to Establish the People’s Communes in the 
Countryside” issued by the central committee of the CCP on August 29, 1958, one of the 
most important tasks for the People’s Communes was to mobilize rural households and 
the commune’s resources for the construction of water works and to cooperate in 
agricultural production (Ji 2016:20). Some scholars argued that the People’s Communes 
originated from the extensive water conservancy campaigns of winter 1957 and spring 
1958, which involved more than 100 million peasants (Nickum 1978:273; Oksenberg 
1969). In 1959, the Ministry of Water and Hydropower held a national convention and 
confirmed that the People’s Communes speeded up irrigation construction (MOWR 
1999:13). Thus, it was argued that the CCP hoped from early on to use collective 
organizations to mobilize rural labors to construct public infrastructures, particularly 
collective water projects, in order to enhance agriculture productivity (Ash 2006; Bramall 
2009:213; Naughton 2007:69).  
56 
 
After the failure of the Great Leap Forward, the Chinese state downsized the People’s 
Communes and organized rural society into a three-tier structure consisting of production 
teams, production brigades and communes (Bramall 2009:216; Eckstein 1975: 77-84; 
Schurmann 1968; Lin 1990). The functions of the communes were reduced to 
administration and coordination, whereas resource ownership, responsibility for 
production management and income distribution were delegated to much smaller unit, the 
production team, which usually consisted of 20-30 households (Lin 1990). Rural life and 
production were profoundly transformed under the three-tier collective system. Domestic 
work was shifted into public sphere, and the state exerted much greater control over 
peasants and agricultural production than previously. 
 
These collective organizations made the mobilization of rural laborers much more 
effective. Prior to the establishment of the collective system, the construction of a 
relatively large irrigation project normally requires a coordination of hundreds or even 
thousands of rural households, which was difficult and costly. The People’s Communes 
could overcome the problem of coordination and easily mobilize labor and material 
resources. This was because the decisions were made not by millions of households but 
by a much smaller number of collectives such as brigades and communes. Above the 
level of communes, the county government or even higher levels of government would 
take command and coordinate collective activities in a large area. Figure 2-3 shows the 
command structure of labor mobilization in Maoist China. It reveals that the collective 
system was absorbed into the bureaucratic structure of the state while at the same time 
they were self-supporting organizations, which largely relied their own resources within 
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rather than resources from above. In other words, the Chinese state turned the 
organizations of rural society into an efficient hierarchical structure without adding 
administrative or fiscal burdens on the state. The bureaucratization of the rural society 
through collective organizations greatly increased the capacity of the state in labor 
mobilization. 
 
Figure 2-3 The command structure of labor mobilization in Maoist China 
 
 
Under the collective system, the construction of water projects basically followed the 
principle of territorial responsibility: brigades or production teams took responsibility of 
the construction of small projects within their territories; communes took responsibility 
of medium-sized projects; and large projects were coordinated by counties and higher 
level authorities (Yu 1974: 56). More specially, projects that affected more than one 
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production team within a single brigade should be organized and built by the brigade. 
The costs should be shared by peasants from the production teams that benefited. If the 
project involved more than one brigade within the same commune, then the commune 
would take charge, and the benefited brigades would contribute labor and resources for 
the project (Nickum 1978:278).  
 
The construction of large projects which usually affected peasants and collective 
organizations within one county or across multiple counties, followed a principle of 
shared responsibility as well. To build a large water project, the government not only 
mobilized communes that directly benefited from the project but also those that did not. 
The principle of shared responsibility was also intended to strengthen the solidarity and 
reciprocity among communities. Take the Hai River maintenance project, which was 
constructed during the 1960s and 1970s, as an example. The main work was conducted 
within Hebei Province. In the beginning of each year, the project headquarters’ office at 
the provincial level estimated the total number of laborers needed for the project. Then 
the task was distributed to each prefecture, then to each county, and eventually to each 
production team. The government provided construction materials and some subsidies for 
food and construction tools. When the production team was told the number of laborers it 
was required to mobilize, the team head would hold a meeting and inform all the 
households of the order from the upper government, and then would discuss and decide 
who should do the job. The laborers who participated in constructing water projects 
normally would not get any cash compensation from the state, but they received work 
points in their own production teams so that they could get a fair share of annual 
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distribution of cash and grain (Ji 2016; Lv 2014; Nickum 1978: 275). Nickum (1978:284) 
claimed that by relying on the distributional incentive of the work point system, the 
commune system was able to use labor more extensively than under an individual wage 
system. 
 
Rural laborers were mostly mobilized for public infrastructure projects during the 
wintertime when there was not much agricultural work. According to Yue (2015:63), 
eighty percent of the work for medium-sized and small water projects was conducted 
during the slack seasons, mostly in winter and early spring. For some large projects such 
as the Hai River Maintenance project, which required long-term labor contribution, a 
certain number of laborers were employed yearlong for the main body of work (Lv 2014).   
 
The collective system mobilized a huge number of rural laborers. In January 1958, it was 
estimated that around 100 million people participated in the nationwide campaigns for 
agricultural water infrastructure (Li 2010: 114). In the 1960s, it was estimated that 40 to 
60 million peasants were involved in irrigation infrastructure projects each year. On 
average, each participating peasant contributed thirty days in a year (Bramall 2009:224; 
Nickum 1978: 280-2). In the 1970s, 100 million workers (30 percent of the total rural 
labor force) were mobilized each year to devote a few weeks to building and repairing the 
irrigation system. This greatly increased rural laborer’s working days in a year. In the 
1920s, a peasant worked about 160 days per year on average, but by the late 1970s, one 
worked 200 to 275 days per year on average mainly due to the mobilization in water 
infrastructure construction during the slack seasons (Naughton 2007:237; Vermeer 
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1988:157). In sum, it was estimated that labor mobilization covered more than 50 percent 
of the cost of building and maintaining agricultural water infrastructures in the Mao 
period (Bramall 2000: 137; Nickum 1978).    
 
It should be noted that although peasants benefited from the expansion of the water 
system, they were often forced to work for these projects because their livelihoods relied 
entirely on collective organizations. However, many peasants also participated 
voluntarily. In constructing some large projects such as the Hai River maintenance 
project, the state provided meals for workers, which was an incentive for rural laborers to 
participate because they could save food for their families by not eating at home (Lv 
2014). Thus, according to one of my interviewees in Southern County, the production 
team head would first ask those poor households to participate in the projects as a gesture 
of taking care of the poor in the community. Another incentive for peasants to participate 
was that these projects could increase the irrigation capacity and thus grain production of 
their farmland (Chen 2012).  
 
In addition to collective organizations, the buildup of an enormous water infrastructure 
should be attributed to the bureaucracy of the Chinese state.  
 
Firstly, the Chinese state assigned priority to agriculture and irrigation on its agenda. This 
was reflected in the campaign slogans such as “take grain as the keyline” (yiliang 
weigang) and “irrigation is the lifeline of agriculture” (shuili shi nongye de mingmai). As 
discussed above, large projects and nationwide campaigns for improving water facilities 
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were usually initiated and promoted by the central government and many medium-sized 
and small irrigation projects were initiated by local governments.  
 
Secondly, local governments, particularly county-level governments, played a significant 
role in the organization and mobilization of rural laborers. These governments 
coordinated laborers from various communes. Generally, the party secretary at the 
prefecture level, who was the top administrator in a prefecture, took charge of large water 
projects, while the party secretary at the county level was responsible for medium-size 
water projects (Yue 2015:64, 97). Moreover, local officials often worked side by side 
with peasants in the construction sites of water projects. Nickum (1978: 283) estimated 
that 1.7 million local officials were dispatched in 1976-77 alone to project sites 
supervising and participating in the construction of agricultural infrastructure. Fu (1958) 
showed that many officials from the prefecture and county governments moved their 
offices to the construction sites in the countryside in the high season of infrastructure 
construction, i.e., winter and spring. In addition, many propaganda activities would be 
organized in order to boost peasants’ morale at the sites.  
 
Lastly, the government provided technological assistance for water conservancy. Many 
technicians were sent to construct water projects. In addition, they trained a great number 
of peasant technicians through demonstration projects and training programs. For 
example, during the ten years from 1949-1959, there were more than 160,000 peasant 
irrigation technicians trained in Hunan province through the school system education and 
onsite training (Liu 1959).   
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In summary, the establishment of collective organizations and labor mobilization through 
these organizations played an indispensable role in irrigation expansion in the Mao period, 
which allowed the Chinese state to overcome the problem of insufficient financial 
resources for irrigation projects. Some scholars called this an approach that substitutes 
labor for capital (Perkins 1969; Nickum 1978). It should be noted that this approach 
rested upon the ability of the state to mobilize rural laborers.  
 
2.5 The Two Cases in the Mao Period 
This section examines in detail the changes of the agricultural water system in my two 
county cases during the Mao period: Southern County in Hunan province and Northern 
County in Inner Mongolia. Although these two cases are located in very different 
geographical areas, they showed similar trends of irrigation expansion in the Mao period. 
In general, Southern County enjoyed much better irrigation conditions than Northern 
County, mainly owing to high levels of precipitation, but the latter also made significant 
progress in harnessing water for agriculture. In addition, the expansion of agricultural 
water use in both cases can be largely attributed to the effective mobilization of rural 
labor. These findings further corroborate the national trend of irrigation expansion and 
labor mobilization.  
 
Southern County 
Although Southern County enjoyed on average 1,358 mm of rainfall every year, there 
were no large irrigation facilities in the county before 1949. For irrigation, peasants used 
ponds to store water and small river dams and ditches to channel water to farm fields. 
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The number of ponds and river dams in the county in 1949 reached as many as 57,897, 
but they were of small size and in poor conditions. These irrigation facilities were highly 
vulnerable and could not fend off large floods or protect against severe droughts. In 
addition, their irrigation capacity was very limited. Although 80 percent of farmland in 
the county received some water from rivers or ponds, only 200,000 mu of farmland, 20 
percent of the total, received stable water supply and was equipped with a good drainage 
system to avoid flooding in the rainy season.
13
   
 
One of the most important achievements in the Mao period was the construction of large 
irrigation projects, which greatly increased the county’s capacity of irrigation and flood 
control. Take reservoirs as an example. The county started to build its largest reservoir in 
1958, at the height of the Great Leap Forward, and the main work for this project was 
finished in 1965. It could irrigate 423,000 mu farmland in three neighboring counties and 
Southern County made up the largest share, 350,000 mu.
14
 Besides this large reservoir, 
the country built 159 reservoirs of various sizes in the Mao period. Of these, two are 
officially classified as medium-sized reservoirs and 157 as small reservoirs. The two 
medium-sized reservoirs were constructed in 1972 and 1973, respectively, and together 
they could irrigate 95,000 mu of land. The small reservoirs altogether could irrigate up to 
260,000 mu of farmland.
15
 After the reservoirs were built, canals and ditches were 
constructed to channel water to farmland. These canals and ditches formed a 
comprehensive network of irrigation, which is called an irrigation zone. In the Mao 
period, Southern County took action to construct and connect these canals and ditches. 
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 Southern County Gazetteer 1995:285. 
14
 Southern County Gazetteer 1995:286. 
15
 Southern County Gazetteer 1995:287. 
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The largest irrigation zone could water 132,000 mu of crops for ten communes in the 
county.
16
  In addition to reservoirs, the county built two large river dams for the first time 
in its history, which could divert water from the rivers to 114, 000 mu of farmland. As a 
result, the supply of agricultural water in the county became much more reliable due to 
the formation of a comprehensive irrigation system. In addition, the reservoirs, river 
dams and canals greatly increased its capacity in mitigating the impact of floods.  
 
The county also made much progress with regard to small irrigation facilities such as 
ponds and small river dams in the Mao period. Another 12,059 ponds and 157 small river 
dams were built for irrigation and flood control. A more significant improvement lays in 
the quality of the pre-existing and newly built ponds and river dams. These ponds and 
river dams need constant maintenance. For example, the clearing of mud from the bottom 
of the ponds should be performed every year to maintain the capacity of water storage. 
Collective organizations in the Mao period provided a good institutional base for this 
work. Before the collectivization, one pond usually irrigated farmland for several 
households and maintenance required coordination. During the collective period, a pond 
usually irrigated the farmland within the same production team, and thus it had become 
much easier to organize rural laborers to maintain it. My interviewees told me that the 
ponds were well maintained due to collective organization during the Mao period.  
 
Besides the facilities mentioned above, others such as pump stations, drainage canals, 
dikes and river banks were constructed or maintained during this period. For instance, 
there were no pump stations in the county prior to 1949, and peasants used water wheels 
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 Southern County Gazetteer 1995:288.  
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to elevate water to high-level farmland. In the Mao period, the county constructed 
hundreds of pump stations and used electric pumps to lift water and channel it to farm 
fields. 
 
In sum, in the Mao period, the county built and maintained a comprehensive irrigation 
system and it was home to more than 72,000 water projects, including one large reservoir, 
two medium-sized reservoirs, two large river dams, 160 small reservoirs, 857 pump 
stations, 7,000 small river dams, and over 65 thousand ponds by the end of 1970s.
17
 This 
greatly increased the irrigation capacity of the county. The  farmland with stable 
irrigation increased from 200,000 mu in 1949 to 850,000 mu in 1979.
18
 This laid a good 
foundation for agricultural production. In 1949, the total grain production was 245 
million kilograms, and it increased to 609 million kilograms in 1978, more than doubled. 
In the meantime, grain production per mu in 1978 increased 2.88 times to 576 kilograms 
on average from 200 kilograms in 1949.
19
   
 
The construction and improvement of these facilities was the result of a combination of 
efforts from the state, collective organizations and peasants. The state invested a total of 
71.2 million yuan during the Mao period. A large number of peasants were mobilized for 
the construction and maintenance of these projects, and they contributed more than 
248.15 million labor days in total and completed more than 300 million cubic meters of 
earth and stonework. 
20
 There were four waves of intensive labor mobilization. The first 
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was in the First Five Year Plan period (1953-1957), when more than 5 million labor days 
were contributed to irrigation improvement each winter. The second took place during 
the Great Leap Forward and its aftermath (1958-1962), when on average more than 10 
million labor days were contributed each year. The third was from 1963 to 1965, when 
more than 5.5 million labor days were contributed each year. The last was from 1969-
1979, when more than 11 million labor days were contributed on average each year.
21
 
The only large reservoir was constructed during the second and third waves of labor 
mobilization, between 1958 and 1965. The project cost 53.93 million yuan in total, of 
which 18.93 million yuan came from the central government and two million yuan from 
peasants. A great number of peasants were mobilized from communes in the county and 
they contributed more than 33 million labor days, the total value of which exceeded 33 
million yuan, 61.2 percent of the total cost of the project. They completed 14.92 million 




Archival documents and my interviews revealed the vivid picture of this large-scale 
mobilization of laborers. In the construction sites during each winter, peasants were 
organized into military-like groups. Peasants from the same commune were classified as 
one regiment (tuan 团), and under each regiment there were companies (lian 连) and 
squads (ban 班). They were encouraged to show good performance in competition. All 
kinds of propaganda measures such as movies, books, newspapers, radio and posters, 
were used to boost workers’ morale. Cadres ate, slept, and worked together with peasants 
at the construction site. Many technicians were trained through onsite training and after-
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67 
 
work schools while working at the construction site. It was a boisterous scene as if an 
army of rural laborers were fighting a battle. After one project was completed, the 
construction site quieted down, and only a small number of workers would remain to deal 
with maintenance. The army was then dispatched elsewhere to fight another battle.  
 
Northern County 
In Northern County, the average annul precipitation is between 310-460 mm. Before 
1949, the man-made irrigation system in Northern County was virtually non-existent and 
there were only a few small canals and ditches diverting water from rivers to a few 
hundred hectares of farmland. In the Mao period, the county achieved great progress in 
irrigation. 
  
From 1949 to 1978, the county constructed one large reservoir (together with several 
other counties), six medium-sized reservoirs and 16 small reservoirs. Connected with 
newly built canals and ditches, these reservoirs and the rivers formed 10 large irrigation 
zones, accounting for half of the irrigated area of the county. In addition, it built two 
large and 22 small pumping stations, which irrigated hilly lands with river water. The 
county also started to sink tube wells and equipped them with motors and pipelines in the 
late 1960s and 1970s. Prior to 1949, Northern County had about two thousand of the so-
called “little muddy wells” (xiaotujing), which were only a few meters deep and could 
only irrigate one mu of farmland each. Starting in the 1960s, Northern County used diesel 
or electric pumps to extract water from the wells, while at the same time it improved the 
technology in well building by using bricks/stones and concrete. These wells could reach 
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10 to 20 meters down. The number of these tube wells increased from 10 in 1960 to 
2,654 in 1978.
23
 Irrigation efforts during the Mao period expanded irrigated area in the 
county from a few hundred hectares in 1949 to 24 thousand hectares, 16.4 percent of its 
total farmland in 1978.
24
 The grain output per mu in 1949 was only 18 kg and the total 
grain output of the county was 46,645 metric tons, and these two numbers increased to 97 
kg and 160,390 metric tons in 1979 respectively.
25
   
 
Similar to Southern County, the construction and development of these water facilities 
were a result of the combined efforts of the state and the mobilization of peasants through 
collective organizations. From 1951 to 1979, the total state investment on water 
construction and water management was 41 million yuan. In 1951, state investment was 
7,200 yuan, and it increased to 552 thousand yuan in 1956, 1.1 million yuan in 1966, and 
more than 5.3 million yuan in 1979.
26
 A great number of peasants were mobilized. They 
contributed approximately 60 million labor days and finished more than 68 million cubic 




Take the county’s large reservoir as an example. Construction was started in 1958 and 
completed in 1965. More than 52,400 labors who came from more than 19 counties and 
cities in Inner Mongolia, were mobilized. At the peak, there were more than 48,000 
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people working in the construction site daily. They contributed more than 23.48 million 




The construction of one of the medium-sized reservoirs further demonstrated how water 
projects were done in the county. The reservoir was contracted between 1974 and 1976. It 
cost about 11.6 million yuan in total, 3.5 million yuan of which came from the state and 
the rest was shared by local communes that benefited from this project. In the first several 
months of construction, approximately 2,000 peasants were working on the site daily. 
They were mobilized mainly from six communes and one large state-owned farm, which 
all benefited from the reservoir. They shared the cost of labor, trucks and money in 
proportion to the benefits they would receive. From summer 1975 on, many other 
communes were also asked to join the project and the number of workers on the ground 
rose to 10,000, along with 1,000 trucks. In total, peasants contributed more than 4.5 
million labor days and completed a total of 2.21 million cubic meters of earth and 
stonework. The county government played a significant role in mobilizing and 
coordinating the communes. In addition, the county government also called its own 
agencies and urban work units/factories to donate trucks, machines and other construction 
materials to support the construction of this project. The county government also founded 
a dozen small sideline factories near the construction site for machine repair, dynamite 
production, steel production, and wood production to provide assistance. Like in 
Southern County, many cadres came to the construction sites, and they worked, lived and 
dined together with  peasant laborers.
29
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To conclude, in the Mao period a comprehensive agricultural water system was built with 
investment from the Chinese state and massive mobilization of labor through collective 
organizations in the countryside. The expansion of the agricultural water system not only 
increased agricultural production during this period, but also laid a good foundation for 
agricultural production in the reform period. The chapter shows that the crucial 
conditions for this expansion were effective mobilization of collective organizations and 
the political priority that the agricultural water system received from the state. However, 
these two conditions weakened after China initiated the market-oriented reforms in the 
late 1970s.  
 
The control of the rural society through collective organizations was weakened as the 
Household Responsibility System replaced the commune system. Under the Household 
Responsibility System, rural households made their own economic decisions and relied 
on the market for income to a much greater extent than previously. The Chinese state 
could no longer mobilize peasants in ways that it did in the Mao period.  In addition, the 
state, and local governments in particular, shifted their priority away from agricultural 
water to more profitable sectors. These changes made significant impacts on the 
agricultural water system. The following chapters will examine these changes in the 







North Feeds South: The Water-Grain Mismatch 
 
The remarkable increase in irrigation capacity during the Mao period laid a firm 
foundation for agricultural growth in the early reform period. Partly as a result, grain 
production increased one third from 304 to 407 million tons between 1978 and 1984, 
permitting China to export grains for the first time since the early 1960s (MOA 2009: 17; 
Naughton 2007: 259). Despite the initial success, however, the further growth of grain 
production has been increasingly mismatched with the distribution of water resources in 
China: the water-scarce north has produced a growing share of grain while grain 
production in the water-rich south has stagnated and then declined. The mismatch has 
been both the cause and a reflection of the agricultural water crisis in China. This chapter 
examines the northward movement of grain production in the reform period and its 
impact on the agricultural water system. It reveals how the contradiction between 
profitability and food security and the measures to solve it have contributed to the 
mismatch.     
 
3.1 Decentralization and Decline of Water Investment in the 1980s 
Despite the important role of the agricultural water system, the Chinese state slashed 
funds for it in the 1980s. Annual spending on water infrastructure decreased from 3.25 
billion yuan in 1976-79 on average to 1.36 billion yuan in 1981. The five-year investment 
decreased from 15.72 billion yuan in the 1976-1980 period to 9.3 billion yuan in the 
1981-1985 period, down by 40.8 percent (NBS 2009: 74). The proportion of water 
72 
 
investment in total infrastructure investment decreased from more than seven percent to 
three percent in the early 1980s and further down to less than two percent in the late 
1980s (Figure 3-1). There was a wide gap between the funds needed and those allocated. 
It was estimated that at least 3.1 billion yuan was needed every year in the 1980s to 
maintain and repair government-owned irrigation facilities in the 1980s. However, the 
government budget for water investment and management was around half a billion a 
year in this period. For example, it was only 470 million yuan in 1986, only 15 percent of 
that was needed (Zhang 1995: 139).   
 
The funding cuts have been attributed to political and institutional factors. Politically, the 
reform was a radical negation of the Mao period. The Maoist policies such as the “mass-
line” politics and “politics in command (zhengzhi guashuai)” were criticized and 
abandoned. As noted in the preceding chapter, the construction of water projects was a 
key policy and practice in the Mao period, thus it bore the brunt of the reform. According 
to Ms. Qian Zhengying, the Minister of Water Resources at the time, senior officials at 
the top argued that the Mao period overemphasized the importance of irrigation, and thus 
the mistake must be rectified (Qian and Ma 2009).  
 
Another important factor was the institutional change stemming from the reform of fiscal 
decentralization in 1980, which was a part of the general process of decentralization 
noted in the introduction. The decentralization reform in China after 1978 has garnered 
wide attention in scholarship. It is regarded as a major factor contributing to the 
economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s. For instance, Jean Oi suggested that the 
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reform, which allowed local governments to retain surplus revenue after fulfilling the 
quota turned over to the central government, had motivated them to promote rural 
industry, leading to the takeoff of the rural economy (Oi 1999). Other scholars argued that 
the decentralization reform had enhanced the incentive of local governments, promoted 
market principles, and stimulated local economic development (Wong 2000; Shirk 1993; 
Huang 1996; Zhao and Zhang 1999; Qian and Weingast 1997). However, while the 
decentralization reform boosted the Chinese economy, its effect on the agricultural water 
system was nearly the opposite.  
 
A central component of the decentralization reform was to establish a contract-
responsibility system, which redrew the boundaries of the rights and responsibilities of 
both local governments and enterprises. As far as enterprises were concerned, the system 
permitted a state-owned enterprise to retain residual profits after paying a predetermined 
quota to the government, whereas previously it must remit all profits to the government. 
In the late 1980s, the system was replaced with the tax-for-profit scheme (ligaishui), in 
which the remittance quota was turned into a number of taxes paid to the government 
(Zhao and Zhang 1999: 256). The reform also transferred most of the responsibilities of 
investment and public services from the center to local governments, which obtained a 
much greater degree of autonomy than previously in decision making and policy 
implementation.  
 
The contract-responsibility system profoundly altered the local-center relations in water 
investment and management. The new system requires a local government to fulfill a 
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certain revenue quota remitted to the central government. Beyond the contract quota, the 
more revenue the government generates, the more it can retain. In addition, the local 
government is supposed to raise a significant proportion of funds itself for public projects 
and services (Zhao and Zhang 1999: 257-9). It was against this background that the 
central government cut irrigation investment substantially, and transferred much of the 
responsibility of financing the agricultural water system to local governments, which 
were expected to raise funds for their water projects (Zhang 2008; Gu eds 1999).  
 
However, the incentive of local governments, particularly those in the south, was to 
increase revenue by promoting local economic growth in the neoliberal era. As a result, it 
tended to concentrate resources in profitable urban-industrial sectors that can stimulate 
economic growth. Contrary to the expectation that local governments would take 
responsibility for the agricultural water system, water investment at the local level was 
cut even more than that at the central level (Lohmar et al 2003: 9). Take Hunan province 
as an example. Agriculture, including water infrastructure, accounted for 12.4 percent in 
fixed asset investment in 1978, but it decreased to less than 3 percent in the second half 
of the 1980s (HBS 1991: 27). As a result, many water projects crumbled and could not 
irrigate farmland effectively. In addition, little money was allocated to building new 
projects or repairing the existing infrastructure, and local irrigation management agencies 
were so short of funding that they could not even pay the salaries of technicians and 
workers in full amount (He and Li 1995; Jin and Pi 1990; MOWRH 1986). Irrigated area 
in the province reportedly declined from 2.76 million in 1982 to 2.67 million hectares in 
1989 (HBS 1982:127; HBS 1990: 54). The actual decline might be greater since local 
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governments tended to underreport their failures. Hunan province was not an exception. 
The diversion of resources away from water conservancy and the shrinking of irrigated 
area were observed in many other provinces (Wang 2012: 216-32).  
 
Without sufficient funds from either central or local governments, the Ministry of Water 
Resources (the Ministry of Water Resources and Hydropower between 1982 and 1988), 
which is the highest-level authority of water administration in China, launched a major 
reform in 1984 that reoriented the water system to the goal of economic self-reliance, a 
neoliberal economic principle (Harvey 2005). The reform identified three principles 
called “Two Pillars and One Key” (liangge zhizhu, yiba yaoshi). The two pillars refer to 
the collection of water fees and the engagement in multiple businesses, and one key is the 
economic responsibility system. All reformative measures were aimed to raise funds for 
water management. The collection of water fees suggests that the water management 
agency would charge rural households and individuals for using water for agriculture. 
The multiple-business principle encourages water management agencies to engage in 
other economic activities rather than only supplying water for agricultural production. 
The responsibility system requires that water management agencies must raise funds 
themselves to cover the cost of water management including the salary of their personnel.   
 
As a result, water management agencies, previously focusing on improving the water 
system and directing water to farms, shifted attention to profitable businesses. Take Field 
Reservoir in Southern County as an example. The building of the reservoir was initiated 
in 1973, and major works of the project, including a large dam, a hydropower facility and 
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artery canals, were completed in 1978. The reservoir was the third largest irrigation work 
in the county, and could irrigate 114 thousand mu of farmland if all auxiliary facilities 
were built to allow the reservoir to operate in full capacity. However, the auxiliary 
facilities have never been completely finished due to a lack of adequate funds in the 
reform period.  
 
The reservoir started to face financial problems soon after it went into operation in 1980. 
The reservoir management staff comprised of 69 persons in 1984, and the management 
must cover staff salaries and daily operation expenses itself due to the drying up of funds 
from upper-level governments. A 1984 report that the reservoir management submitted to 
the county bureau of water resources and hydropower showed that it ran a deficit of about 
40,000 yuan a year, about half of its annual budget. To cover necessary expenses, the 
management agency had to follow the Ministry of Water Resources’ call and involved 
itself in multiple businesses. In addition to fishery and hydropower that were economic 
activities originally designed for the reservoir, the management agency opened a grocery 
store and a restaurant, and bought a bus to transport people between the county town and 
the township where the reservoir is located. The involvement in multiple businesses 
improved the reservoir’s economic conditions. Between 1985 and 1990, the management 
agency was running a budgetary surplus and able to improve the living conditions of its 
employees. However, increased income did not translate into the improved supply of 
agricultural water. On the contrary, the management appointed more talented members 
and allocated most economic resources to profitable businesses such as fishery and the 
bus business, and only took a minimal effort to keep irrigation running. The reservoir 
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irrigated 55 thousands mu in 1990, only half of its full capacity and increased little from 
the early 1980s on.  
 
In the meantime, regional inequality in economic development took a toll on the water 
system under the decentralized system because less-developed regions were unable to 
raise sufficient funds to cover the expenses of water management. For example, the 
amount of central water funds that Northern County received decreased from 4.15 million 
yuan every year in 1976-1980 to 1.79 million yuan in 1981-1985. To make up for the 
shortage of water funds, the Water Resources Bureau in the county encouraged the 
management agencies of irrigation facilities such as reservoirs to engage in commercial 
activities including fishery, manufacturing, shop keeping, etc. However, these activities 
could not generate sufficient income in less developed regions while at the same time 
diverting human resources away from the agricultural water system management. As a 
result, irrigated area in Northern County declined in the 1980s and early 1990s.  
According to the county’s water gazetteer, irrigated area declined from more than 500, 
000 mu in 1978 to about 400,000 mu in 1990. The causes for the decline include 
insufficient water funding for repair and maintenance, the silting of irrigation districts, 
the breakdown of irrigation facilities and the damages caused by floods.  
 
In addition to the “Two Pillars and One Key,” the Ministry of Water Resources pushed 
through the policy of compulsory labor contribution in 1989, which mandated that each 
rural laborer must contribute 10 to 20 labor-days every year to rural public works 
including irrigation projects (Gu eds 1999: 280). The goal of the policy was to increase 
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the contributions from peasants and mobilize rural labor to compensate for the shortage 
of water funds. As noted in Chapter 2, mobilizing labor for water projects was a common 
practice in the Mao period. However, the situation was changed substantially in the post-
reform period. While peasants were highly dependent on the state and the collective 
system for livelihoods before 1978, they were allowed to make their own economic 
decisions in response to the market and other external economic factors after the reform. 
In other words, the control of rural labor by the state was significantly weakened. As a 
result, tension arose when local governments compelled peasants to contribute labor to 
public projects. When the latter failed to comply, local officials would fine them for 
missed work days, which had further increased the economic burden on the latter and 
added to rural distress in the 1990s (Ouyang 1999).  
 
In summary, the reform led both central and local governments to focus efforts on 
economic growth while neglecting the agricultural water system in the 1980s. The central 
government cut irrigation funds drastically, and local government diverted resources 
away from water conservancy. The drying up of funding prompted local water 
management agencies to engage in money-making businesses, and as a result, the 
importance of water conservancy was downgraded and even neglected. The 1980s was 
thus a decade when the pursuit of profitability overrode the significance of food security, 
leading to the cutting-back of efforts and resources for the water system at both central 





3.2 Northward Movement of Grain Production 
By the early 1990s, it had become clear that the transfer of water investment 
responsibility to the local level did not work because the cut in water investment had 
caused the increasing incidence of facility breakdowns. The crumbling of irrigation 
facilities reduced the capacity of the agricultural water system in flood control and 
drought alleviation. In the 1970s, the rates of disaster-damaged farming area (chengzai qu 
成灾区) were 42 percent and 28 percent of the disaster-struck areas (shouzai qu 受灾区) 
in the case of floods and droughts respectively, but these increased to 53 percent and 46 
percent in the 1980s (Zhang 1995: 139).
30
 In addition, due to insufficient funding, many 
irrigation works could not be built with auxiliary facilities such as small dams, canals, 
dykes and aqueducts, keeping them from operating in full capacity. These problems 
contributed to the shrinking of irrigated area in the 1980s and amplified the negative 
effect of natural disasters. Nationwide, irrigated area declined from 45 million to 44.4 
million hectares between 1979 and 1988, reversing the decades-old growing trend (MOA 
2009: 7). 
 
Partly as a result, grain production had stagnated and even declined in the second half of 
the 1980s after it peaked in 1984 at 407 million tons. In 1985, it dropped to 379 million 
tons and had not recovered until 1989 (Figure 3-1).  The crumbling of water facilities, the 
shrinking of irrigated area, the impact of natural disasters and the stagnation of grain 
production had altogether alarmed the central government.  
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 The rate is the proportion of disaster-damaged farming area to disaster-struck farming area.  
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The central government was thus forced to increase agricultural water investment in the 
1990s for the sake of grain security. In 1989, the State Council issued a guiding document 
on the development of agricultural water in the 1990s. The document, entitled “State 
Council’s Decisions on Greatly Developing the Infrastructure of Farmland and Water 
Resources,” acknowledged the insufficiency of efforts in the 1980s and called to shore up 
investments and resources at both central and local levels. Following the policy, the 
central government allocated much more funds for agricultural water than previously.  
Between 1989 and 1995, the budget for agricultural water infrastructure had grown from 
3.0 billion yuan to 14.3 billion yuan, more than quadrupled (NBS 2009). In addition, the 
central government also launched a number of projects to improve agricultural conditions. 
A good example is the National Comprehensive Agriculture Development Program 
(nongye zonghe kaifa 农业综合开发), which was initiated in 1988 and has been in 
                                                        





















































































operation ever since. Between 1988 and 1999, central funds for the project totaled 26.9 
billion yuan (more than two billion yuan a year on average), plus nearly an equal amount 
of supplementary funds provided by local governments.
32
 More than half of the funds 
were used for agricultural water use.   
 
Figure 3-2 shows annual agricultural water infrastructure investment from the central 
government between 1991 and 2003. The total investment increased from around 5 
billion yuan to more than 68 billion yuan, an annual growth rate of 24 percent on average. 
In 1995, the investment grew more than 45 percent from 1994. In 1998 and 1999, it shot 
up again, with the investment growing nearly 60 percent in 1998 and 30 percent in 1999. 
Another two events also contributed to the surge of central funds for agricultural water 
infrastructure. In 1994, Lester Brown published the widely-known report, entitled “Who 
Will Feed China?”, which raised concern worldwide about the prospect of China’s grain 
production. The Chinese government was under pressure to demonstrate that it was able 
to produce sufficient grains for domestic consumption. In 1998, huge summer flood 
caused tremendous damage and exposed the vulnerability of the agricultural water 
system. This again prompted the central government to step up water investment further. 
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 The data are available on the website of the project: http://nfb.mof.gov.cn/  
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In short, the concern about food security forced the Chinese state to improve the 
agricultural water system in the 1990s. With increased investments and efforts, irrigated 
area started to expand again, along with the growth of grain production. Between 1990 
and 2000, irrigated area expanded from 47.4 million to 53.8 million hectares, up 13.5 
percent, while grain production exceeded 500 million tons in 1996, another milestone 
after 1984 (Figure 3-1 above).  
 
However, the contradiction between grain security and the pursuit of profitability did not 
go away. As the central government pushed to improve agricultural conditions including 
water conservancy in the 1990s, the contradiction was played out very differently in the 
                                                        























south and in the north. In the south, particularly coastal regions such as the Yangtze River 
Delta and the Pearl River Delta, rapid industrialization and urbanization were drawing 
resources away from grain production. The increased funds on water and agricultural 
infrastructure from the center appeared puny as compared with the profits from urban and 
industrial sectors. As a result, despite the call to improve agricultural conditions including 
irrigation from the center, local actors such as government officials and rural residents 
continued to devote most of their resources to urban and industrial development. This 
trend was even fueled by Mr. Deng Xiaoping’s speeches in 1992 which unleashed a new 
tide of fervor for export-oriented industrialization. The result was that large tracts of 
farmland, including land with access to good irrigation, were lost to factories and cities. 
Take Guangdong province as an example. Irrigated area in the province declined from 
1.8 million hectares in 1990 to 1.5 million hectares in 2000. In the meantime, cropping 
area declined from 4.0 million to 3.3 million hectares (MOA 2009: 97-100, 144-146).  As 
compared with Guangdong, urbanization and industrialization in Hunan province, where 
Southern County is located, was less dramatic, but the province also devoted more 
resources to urban and industrial development than to water conservancy and agriculture. 
Irrigated area in the province stagnated around 2.7 million hectares in the 1990s, and its 
cropping area declined from 5.4 million to 5.0 million hectares (MOA 2009: 97-100, 144-
146).    
 
In the north, the increased investments and efforts made a notable impact on irrigation 
and agricultural production. This was so because competition between grain production 
and industrial-urban development for resources was much less intense than that in the 
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south. According to the comparative advantage theory, the opportunity cost of allocating 
resources such as labor, land and capital to agriculture was much less than that in the 
south (Hendrischke and Feng eds. 1999; Lin, Cai and Li 2003). In addition, with a larger 
size of landholding, rural households can derive a substantial income from agriculture if 
agricultural conditions are improved. The effect on irrigation and agriculture was most 
pronounced in the northeast provinces such as Heilongjiang and Jilin. For example, 
irrigated area in Heilongjiang increased rapidly from 1.1 million hectares to 2.0 million 
hectares in the 1990s, almost doubled. In the meantime, cropping area in the province 
increased from 7.4 million to 7.9 million hectares. Inner Mongolia, where Northern 
County is located, witnessed a similar trend. From 1990 to 2000, irrigated area expanded 
from 1.3 million to 2.4 million hectares, and cropping area increased from 3.9 million to 
4.4 million (MOA 2009: 97-100, 144-146).    
 
Due to the differences in agricultural investments and efforts, grain production started to 
retreat from the south while expanding in the north. The geographical movement of grain 
production changed regional food relations within China. Until the end of the 1980s, the 
south had produced more grains than the north and exported surplus to the latter. In the 
1990s, however, the trend was reversed. Instead of importing grains from the south, the 
north as a whole started to export grains to the south. Figure 3-3 shows per capita grain 
production in the south and north after being subtracted by the national average.
34
 As it 
reveals, grain production in the north has increasingly exceeded the national average 
since the 1990s, while that in the south has dipped further below the average, suggesting 
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 The figure shows the differences of per capita grain production between the south and the national 
average, and between the north and the national average respectively, and it also tracks the increasing 
difference of per capita grain production between the north and the south.    
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that the trend of northward relocation has been strengthening. In 2014, grain production 
in the south was 341 kilograms per person, 103 kilograms less than the national average 
(444 kilograms), whereas in the north it was 589 kilograms, 145 kilograms more than the 
average.  
 






The expansion of grain production in the north had much to do with government policy. 
Confronting the contradiction between economic growth and grain production, the central 
government has intentionally supported northern regions over the south to produce more 
grains. For example, the National Comprehensive Agriculture Development Program 
invested much more in the northeast, the North China Plain and the Middle Yangtze 
Region than in others (Wang 1995; MOF 2001). In the first phase of the project, the 
government identified 11 regions to be primary project sites, of which eight are located in 
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the north (Han 1995; Wan 1990). Northern County in this study was among the first five 
hundred counties that implemented the project. According to the documents collected 
from the county’s archives, the project was aimed to increase grain production by 
expanding irrigated area (mainly by means of sinking tube wells), create terrace fields to 
reduce soil erosion and improve soil quality. In addition to this project, the county 
implemented a number of projects, all of which were aimed to increase grain production.  
 
In summary, the concern about food security led the Chinese state to increase investments 
on water and agricultural infrastructure in the 1990s. However, these investments had 
little effect in the south where rapid industrialization and urbanization diverted resources 
away from grain production. By contrast, the investment expanded irrigated area and 
grain production in the north where the competition for resources between urban-
industrial sectors and agriculture was less intense than in the south. As a result, grain 
production expanded in the north while it was squeezed out in the south, leading to the 
northward movement of grain production.  
 
3.3 The Water-Grain Mismatch 
The northward movement of grain production in China has offered a temporary solution 
to the contradiction between food security and the pursuit of profitability. By moving the 
main sites of grain farming to the north, China could achieve rapid industrialization and 
urbanization while at the same time increasing grain production for food self-sufficiency. 
However, the solution created a mismatch between grain production and water resources. 
As noted previously, the south is endowed with abundant water resources and is thus 
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suitable for grain production. Figure 3-4 shows that the levels of precipitation decrease as 
one travels from south to north. Annual precipitation in most southern provinces exceeds 
800 mm. In southern coastal provinces, the level of precipitation even reaches over 1,200 
mm a year. This creates a favorable condition for grain production because grain crops 
are usually water intensive. In general, approximately one cubic meter of water is needed 
in order to produce one kilogram of grain (Allan 1998). Over the past two centuries, 
southern coastal provinces, the Middle Yangtze River region (Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi and 
Anhui) and the Sichuan Basin have been the main sites of grain production, particularly 
for water-intensive crops such as rice, due to their abundant water resources.  
 
Figure 3-4 The distribution of annual precipitation in China 
 
 
The north as a whole, by contrast, is short of water. In the North China Plain including 
Hebei, Henan and Shandong, annual precipitation is around 600 mm, and the Yellow 
River, Hai River and Huai River also provide an important source of water. However, 
due to water deficiency, the region has mainly grown relatively drought-resistant crops 
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such as wheat. The northwest, the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau and Inner Mongolia are severely 
short of water, with the level of annual precipitation around 400 mm and even less than 
200 mm in some regions. These regions thus lack enough water resources to farm grain 
crops and had traditionally imported grains from the south. The situation in the northeast 
is somewhat better. The level of precipitation is relatively high, and the three major rivers 
including the Songhua River, the Heilongjiang River and the Ussuri River provide a 
source of irrigation. Nevertheless, the region must rely on groundwater for irrigation in 
recent decades. The varying levels of precipitation contribute to the uneven distribution 
of water resources in China. The north as a whole, which covers 63.5 percent of the 
country, only accounts for 19 percent of water resources. As far as groundwater is 
concerned, the north is also far behind the south, with only about 30 percent of the total 
(Liu and Chen 2001; Wang et al 2007; Zhang, Xia and Hu 2009). The size of land 
holding is larger in the north than in the south. The north is home to about 65 percent of 
farmland and 46 percent of the population. Per capita farmland in some regions can be as 
large as 0.5 hectare. However, grain production is not merely dependent on farmland but 
also on water resources. Without sufficient water, the productivity of farmland is low. 
This is why the north had to purchase grain from the south even if it had more farmland 
than the latter in the 1980s and earlier.  
 
Scholars use the concept of virtual water to capture the inseparable relationship between 
water and grain production. Virtual water refers to the water needed to produce 
agricultural commodities. When the commodities are traded, the water used to produce 
them is also traded (Allan 1998, 2003; Hoekstra and Hung 2002). The trade of virtual 
89 
 
water provides a solution to the problem of water deficits in regions such as the Middle 
East and North Africa (Allan 1998). The guiding principle is that water-deficit regions 
should import water-intensive commodities while exporting less water-intensive 
commodities as a way to ameliorate water shortage. For example, the Middle East and 
North Africa imported 50 million tons of grain annually in the 1990s, and this tonnage 
requires about 50 billion cubic meters of water to produce it, which is equivalent to the 
volume of fresh water that flows into Egypt down the Nile in a year. Thus grain imports 
to the region have a great positive effect on its water use (Allan 2003: 107-08).  However, 
the mismatch between grain production and water resources in China runs directly 
against the idea of using the trade of virtual water to solve the problem of water shortage.  
 
A study shows that the north exported 26 million tons of grain a year to the south on 
average between 1990 and 2008. The virtual water contained in these grains amounted to 
more than 23.3 billion cubic meters a year (Wu et al 2010).
36
 In 2014, the north as a 
whole exported 83.6 million tons of grain to the south, provided that every person 
consumed the same amount of grain. Virtual water contained in these grains amounted to 
more than 83.6 billion cubic meters. The South-North Water Transfer project, the most 
ambitious water project in China so far, plans to divert 44.8 billion cubic meters of water 
a year from south to north. However, this is less than 54 percent of the virtual water 
exported from north to south through the trade of grain. In other words, the water 
diverted from south to north cannot make up the loss of virtual water even if all water 
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  Wu et al (2010) uses the grain-water ratio of 1.116 meaning one cubic meter of water can produce 1 kg 
of grain in China, slightly higher than the ratio of 1 used by Allan (2003). However, Wang et al (1999) uses 
the ratio of 0.849 and Lu et al (2010) uses 0.8. This study follows Allan (2003) and Yang & Zehnder (2001) 
to use a rough ratio of one kg grain to one cubic meter of water to simplify the calculation.  
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from the south is used for agriculture in the north. In actuality, the goal of the project is to 
supply water to cities in the north, and little water will be used for agriculture.  
 
Table 3-1 below shows provincial data on surplus grain and virtual water that is 
contained in it. Surplus grain is computed by subtracting grain for self-consumption in a 
provincial region from its total grain production. In the north, most provincial regions 
produced surplus grain in 2014, which was traded to regions where grain production 
could not meet the demand. The largest producers of surplus grain are Heilongjiang, Jilin, 
Inner Mongolia and Henan, but all these provinces are short of water. Inner Mongolia, 
where Northern County is located, is particularly water deficient. Annual precipitation in 
the region is only 305 mm in a normal year, but it sent out 16.41 billion cubic meters of 
water through the grain trade in 2014. Some regions in the north could not produce 
sufficient grain for their own consumption. Most notably Beijing and Tianjin, two mega 
cities with large numbers of migrants, must purchase grains from other regions. In 
addition, the Qinghai Plateau and some northwestern regions such as Shaanxi must 
import grains due to the low levels of rainfall and adverse agricultural conditions. It 
should be noted that some northwestern regions such as Xinjiang, Ningxia and Gansu, 
despite the shortage of water, started to produce surplus grain and trade their virtual water 







Table 3-1 North vs. South in terms of surplus grain and virtual water in 2014 















Anhui 7.16 7.16 Heilongjiang 45.41 45.41 
Jiangxi 1.28 1.28 Jilin 23.11 23.11 
Hunan 0.11 0.11 Inner Mongolia 16.41 16.41 
Hubei 0.03 0.03 Henan 15.85 15.85 
Jiangsu -0.42 -0.42 Xinjiang 3.95 3.95 
Chongqing -1.83 -1.83 Shandong 2.52 2.52 
Hainan -2.14 -2.14 Ningxia 0.84 0.84 
Yunnan -2.31 -2.31 Hebei 0.83 0.83 
Sichuan -2.38 -2.38 Gansu 0.09 0.09 
Guizhou -4.18 -4.18 Tibet -0.43 -0.43 
Guangxi -5.75 -5.75 Qinghai -1.54 -1.54 
Shanghai -9.64 -9.64 Liaoning -1.95 -1.95 
Fujian -10.22 -10.22 Shanxi -2.88 -2.88 
Zhejiang -16.87 -16.87 Shaanxi -4.78 -4.78 
Guangdong -34.02 -34.02 Tianjin -4.97 -4.97 
   Beijing -8.91 -8.91 
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 To simplify the calculation, this study assumes that per capita grain consumption is the same among all 
provinces in the same year. I calculate each province’s total consumption by multiplying per capita grain 
consumption by its population. A province’s grain surplus is then calculated by subtracting its total grain 
consumption from total grain production. A positive number means the province has grain surplus and can 
export its grain, while a negative number means the province is short of grain and must import grain from 
other provinces. Based on virtual water theory, we calculate each province’s virtual water discrepancy. 





Most southern regions could not produce sufficient grain for themselves and must 
purchase grain from the north. The regions that are most deficient of grain are coastal 
regions in the southeast including Guangdong, Zhejiang, Shanghai and Fujian, which 
experienced rapid urbanization and industrialization and drew large numbers of migrants. 
As they imported grain from the north, virtual water was also imported, though these 
regions have abundant water resources (Liu et al 2007). The most serious problem 
concerning the water-food nexus in the south is that the main grain sites now produce 
little surplus grain. According to the guiding policy of the central government for 2008-
2020, six provinces in the south are identified as main grain-producing zones, including 
Sichuan and five provinces located in the middle and lower Yangtze River (Hunan, Hubei, 
Jiangxi, Anhui and Jiangsu). However, as shown in Table 3-1, Jiangsu and Sichuan could 
not produce sufficient grain for themselves while Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi produced 
almost no surplus grain. Only Anhui still maintains a surplus grain output. These regions 
are all water abundant and among the places best suited for grain production in China. 
However, their inability to produce surplus grain suggests that they are not sharing their 
water resources with other water-scarce regions through the trade of virtual water.  
 
In summary, the contradiction between the pursuit of profitability and food security and 
the measures to solve the contradiction created a mismatch between grain production and 
water resources in China in the 1990s. The water-scarce north has been producing an 
increasing share of grain while the water-rich south must purchase grain from the north. 
Seen in the perspective of virtual water, it is the water-scarce north that exports water to 
the water-rich south rather than the other way around. This distorts water relationship 
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between China’s south and north and holds the key to understanding the agricultural 
water crisis in the country.  
 
3.4 The Mismatch and the Agricultural Water Crisis 
Voluminous studies have been conducted on China’s water crisis: water pollution in 
major rivers and lakes, the breakdown of water facilities, the drying up of rivers and lakes, 
and the depletion of aquifers. Brown and Halweil (1998) contended that water problems 
had (and would further) undermined grain production in China. This study turns their 
argument around and offers a more nuanced explanation. It argues that the concern for 
food security in the context of the fanatical pursuit of profitability has created the 
mismatch between grain production and water resources, exacerbating China’s 
agricultural water crisis. In what follows, I will examine how various water problems are 
related to this mismatch.   
 
The crumbling of irrigation facilities  
The Mao period left a legacy of millions of irrigation facilities. However, many of these 
irrigation facilities were incomplete and required follow-up work. For example, after the 
major dam of a reservoir is constructed, auxiliary facilities must be built to supply and 
distribute water to farms. These facilities may include levees, dykes, canals, pump 
stations, sluices, ditches, flumes, culverts, viaducts and pipelines. However, many of 
irrigation works from the Mao period did not yet build these auxiliary facilities and could 




The central government transferred the responsibility of water conservancy to local actors 
in the 1980s. However, local governments, particularly those in the south, were diverting 
resources away from agricultural water to urban-industrial sectors, thus the auxiliary 
facilities were rarely built. In the north, the economy did not grow as fast as that in the 
south, thus many local governments were tight on budget and could not allocate funds for 
maintaining and constructing irrigation facilities. In addition, irrigation facilities are fixed 
assets that are easily worn out, and require constant maintenance. Due to a lack of 
resources for effective maintenance and management, many reservoirs, pump stations and 
large irrigation zones were breaking down.   
 
The agricultural water crisis prompted the central government to survey the conditions of 
irrigation facilities in the 2000s. According to a research report released by the National 
People’s Congress in 2009, most irrigation facilities were in urgent repair and 
maintenance. More than 50 percent of large irrigation zones and 60 percent of small 
irrigation zones saw their irrigation facilities crumbling. More than 95 percent of large 
pumping stations were in need of urgent repair and reconstruction. As far as reservoirs 
are concerned, more than 40,000 reservoirs were breaking down to the point that they 
could create catastrophic disasters once the dams were collapsed in the event of floods 
(NPCC 2009; Guo et al 2011).    
 
In the south, irrigation facilities have been giving way to urban and industrial 
development. Take Hunan province as an example. Roads, factories and mines are often 
built at the expense of irrigation facilities. In 1985 alone, due to the construction of road 
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for factories and cities, the province damaged 465 kilometers of canals, 3,245 ponds and 
2,435 other facilities (MOWRH 1986). My own fieldwork in Southern County in 2010 
found that the government used irrigation funds to build water scenes for urban real estate, 
factories were built on or near river banks, and private investors were destroying rivers 
and canals by digging sands for building materials in the city. In Guangdong Province, 
the funds for water conservancy have been growing in the past two decades, but much of 
the money was used for facilities that serve urban and industrial sectors whilst less than 
30 percent was used to improve the agricultural water system, and urban and industrial 
development was encroaching on farmland (Li 2002; Zhan 2012). As a result, irrigated 
area in the province declined from 2.29 million hectares in 1980 to 1.77 million hectares 
in 2013, down 22.7 percent (GBS 1993: 111; GBS 2014: 79).
 
In Jiangsu, another coastal 
province that has experienced rapid economic growth, rivers, canals, reservoirs and ponds 
were silted up with at least 30 percent reduction in the capacity of water flow or storage; 
more than 40 percent of pump stations was in need of repair or could not work at all; only 




Northern regions also experienced the breaking down of irrigation facilities. However, 
different from their southern counterparts that were unwilling to invest in irrigation, local 
governments in the north were unable to invest in irrigation due to budget constraints. In 
addition, it should be noted that many local governments in the north desire to imitate the 
development model of the south and allocate more resources to urban and industrial 




In short, the crumbling of irrigation facilities in the south including coastal regions, the 
most economically developed regions in China, highlights how the pursuit of profitability 
has contributed to the underinvestment and even neglect of the agricultural water system. 
As a consequence, grain production in many southern regions stagnated and declined. To 
meet the growing demand for food, the north has intensified grain production, 
contributing to another serious water problem in China: the depletion of aquifers.   
 
Falling water tables 
Until the early 1960s, ground water resources had been rarely tapped in China. In 1965, 
there were only 150 thousand tube wells. However, the quantity of tube well started to 
grow very rapidly thereafter. By the late 1970s, there were 2.3 million tube wells. The 
number of tube wells rose very slowly in the 1980s due to the neglect of the agricultural 
water system overall. However, it started to rise rapidly in the 1990s, as the main sites of 
grain production were moving from south to north. In other words, the intensification of 
grain production in the north has been positively associated with the sinking of tube wells 
for irrigation. By 2003, the number of tube wells rose to 4.7 million. A recent census of 
irrigation facilities showed that there were 5.4 million tube wells for irrigation at the end 
of 2011, pumping out 104 billion cubic meters of water from underground (Wang et al 
2007: 45-47; MOWR & NBS 2013).   
 
The over-extraction of groundwater has led to falling water tables. The problem started to 
attract wide attention in the mid-1990s, as the issue of food security in China was 
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highlighted by Brown (1994; 1995). The Ministry of Water Resources conducted a 
comprehensive survey of groundwater problems in 1996. The survey found that the 
groundwater overdraft was a widespread phenomenon and took place in 24 of China’s 31 
provinces. The cones of depression were found in more than 164 locations and affected 
more than 180 thousand square kilometers of area (Wang et al 2007: 48). The World 
Bank published a report in 1997 that also sounded an alarm on the problem of 
groundwater overdraft. Groundwater in the Hai River basin, which covers Hebei, Beijing, 
Tianjin and parts of Shanxi, Henan, Shandong, Jiangsu and Anhui, was over-extracted by 
as much as 30 percent and in many areas groundwater tables dropped by 100-300 meters 
(Johnson, Liu and Newfarmer 1997: 88). In 1998, Brown and Halwail (1998) suggested 
that the water table beneath the North China Plain was falling 1.5 meters per year, a 
disastrous rate that would soon exhaust groundwater resources. In recent years, it is found 
that the problem of falling water tables has been worsening. In 2006, there were 216 
cones of depression, 52 more than the number in 1996. The cones of depression in the 
North China Plain are particularly worrisome. It reportedly has the largest cone of 
depression in the world, 8.8 thousand square kilometers (MOLR 2006; Xinhua Net 2014). 
The overdraft of groundwater will cause a series of environmental problems, including 
the drying up of rivers and lakes, desertification, land subsidence, sea water intrusion, 
salinization and water pollution (Shalizi 2006; Wang et al 2007).  
 
The problem of falling water tables in the north is unevenly distributed and is correlated 
with the intensity of grain production. The Hai River basin is where it is most serious. 
This is due to the overdraft of groundwater in the region, fueled by the combined demand 
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from agriculture, industry and city. In 1997, groundwater accounted for 60.8 percent of 
all water resources tapped, and the utilization rate of all water resources reached 89.4 
percent, suggesting that the region had nearly exhausted its water resources. Other major 
zones of grain production also saw the increasing draft of groundwater. In the northeast, 
which is now the most important site of grain production in China, the volume of 
groundwater tapped for irrigation grew from 8.5 billion cubic meters in 1980 to 26.6 
billion cubic meters in 1997, and its share in all water resources tapped was up 19 percent 
from 23.9 to 42.9 percent for the same period (Liu and Chen 2001: 8). The northwest 
mostly relied on surface water for irrigation in the 1980s and 1990s, but as grain 
production started to intensify in the recent decade. Local actors have turned to 
groundwater for irrigation. For instance, the share of groundwater in all water used in 
Xinjiang increased from less than 10 percent in the late 1990s to 23 percent in 2012.
38
 
The most dramatic case is Inner Mongolia, which is now the third largest grain producer 
(based on per capita grain production) following Heilongjiang and Jilin. The drafting of 
groundwater increased from 1.5 billion cubic meters in 1986 to 9.1 billion cubic meters in 
2014, and the share of underground water increased from 14.6 percent to more than 50 




In short, the intensification of grain production is a major factor contributing to the 
problem of falling water tables in the north. The problem is most serious in the North 
China Plain, but it now spread to the northeast and northwest as these regions are tuned 
into major sites of grain production.  
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 Data source: website of Xinjiang Water Resources Bureau. See http://www.xjslt.gov.cn/index.htm  
39
 Also see 2014 Report on Inner Mongolia Water Resources (Neimenggu shuiziyuan gongbao), by Inner 
Mongolia Water Resources Bureau. 
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 Water pollution 
The problem of water pollution in China has been well studied. Economy (2011) detailed 
the horrific pollution of the Huai River, one of the major rivers in China. Other scholarly 
or popular works also touched upon the issue of water population in China (Johnson, Liu 
and Newfarmer 1997; Liu and Wu 2012; Ma 1999; Nickum 1998; Qu and Fan 2010; 
Smil 1994; Watts 2010). Over the past two decades, the incidents of water pollution have 
frequently made the headlines. In 1980, 20.7 percent of the rivers were polluted, and the 
figure rose to 37.6 percent in 1999. Although the Chinese government has taken great 
effort in the recent decade to prevent and treat river pollution, the problem continued to 
be very serious. In 2015, the percentage of the rivers polluted was 35.5 percent, only 
slightly lower than that in 1999, given that the data reported by the Chinese authority is 
truthful (Liu and Chen 2001: 94-97; MOEP 2016). The conditions of lakes are even 
worse than the rivers. In 2015, of the 61 lakes surveyed, 55 or more than 90 percent 
suffered from eutrophication, and 30.6 percent of large lakes and reservoirs were polluted 
(MOEP 2016). Groundwater is also heavily polluted. A national survey of groundwater in 
2015 reveals that 61.3 percent is polluted. The problem in the north is worse than in the 
south as another survey shows that 79.6 percent of groundwater in the north is polluted 
(MOEP 2016).  
 
The primary reason of water pollution is that urban (residential) and industrial sectors 
discharged toxins and wastewater to rivers, lakes and underground. The problem exists 
widely across China, but it is most serious in economically developed regions, such as 
coastal regions, the Hai River Basin and the northeast (which was the base of heavy 
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industry in China before the 1990s), whereas the problem is relatively moderate in 
western China (Liu and Chen 2001: 94-97). The variation can be explained by the logic 
of the pursuit of profitability noted in the introduction. The industrial and urban pollution 
of waters caused severe harm to grain production both in the south and north. Although 
the main sites of grain production have shifted from south to north, the south still 
produces a significant share of grain in China, 44 percent in 2014. In addition, grain 
production and urban-industrial sectors exist side by side in the North China Plain.  
 
However, the concern for food security, which contributes to the intensification of grain 
production in the north, is also responsible for water pollution. To produce sufficient 
grains, the governments and farmers applied chemical fertilizers, pesticides and plastic 
mulches intensively, which contribute a major source of water pollution. In 2014, China 
consumed 60 million tons of chemical fertilizers, 1.8 million tons of pesticides and 2.6 
million tons of plastic mulches, having increased from 12.7 million tons of chemical 
fertilizers in 1989, and from 0.73 million tons of pesticides and 0.48 million tons of 
plastic mulches in 1990 respectively (NBS 2015: 41; MOA 2009: 8). However, only 35.2 
percent of fertilizers and 36.6 percent of pesticides were absorbed by crops. That is, 38.9 
million tons of fertilizers and 1.1 million tons of pesticides were discharged to water and 
soil in 2014. Most of plastic mulches were left in farm fields, polluting soil and water 
(MOEP 2016). Chemical fertilizers and pesticides, once discharged to water, will 
contribute to the eutrophication of lakes and rivers, heavy metal pollution and the 
elevated levels of nitrite in groundwater. In addition, the expansion of animal farms, 
which are built to meet the growing demand for meat in China, has also been a major 
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source of pollution as animal waste containing antibiotics, hormones and bacteria is 
discharged into open water (Jin and Shen 2013; Schneider 2017).  
 
According to the Ministry of Agriculture, agricultural production (including raising 
animal in factory farms) has surpassed industrial and urban sectors and become the 
largest source of pollution in China (Beijing Times 2015). Water pollution is positively 
associated with the intensity of farming activities. For example, the northeast, the North 
China Plain and the Middle Yangtze region, which are all the main sites of grain 
production, are among the regions that suffer most from the problem of water pollution 
(Yu, Hu and Zeng 2015). In addition, as grain production is intensified in the north, the 
pollution of groundwater is more serious than in the south, as noted above.   
 
In sum, major water problems, including the crumbling of agricultural water facilities, 
depletion of aquifers and water pollution, have all been related to the contradictions in the 
structural dilemma between profitability and food security. The crumbling of agricultural 
water facilities in the south has been due to the bias toward urban-industrial sectors. The 
depletion of aquifers has been caused by the intensification of grain production in the 
north, which the Chinese state has promoted due to the concern for food security. All 
sectors, including agricultural, industrial and urban service sectors, have contributed to 
water pollution. However, the causes and results of water pollution are closely associated 
with the movement of grain production under the structural dilemma, that is, water 
pollution in the south has mainly derived from urban and industrial production, whereas it 




This chapter shows that the neoliberal shift after the reform has sharpened the 
contradictions between profitability and grain production. In the 1980s, the pursuit of 
profits under a decentralized system led to the drastic cut of funding for the agricultural 
water system, leading to the breakdown of water facilities and the stagnation of grain 
production. To counter the trend, the central government increased water and agricultural 
investments in the 1990s. However, this reinforced the trend of the northward 
geographical movement of grain production, which was originally set in motion by the 
rapid expansion of urban and industrial sectors in the south, particularly in coastal regions. 
As a result, grain production and the distribution of water resources have been 
increasingly in mismatch, i.e., the water-scarce north has produced more and more grains, 
leading to serious water problems.   
 
The worsening water problems have prompted the central government to take more 
forceful measures in the new century, including offering billions of water funds and 
setting red-lines on the exploitation of water resources. However, the central efforts must 
be implemented at the local level. The next chapter will look into central-local relations 
in China and assess whether and to what extent the new central measures, under the 
constraints of the profitability-food-security dilemma, can reverse the declining trend of 







Central Mandates and Local Interests: Politics of Water Investment 
 
On 28 November 2014, Southern Weekend, a liberal newspaper in China, posed a 
puzzling question, “Why did huge water investments fail to alleviate droughts over the 
past decade?”
40
 The newspaper pointed out that the Chinese state invested more than one 
trillion yuan in water sectors between 2005 and 2013. Yet, the acreage of farmland that 
was damaged by droughts did not diminish but expanded to 157 million hectares in the 
nine years, which is equivalent to 1.2 times all farmland in China. The newspaper 
attributed the problem to official corruption that scythed away agricultural water funds. 
Official corruption is indeed a factor, given the prevalence of corruption not only in the 
water system but in the entire administrative system (Kwong 2015; Sun 2004; Wederman 
2004). This chapter will demonstrate, however, that the diminished impact of water 
investment has been due more to the structural dilemma than to the corruption of 
individual officials. The contradiction between food security and profitability has diluted 
central endeavor at the local level as local governments moved to concentrate resources 
on profitable economic sectors. The preceding chapter examines the regional 
manifestation of the structural dilemma. This chapter will take a step further and focus on 
the manifestation of the dilemma in center-local relations. 
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I will first examine the structure of China’s water management system. After that, I will 
detail the changes in central policy since the late 1990s that have resulted in rapid growth 
in agricultural water investment. I will then examine the responses of the local 
governments in the two counties in the context of increasing water funds. My research 
shows that, although the central government called for greater effort on the agricultural 
water system, local governments’ responses to the call varied. In Southern County, the 
local government continued to concentrate resources on urban and industrial sectors, and 
diverted a significant proportion of central funds for purposes unrelated to agriculture. By 
contrast, Northern County invested increasing funds to sink tube wells, and the over 
pumping has led to the falling of water tables. As the competition for water has 
intensified between agricultural and urban sectors in recent years, the county also 
prioritized water supply for industrial and urban sectors, thus placing a great strain on the 
agricultural water system.  
 
4.1 The Water Management System in China 
The water management system in China is a complex structure that comprises 
organizations and institutions from the national level down to the village level. Figure 4-1 
shows all important components of the system. The system contains two different 
structures: the vertical structure and the horizontal structure. The two structures lead to 
the decentralization of decision making power in the water management system. As a 
result, the power of the central state is limited, and it must rely on the cooperation of 




The vertical structure is a salient feature of the system. At the top is the State Council, the 
highest administrative authority in China, and the Ministry of Water Resources is one of 
its agencies. Under the Ministry of Water Resources are Water Resources Bureaus at 
provincial, prefectural and county levels (at the township level are Water Resources 
Stations). These agencies form the hierarchy within the water management system. In 
addition, the vertical system of governments from the State Council to provincial, 
prefectural, county and township governments is responsible for water investment and 
management. This is so due to the horizontal structure that connects water agencies to 
governments at every level.   
 
The horizontal structure refers to the water management system at a particular 
administrative level, which usually comprises a local government and a Water Resources 
Bureau. Take the county level as an example. The Water Resources Bureau is the 
principal government agency managing the water system in the county, including rivers, 
lakes, reservoirs, canals, pump stations, etc.  However, it must be subject to the authority 
of the county government, and its funding also comes from/through the government. 
Thus the Water Research Bureau must follow the order of the county government, and as 
a matter of fact, it is one of the agencies of the county government. In addition, the Water 
Resources Bureau reports to the upper-level Water Resources Bureau, that is, the 
prefectural Water Resources Bureau, and follows policy commands from the latter. Thus, 
the Water Resources Bureau must be subject to the authority of both the county 
government and the prefectural bureau. The prefectural Water Resources Bureau does not 
have direct authority over the county government, but it can exert influence through the 
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prefectural government.  
 





In addition, other government agencies are also involved in agricultural water investment. 
These include Bureau of Land Resources (guotu ju 国土局), Bureau of Finance, Bureau 
of Agriculture, Bureau of Development and Reform (fagai ju 发改局) and Office of 
Poverty Alleviation. These agencies have their own sources of funding and often invest in 
agricultural-water-related projects. Local officials I interviewed in Southern County 
called this jiulong zhishui (九龙治水) (literally, nine dragons govern the water), and 
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In short, the decision making power of water management in China is decentralized, and 
the local government holds a very large say in water investment and management in its 
jurisdiction.  
 
Figure 4-1 also shows that the Chinese state has set up ad hoc commissions for large 
rivers that flow through more than one province. These ad hoc commissions will 
coordinate provincial governments in water resources management. The most well-
known commissions have been the Yangtze River Water Resources Commission and the 
Yellow River Water Resources Commission. These commissions report directly to the 
Ministry of Water Resources, a level above the provincial level. Likewise, water ways 
and irrigation facilities that flow across jurisdictions will be coordinated by a higher level 
of water management agencies. For instance, a large irrigation district that covers more 
than one county will be coordinated by the prefectural water agency.  
 
Another important unit in the system is villages, which are the lowest level of social-
bureaucratic organization in China. As seen from Chapter 2, the village-level 
organizations contributed greatly to the expansion of the agricultural water system in the 
Mao period. In the post-reform period, however, the de-collectivization reduced the 
village organization to a coordinator that does not have the power of control. Thus it has 
become difficult for villages to mobilize rural households to contribute to agricultural 
                                                        
42
 The focus group discussion at Southern County Bureau of Finance: May 7, 2013.  
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water use. I will discuss this issue in detail in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
4.2 “Repaying the Debt”: Central Push to Rejuvenate the Agricultural Water 
System 
The year of 2011 is another major turning point in the history of water investment in 
China. The State Council used its No.1 policy document to highlight the importance of 
the agricultural water system and promised to double water investment over the following 
ten years.  In 2010, the total water investment from the central government reached 138.6 
billion yuan, the highest level in the post-reform period. A doubling of water investment 
means that the central government would invest 277.2 billion yuan every year between 
2011 and 2020. Mr. Chen Lei, the Minister of Water Resources remarked that the Chinese 
government was repaying the “debt” that it owed to the agricultural water system 
(Xinjingbao 2011). That is, the Chinese state should have invested the money in the 
system in the 1980s and 1990s but held off until now. In actuality, “repaying the debt” 
started at least a decade earlier than the release of the No.1 Document in 2011. As noted 
above, the center tripled water investment right after the summer floods in 1998. The 
water investment debt that the Chinese state “owed” was enormous. One conservative 
estimate puts it at three trillion yuan. If it were the case, it would take at least another 15 
years for the Chinese government to pay off the debt if half of the investment is allocated 










Figure 4-2 shows that water investment jumped from 170 billion yuan in 2009 to 434 
billion yuan in 2014, up 155 percent. The increase was started by the central government, 
which doubled its investment in 2010 and nearly doubled it again in 2012. The central 
government also used the investment as a leverage to draw investments from local 
governments. One of the conditions for the reception of central water funds is that local 
governments must match an equal amount or a proportion of it for the same project. That 
is to say, the central government provides only a proportion of funding for a proposed 
local project, and the rest must come from the local government. These local funds, called 
counterpart funds (peitao zijin 配套资金), is a sign of shared responsibility between the 
center and local government. This is a key way for the central government to mobilize 
local resources to achieve national goals. Figure 4-2 shows that the surge in central 
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investment has pulled up local water investments. As a result, water investments at the 
local level increased from 78.5 billion yuan in 2009 to 203.4 billion yuan in 2014. Figure 
4-3 below also shows that central and local governments invested similar amounts of 
water funds in most of the years, suggesting a system of shared responsibility being in 
place.  
 
The Ministry of Water Resources classifies all water investments into four categories: 
flood control, water supply, water conservancy and hydropower. Agriculture water use 
falls into the category of water supply, and it to some extent also depends on flood 
control and water conservancy. Flood control, such as building levees and dredging 
rivers, protects the irrigation system in the event of flooding. Water conservancy (shuitu 
baochi) refers to the treatment and prevention of the erosion of water systems such as 
rivers, valleys and basins. The investments for water supply not only include the funds 
for the supply of agriculture water but also those for the supply of water to industries, 
villages and cities. For example, the well-known “South-North Water Transfer project” 
falls into the category of water supply, but is mainly designed to supply water to cities in 













Figure 4-3 above shows the four types of investments from 2004 to 2014. Flood control 
and water supply received the largest investments, accounting for 37.3 percent and 45.4 
percent in 2014 respectively. The funds for hydropower amounted to 56.7 billion yuan, 
making up 13.9 percent, whereas water conservancy received 3.5 percent. However, the 
funds for water supply include those for water supply for industrial use and residential 
use. According to the 2014 annual report of water resources, about 11.4 billion yuan was 
allocated for irrigation districts, and 37.8 billion yuan was allocated to build and repair 
small-scale irrigation facilities. These two investments make up 26.6 percent of the total 
investment for water supply in 2014. Therefore, it is difficult to decide how much 
funding has been allocated for agricultural water use because many funds are used to 
improve the comprehensive water system, from which the agricultural water system 
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benefits. However, it is safe to state that the direct investment in agricultural water supply 
only accounts for a small proportion of all water funds, about 12.1 percent in 2014. 
Therefore, the total amount of all water funds after 2010 has increased rapidly, but the 
funds allocated directly for agricultural water were modest, as most of funds were used to 
improve the comprehensive water system or to construct large water projects such as 
hydropower and large-scale water transfer. For example, the central government invested 
10.3 billion yuan in the South-North Water Transfer Project in 2014, which is close to the 
total amount of funds allocated to all irrigation districts across the country in the same 
year.   
 
Nevertheless, the central government has paid much more attention to the problems of 
agricultural water than in the 1980s and 1990s. In 2004, the Chinese state launched the 
project of “Building a New Socialist Countryside,” under which many policies were 
undertaken to boost agriculture and improve conditions for rural residents. Water 
investments also grew as a result of the policy shift. In 2008, the State Council used the 
No.1 Document to focus on agricultural infrastructure, and the total water investment was 
increased by 56.3 percent in the year (Figure 4-2 above). In short, over the past decade 
and a half, the problems of the water system including agricultural water have drawn 
increasing attention from the center. The rest of this section will detail major measures 
undertaken to improve the agricultural water system since the turn of the century and the 





Strengthening embankment for large rivers and new large water projects 
The 1998 floods exposed the vulnerability of the dams, levees and banks along large 
rivers including the Yangtze River, the Songhua River and the Huai River. After the 
floods, the Chinese state started to fortify embankment for all major rivers, and a 
significant amount of water funds were allocated for reinforcing existing embankments 
and constructing new embankments. The annual reports of water resources show that a 
few thousand kilometers of embankments were repaired and fortified every year after 
1999. Between 2001 and 2014, the total length of embankments increased from 273,401 
kilometers to 284,425 kilometers, up 11,024 kilometers. In the meantime, the length of 
up-to-standard embankments increased from 76,532 kilometers to 188,681 kilometers, up 
112,149 kilometers. Provided that the new constructed embankment is all up to standard, 
the length of all embankments that were fortified in the period reached 101,125 
kilometers, that is, the Chinese government fortified 7,223 kilometers of embankment 
every year on average (MOWR 2015:41).  
 
In addition, the Chinese government started a number of major water projects that will 
improve the agricultural water system. For example, it carried out 19 major projects 
along the Huai River, which was flooded in 1991 and 1998, and again in 2003. The 
investment in the Huai River totaled 44.7 billion yuan and all projects were basically 
completed in 2010 (Xinhua Net 2010a). In addition, the Chinese government started to 
build a number of reservoirs. The building of reservoirs was mainly driven by the 
demand for hydropower, but some of the reservoirs were also designed to control floods 
and supply water to agriculture. The number of reservoirs increased from 84,363 in 2004 
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to 88,605 in 2011. That is to say, China constructed 4,242 new reservoirs in the eight 
years, of which 107 are large reservoirs, 477 are medium-sized and 3,658 are small 
reservoirs (MOWR 2015:36). It should be noted that two enormous water projects were 
also being built in this century: the Three Gorges Dam and the South-North Water 
Transfer Project. The main purpose of the former is to generate hydropower and that of 
the latter is to quench the thirst of northern cities for water, particularly Beijing and 
Tianjin.  
 
Repairing and fortifying reservoirs and dams 
The poor conditions of Chinese reservoirs would shock most observers. At the turn of the 
century, China was home to 84,083 reservoirs, of which 420 are large, 2,744 are medium-
sized and 80,919 are small reservoirs. However, as many as 30,413 reservoirs, 36.2 
percent of the total, were dangerous with their dams at the risk of collapsing. These 
dangerous reservoirs comprised 145 large, 1,118 medium-sized and 29,150 small 
reservoirs (Wang, Xu and Quan 2002). After a decade of repair and fortification, large 
and medium-sized reservoirs were all reinforced and removed from the list of safety 
watch. However, by 2012, there were still more than 40,000 small reservoirs at risk, 
according to the Minister of Water Resources (Chinanews 2012).   
 
The safety problem of reservoirs is not new. In the 1970s, the collapse of hundreds of 
dams raised the alarm of reservoir safety. A survey carried out in the late 1970s found that 
one third of reservoirs were at potential risk and should be repaired (Guo et al 2011). 
However, the issue was shelved in the 1980s and early 1990s as the Chinese state axed 
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water funds. Prior to 1998, the central government financed the reparation and 
fortification of only 69 large reservoirs and 12 medium-sized reservoirs, a tiny proportion 
of those at safety risk (Renminwang 2001). In the three years after 1998, the central 
government invested 3.4 billion yuan to repair and fortify 183 large or medium-sized 
reservoirs (Renminribao 2001). After that, the pace of repairing and fortifying reservoirs 
accelerated. Between 2001 and 2007, the central government invested 27.6 billion yuan 
and repaired and fortified more than 2,000 reservoirs (CCTV 2007). In 2008, the Ministry 
of Water Resources, with the permission of the State Council, drafted and carried out 
another ambitious plan, which invested 62 billion yuan and completed the reparation and 
fortification of 7,356 reservoirs in three years. By 2011, all large, medium-sized and 
major small reservoirs had gone through reparation and fortification (Guo et al. 2011). 
Between 2011 and 2015 (the 12
th
 Five-Year Plan), the Chinese state repaired and fortified 
all small reservoirs that were identified as at safety risk, 50,742 in total 
(Zhongguoshuilibao 2016). In summary, between 1998 and 2015, China completed 
repairing and fortifying all dangerous reservoirs, which amounted to approximately 
60,000.  
 
Direct agricultural water investment 
Before 2008, direct investment in agricultural water only made up a small proportion of 
total water investment. Figure 4-4 shows that the proportion was around 10 percent 
between 2001 and 2008 and that annual irrigation investments amounted to about 10 
billion yuan a year. These irrigation investments were usually used for large irrigation 
facilities. According to the annual reports of water resources, irrigation funds were mostly 
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used to build auxiliary facilities in large and medium-sized irrigation districts; ii) to 
improve the irrigation system in order to increase water use efficiency, including 
repairing canals and ditches; iii) to build electric pump stations and sink tube wells; iv) to 
improve the quality of farmland, such as preventing soil erosion and treating salinized 
farmland; v) to build and promote the use of water-saving facilities and technologies, 
particularly in arid areas.  
 





These irrigation funds were mainly allocated to improve major irrigation districts and 
large-scale irrigation facilities while neglecting small ones, which were supposed to be 
taken care of by townships and villages. However, it was clear in the early 2000s that 
rural communities and households alone could not deal with the decline of small 
irrigation facilities effectively. In 2005, the central government decided to establish a 
                                                        
45








































special fund for repairing and maintain small irrigation facilities. The fund went into 
operation in 2008, when the central government allocated three billion yuan for 
township- and village-level irrigation. The fund was increased to 13.6 billion in 2014, and 
the central government allocated 76.9 billion yuan in total for the special fund by 2014 
(Guangaiwang 2013; Chinanews, 2013). Figure 4-4 shows that irrigation investments 
increased very rapidly from 11.7 billion yuan in 2008 to 82.3 billion yuan in 2014. And 
the share of irrigation in all water funds also grew to 20.2 percent in 2014.   
 
In short, direct investments in irrigation (or agricultural water use) occupied only a 
marginal position in state efforts to improve the water system after the shock of the 1998 
summer floods. In the first 10 years after the floods, the attention was focused on large 
rivers, large/medium-sized reservoirs and large water engineering projects such as the 
Three Gorges Dam and the South-North Water Transfer Project. It was not until around 
2008 that the central government shifted attention to small reservoirs and small-scale 
irrigation facilities that serve directly agriculture.  
 
“Three red lines” 
To cope with the impending water crisis, the Chinese state has set “Three Red Lines” on 
water consumption, water use efficiency and water pollution control. The red lines 
suggest that they will be strictly enforced. The three red lines were raised in the 2011 
No.1 Document, and were specified in another document released by the State Council in 
January 2012. Table 4-1 specifies the red lines and produces specific targets of water 
consumption, water use efficiency and water pollution control (Shen, Jiang and Sun 
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2015). The first red line is the ceiling of total water consumption. In 2010, China 
consumed 600 billion 𝑚3, and the economic growth would lead to the further growth in 
water consumption. This red line is made out of the concern of water scarcity. As noted 
earlier, per capital water resources in China is only one fourth of the world average, about 
2,100 𝑚3 per person.  
 
Table 4-1 The targets of the Three Red Lines 
Targets 2015 2020 2030 
Total water consumption must 
not exceed 
635 billion 𝑚3 670 billion 𝑚3 700 billion 𝑚3 
Industries will reduce their water 
use per US$1,600 (CNY10,000) of 
industrial added value 
73.5 𝑚3 65 𝑚3  40 𝑚3 
Irrigation efficiency must exceed 53% 55% 60% 
The number of water function 
zones meeting the water quality 
standards will be more than 
60% 80% 95% 
All sources of drinking water 
meet standards for both rural 
and urban areas 
 Yes Yes 
 
The control over total water consumption can be achieved by increasing water use 
efficiency, which is measured by the next two indicators in Table 4-1. The water 
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consumption for every 10,000 yuan added value is expected to decrease from 105 𝑚3 to 
73.5 𝑚3 in 2015 and further down to 65 𝑚3 in 2020 and 40 𝑚3 in 2030. In addition, 
irrigation efficiency is set to increase from less than 50 percent in 2010 to 60 percent in 
2013. The control over water pollution is measured by water quality in water function 
zones and that of drinking water. Water function zones refer to any water zones use water 
for specific purposes such as drinking, fishery, ecological restoration, entertainment, 
industrial production and agriculture.  
 
The State Council calls the Three Red Lines the most stringent policy of water 
management, and promises to enforce them effectively. These targets have affected water 
investments. To increase irrigation efficiency, the central government invested to repair 
canals and ditches to prevent irrigation water from leaking on the way to farms. In 
addition, the government promotes the application of water-saving facilities and 
technologies, particularly in water-scarce regions. However, as noted previously, the 
contradiction between food security and profitability has been the major factor in creating 
various problems. And this contradiction has not been sufficiently addressed.  
 
Additionally, although the central government has enhanced policy support for 
agricultural water use, these policies must be implemented at the local level. Whether 
local governments will carry out these policies willingly and effectively matters a great 
deal to the prospect of the agricultural water system. Furthermore, despite the increase in 
central water funds, central budget alone is not sufficient to counter the declining trend of 
agricultural water use. To succeed, it must mobilize local resources. The following two 
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sections examine how central-local dynamics affected water investments in the two 
research sites.  
 
4.3 Southern County: “The Local Fund Never Came” 
Southern county is located in a region with abundant surface water resources. It lies to the 
south of Dongting Lake, the second largest fresh water lake in China. There are four 
major rivers and 131 water ways in the county that are longer than three kilometers. The 
lengths of the four major rivers in the county add up to 326 kilometers. The county built a 
comprehensive agricultural water system in the Mao period, as introduced in chapter two. 
The abundance of water resources and large numbers of irrigation facilities are no doubt a 
boon, but this also presents an enormous task for the county to control flood and maintain 
the agricultural water system.  
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the local government devoted minimal levels of financial 
resources only to keep the water system from falling apart while funds from the central 
government were merely a trickle. In the 18 years from 1986 to 2003, water funds from 
various levels of government totaled 255 million yuan, only 14 million yuan a year on 
average.
46
 Furthermore, this aggregate figure conflates water funds before and after 1998. 
And the amount of water investment before 1998 was significantly less than that after 
1998. According to the national data, the former was approximately one third of the latter. 
Assuming this was also true for the county, it can be estimated that annual water 
investment was about 8.5 million yuan a year in the county between 1986 and 1997. My 
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interviews with local officials suggest that this may as well overestimate the actual 
investment. Mr. Wang, the head of the water management department within the Bureau 
of Water Resources, had worked for the bureau since the 1990s. He told me that the 
county budget for water investment was about two million yuan a year in the 1990s 
before it increased to five million in 2003.
47
 If so, the total water investment was likely 
less than five million yuan a year in the 1990s because water funds from upper-level 
governments were usually about the same as the county-level investment at the time. In 
short, both local and central governments severely underinvested in the water system in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
The 1998 summer floods exposed poor conditions of the water system nationwide, 
including Southern County. More water funds started to come down from the central 
government to the county after that. In 2002, Field Reservoir received a central fund of 
9.2 million yuan to repair and fortify its major dam. The dam was in a very poor 
condition after it was in use for more than 20 years without any repair and maintenance. 
If it collapsed, it would affect a great proportion of the population in the county and cause 
severe damages to farms, railways, highways and several towns in the downstream area. 
The budget for reparation and fortification was 18.5 million yuan, of which 9.2 million 
yuan was promised by the central government while the other 9.3 million yuan should be 
shouldered by local governments as a counterpart fund. After the central fund was paid to 
the reservoir, the provincial government allocated 450,000 yuan. The rest of the fund, 
8.85 million yuan, was the responsibility of the county government. However, “the local 
fund never came,” the management staff told me on June 8, 2010 when I held a focus 
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group discussion with them. In the end, the management agency only spent 9.65 million 
yuan.  
 
Due to the insufficiency of the funding, the management agency had to scale back the 
original repair plan and focus only on the most necessary parts of the project. The 
management staff told me that the dam was much safer than before it was repaired, but it 
was still at risk since a few fortification plans had to be scrapped as there was no local 
counterpart fund. In addition, the repair only improved the safety of the dam but did little 
to agricultural water use. Canals and ditches were silted up or crumbled, and were unable 
to carry water to farms as efficiently as they would be.  
 
The shortage of local funds was due less to the local government’s weak financial 
capacity than to its investment priority. The county is much less concerned about grain 
self-sufficiency than the central government because it could purchase grain from the 
market if there were a shortage. In addition, the export of surplus grain cannot generate 
much income for the county due to the comparatively low prices of grain. Instead of 
investing in the agricultural water system that could not lead to a fast rate of economic 
growth, the county government focused most attention on urban and industrial sectors. In 
2000, the county grew 8.9 percent, to which agriculture only contributed 1.1 percent, 
whereas industry contributed 4.6 percent and services 3.1 percent. In the same year, the 
county’s fiscal expenditure totaled 265 million yuan, of which only 14 million yuan, 5.3 
percent, was spent on agriculture, which includes multiple sub-sectors such as 
123 
 
agricultural water use, crop farming, animal husbandry, forestry and fishery.
48
 That is to 
say, the spending on agriculture was even less than its contribution to economic growth 
(12.4 percent, or 1.1 out of 8.9 percent). Thus, despite the call from the central 
government, the government of Southern County continued to favor economic growth 
overwhelmingly over food security.  
 
Table 4-2 Sources of water investment in Southern County: 2006-2014
49




Investment by central, 
provincial and prefecture 
governments 
Investment by the 
county government 
Amount Proportion Amount Proportion 
2006 42.0 30.0 71.4% 12.0 28.6% 
2007 106.6 75.5 70.8% 31.1 29.2% 
2008 98.4 68.4 69.5% 30.0 30.5% 
2009 130.0 100.0 76.9% 30.0 23.1% 
2010 224.0 143.0 63.8% 81.0 36.2% 
2011 337.1 257.1 76.3% 80.0 23.7% 
2012 481.5 368.5 76.5% 113.0 23.5% 
2013 451.2 292.1 64.7% 160.0 35.5% 
2014 324.2 244.2 75.3% 80.0 24.7% 
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In the most recent decade, prompted by the central government, Southern County has 
significantly increased the volume of water investment. Table 4-2 shows sources of water 
investment in the county between 2006 and 2014. The proportion of water investment 
from the county remained about from one quarter to a third in the period. However, as the 
central government increased water investment, the investment contributed by the county 
government grew accordingly. Overall, total water investment in the county jumped from 
42 million yuan in 2006 to more than 300 million yuan in recent years, and the 
investment from the county government increased from 12 million yuan to 80 million 
yuan and even more in some of the years.   
 
However, my research shows that the tendency of the county government to favor urban-
industrial sectors over grain production has not significantly changed. It is found that 
water investments in the county have continued to prioritize profitable sectors over 
agriculture water use. The county government has employed a number of methods to 
channel water funds to profitable sectors rather than grain farming. Below I will discuss 
three major methods found in my field research. 
 
First, water projects are built to support urban and industrial expansion rather than 
agriculture, even though they are in the name of supporting agricultural water use. In the 
past decade, Southern County renewed dam construction after it was ceased in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Official records show that the county has built four large dams since 2006. 
However, while dam construction in the Mao period was aimed to support agriculture, in 
recent years has it been to promote urban expansion, tourism and hydropower. For 
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example, the Pearl Dam, which was built in 2006-2008, had received 22 million yuan 
from the county government alone and probably more from upper-level governments. 
The main function of the dam is not to irrigate farmland but to create a beautiful urban 
scene that could boost the prices of real estates around the water. An irrigation official 
told me that, although the Bureau of Water Resources was responsible for this project, it 
was the county leaders who decided on the site of the dam. He said, “As irrigation experts, 
my colleagues and I do not think that the site of the dam should be in the place where it is 
now.”
50
 In addition to urban real estate, tourism is another sector that can stimulate rapid 
economic growth. The county government started a number of projects to reshape the 
existing reservoirs to attract tourists. For example, the local government has invested 
millions of yuan in tourist facilities of the large reservoir in the county from 2007 onward. 
Around the reservoir it built villas, a golf course and various facilities for water-related 
entertainment. Another two large dams are also built in tourist regions, and the last dam 
is built to generate hydropower to meet the increasing demand for electricity due to 
industrial and urban expansion.  
 
Second, the government concentrated water funds in a few villages to build 
demonstration zones for grain production and the New Socialist Countryside. Although 
the county tends to prioritize industrial and urban sectors over agriculture, it has to show 
that it abides by central policy and does not violate any policy directives from above. In 
addition, as grain production has become a strategic national goal, the central government 
has offered generous infrastructure and development funds to regions that produce grains. 
To receive central funds, the county government tried to demonstrate its efforts in 
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promoting grain production. My fieldwork in the county reveals that the county 
government has poured millions of dollars to a few villages to build the demonstration 
zones for officials from above to visit. The agricultural water system in these villages is 
the best in the county. This strategy is successful. From 2008 onward, Southern County 
has been recognized as a major grain-producing county, and thus received large amounts 
of development funds. The deputy director of the Finance Bureau of the county told me 
that the county received 400 million yuan of development funds from upper-level 
governments in 2012 alone for its status being a major grain-producing county.
51
 
However, the concentration of resources in a few places would actually produce negative 
effects on the agricultural water system as it neglects the health of the water system at 
large. I will discuss this problem in more details in the next chapter.  
 
Finally, water funds are also disproportionally distributed among the subsectors of 
agriculture. The county government has channeled more water funds to cash crops that 
could boost both economic growth and local revenue than to grain crops.  For example, 
the county has been trying to turn itself into a base for tobacco production since 2005. 
Between 2005 and 2014, it invested more than 200 million yuan to build the 
infrastructure for tobacco production, including irrigation facilities, roads and tobacco 
houses. The irrigation project for tobacco, called yanshui gongcheng (literally, the 
tobacco-water project), received generous water funds. It is unknown how much money 
has been invested in the irrigation system for tobacco. My field visits to tobacco 
production bases in 2013 revealed that the irrigation system for tobacco farms is among 
the best in the county. In addition to tobacco, water funds have also been used to support 
                                                        
51
 Interview date: May 7, 2013.  
127 
 
the farming of vegetables, tea and herbs for making medicines.  The focus on cash crops 
such as tobacco, vegetables demonstrates the bias that the county government holds 
against grain crops, leading to water funds concentrated in areas of cash crops. This 
suggests that most farms, which are planted with grain crops, rice in particular, have 
received disproportionally low amounts of water investment.     
 
In summary, water funds in Southern County have been oriented toward profitable 
sectors such as tourism and real estate, demonstration zones and cash crops, whereas 
grain farms, which account for about three quarters of farmland in the county, are 
neglected or given low priority. The concentration of water funds in nonagricultural 
sectors, demonstration zones and cash crop farms has undercut the investment for regular 
farms and undermined the efforts to improve the agricultural water system as a whole.  
 
In addition, it should be noted that water funds for agriculture have only made up a small 
proportion of all water investments. At the national level, as noted above, most water 
funds are aimed to control floods and supply water for uses in the city. This is also the 
case in Southern County. Flood control has absorbed a significant proportion of water 
funds. The county is a place that has seen frequent floods and droughts. According to 
data from the county bureau of water resources, there was a serious drought every two 
years and flood every three years since 1949. In the event of natural disasters, the local 
government must work to minimize the costs of natural disasters and avoid any human 
casualties. Otherwise, local officials would be punished or even removed from their 
position. When there is a serious drought or flood, or a warning for one, major county 
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leaders, usually top county governor, will take the responsibility of coordinating 
government agencies, townships and villages to fight the disaster. Therefore, it should be 
noted that not all water funds were used directly for agricultural water use, though water 
investment has appeared very high in volume.  
 
Nevertheless, the central government started to stress the importance of small irrigation 
facilities after 2008, and allocate water funds to repair and improve these facilities, 
including small reservoirs, canals, ditches and irrigation ponds. In the past five years, 
Southern County has also allocated water funds to improve small irrigation facilities. The 
next chapter will examine in detail how these funds were used and what impacts they had 
on the agricultural water system. It should be noted that these funds accounted only a 
small proportion of all water investments, usually less than 20 percent.  
 
4.4 Northern County: Save Agricultural Water for the City 
Northern County is located in eastern Inner Mongolia where the economy is relatively 
underdeveloped. Different from Southern County whose industrial and urban sectors 
make up the major share of the economy, Northern County is still an agricultural 
economy where the share of agriculture in the economy is much higher than that in the 
former (Table 4-3). In 2013, agriculture accounted for 25.8 percent of GDP in Northern 
County but only 11.2 percent in Southern County. Moreover, many nonagricultural 
sectors in Northern County are intimately related to agriculture. Industrial activities such 
as grain processing, meat production and alcohol production assume a crucial position in 
the local economy. Therefore, the contradiction between food security and profitability is 
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not as sharp as that in the south as the growth of grain production can be profitable in the 
county. As was shown previously, the problem in Northern County is not that it produces 
an insufficient volume of grain but that it produces too much grain in a water-scarce and 
environmentally vulnerable region.  
 
Table 4-3 Key economic indicators of Southern and Northern County
52
 
 1995 2000 2005 2010 
 S N S N S N S N 
GDP 
(billion yuan) 
2.4 1.1 6.2 1.5 14.4 3.1 49.0 9.3 
Local revenue 
(million yuan) 
201 51 236 60 535 170 2,548 508 
Rural income per 
capita (yuan) 




38.6 __  31.5 45.9 20.8 46.4 12.6 28.5 
Note: * A severe drought struck Northern County in 2000, leading to a rapid fall in rural 
income.  
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, a major factor that held back water investment in the county was 
its poor financial capability. The county was recognized as poor county by the central 
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 Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of the two counties in various years. S and N stand for Southern and 
Northern County respectively.  
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government, along with 591 other counties in the 1990s. In 1995, local revenue amounted 
to only 51 million yuan, and annual rural income was 1,059 yuan per capita on average, 
only two thirds of the national average, which was 1,578 yuan (NBS 1996:36). By 
comparison, local revenue in Southern County reached 201 million yuan in the same year, 
about four times that in Northern County. Table 4-3 shows that Southern County has 
outperformed its northern counterpart in nearly all economic indicators. In addition, the 
share of agriculture in GDP has been substantially lower in Southern County than that in 
Northern County.  
 
Due to a tight local budget, Northern County had to mainly rely on central funds for 
water investment in the 1990s, while the local government took responsibility to mobilize 
peasants to contribute labor to water projects. In the early 1990s, due to the insufficiency 
of water funds, the county could only repair some existing irrigation facilities such as 
canals and culverts. Irrigated area started to expand, but at a slow speed. In 1993, for 
instance, the central government transferred only 2.2 million yuan to the county for water 
investment. In the late 1990s, the central government increased support for 
underdeveloped grain-producing areas such as Northern County. Water funds from the 
center were increased to 7.0 million yuan in 1995 and further to approximately 10.0 
million yuan in 1999. In this period, attention was focused on both surface and ground 
water. The county inherited from the Mao period a number of irrigation facilities that 
harness surface water, including 15 reservoirs and 84 pump stations. Some of the water 
funds were used to improve these facilities. Contrary to Southern County where irrigated 
area stagnated or probably declined in the 1990s, Northern County saw its irrigated area 
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expanding from 340,000 mu in 1991 to 429,135 mu (28,609 ha.) in 2000, up 26.2 percent.   
 
The year of 2000 was a turning point with respect to water investment in Northern 
County. A severe drought struck the county in full force and halved its grain production. 
In the meantime, the central government further increased development funds for poor 
and grain-producing regions in western China. As a result, the county received a growing 
volume of water funds, which totaled 149 million yuan between 2001 and 2005. After 
2006, the county received about 50 million yuan a year for water investment. With these 
water funds, the county sank a large number of tube wells. In addition, the rising grain 
prices, which were a part of grain policy of the central government, motivated farmers to 
increase grain production. The most efficient way to do so is to sink tube wells and turn 
rain-fed farms to irrigated farms. The yield of the latter is usually a few times the former 
or even higher in a normal year, given low levels of precipitation in the county.
53
 Thus 
both the local government and farmers were actively sinking tube wells. As a result, the 
number of deep tube wells increased from about 1,000 in 1999 to more than 9,000 in 
2013, plus another 20,000 shallow wells. The extraction of ground water through the 
wells enlarged irrigated area in the county from 28,609 hectares in 2000 to 55,945 
hectares in 2013, nearly doubled. This also boosted grain production in the county, which 
increased from 642,000 tons in 1998, the highest level in the 1990s, to 1.25 million tons 
in 2013, also doubled. This growth fits into the regional pattern. As seen from the 
previous chapter, northern regions like Inner Mongolia and Northeast China have become 
the backbone of grain production in China as grain production relocated from south to 
north.  
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However, the swelling number of tube wells has strained the county’s scarce water 
resources. Mr. Cui, 44 years old at the time of interview, had been working for the 
Bureau of Water Resources of the county since 1989. He told me that the falling of 
groundwater tables accelerated in the past decade due to the intensification of 
groundwater irrigation. The water table fell nearly eight meters every year, and on 
average, groundwater tables in the county fell from 30 meters in the 1990s to more than 
100 meters in recent years.
54
 The over-pumping of groundwater drained away surface 
water while at the same time making recharge increasingly difficult. In addition, while 
low levels of precipitation have to do with climate change in the region, it also results 
from shrinking surface water in the county and surrounding areas, which reduces the 
likelihood of rainfall.  
 
To deal with the problem of over-pumping, the county government started to introduce 
water saving technologies as early as in the 1990s. Farmers used to use traditional water-
saving methods such as border irrigation, furrow irrigation and land leveling, and these 
methods have relatively low fixed cost, but they were adopted in the quite early age and 
have exhausted their potential of water saving (Liu, et al. 2008). However, the issue of 
water saving has never become more serious than in recent years. The county government 
no longer financed sinking new tube wells in recent years. In addition, it used a large 
water fund from the central government to promote drip irrigation. Drip irrigation can 
save water and fertilizer by allowing water to drip slowly to the roots of plants, either 
onto the soil surface or directly onto the root zone, through a network of valves, pipes, 
tubing, and emitters. Thus drip irrigation is generally more efficient than conventional 
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water-saving methods. The county started to install the facilities of drip irrigation in 2010. 
By 2015, it had installed drip irrigation for 900,000 mu of farmland (60,000 ha.). The 
financial cost of adopting drip irrigation is not low. The main equipment of drip irrigation 
including main line, valves and laterals, cost around 600-800 yuan per mu and they can 
be used for about 20-30 years. But every year farmers need to replace the drip tape, 
which will cost another 120-130 yuan per mu. In the phase of experimentation, the 
county government subsidized the installment of the main equipment and also the 
disposable drip tape. For instance, in 2012, besides providing free equipment to 
households who agreed to adopt drip irrigation, the government also subsidized 100 yuan 
for the replacement of drip tape per mu. Thus, individual households only paid 20 yuan 
for the replacement of drip tape per mu. Taken together, the central government had 
invested 648 million yuan in drip irrigation in the county. The project of drip irrigation is 
expected to reduce agricultural water use. According to my interviews with local officials, 
technically irrigating one mu of farmland only requires 15 to 20 cubic meters of water if 
drip irrigation is adopted, comparing to the 100 cubic meters with traditional irrigation 
methods. Thus it can save water up to 70-80%. The effect of drip irrigation remains to be 
evaluated in the county. A major concern arising from my fieldwork is whether farmers 
are willing to bear the recurring cost, that is, 120 yuan per mu after the first year.  
 
The water-saving policy is well in line with the center’s red lines. It seems that the 
initiative came from the central government as it provided nearly all funds for the 
application of drip irrigation. However, while agriculture has become the target of water 
saving and efficient water use, the city or industry has been largely spared from scrutiny. 
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Moreover, to stimulate economic growth further and increase revenue, the local 
government has now turned to industrial and urban sectors, particularly urban real estate.  
Table 4-3 shows that the share of agriculture in GDP declined from 46.4 percent to less 
than 30 percent in recent years, suggesting that the importance of agriculture in further 
economic growth has diminished.   
 
Northern County, like many other cities and towns in China, has in recent years focused 
on urban real estate development for it can generate local revenue. When I was doing 
fieldwork in 2013, urban houses were sprawling well beyond the old county town and 
into the countryside. The size of the old county town was about 5.5 square kilometers in 
2005, and it was expanded to more than 10 square kilometers. Along with the change was 
the growth of the population in the county town from 30,000 in the 1990s to 80,000 in 
2013. According to the county’s urbanization plan, the goal is to increase the population 
to 100,000 by 2015 and 200,000 by 2030. The county town will expand to 26 square 
kilometers accordingly. The county is located in a place with abundant land, thus the 
conversion of farmland into urban land, would not be a constraint. The biggest problem is 
water. The population growth has led to over pumping in the county town, and the water 
table declined to more than 150 meters. Moreover, underground water in the town is 
severely insufficient to meet the demand from further population growth.   
 
The solution is water transfer. The county started to transfer water from the largest river 
that flows through the county. As noted above, the river does not contain much surface 
water. Thus the county sank 14 large tube wells along the river and transport water to the 
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county town through pump stations and water pipes. The distance between the water 
source and the county town is 34 kilometers. The project was started in 2012 and largely 
completed in 2015. The total cost of the project amounted to 137 million yuan, and there 
will be costs of maintaining the facilities thereafter.  The central government provided 80 
million yuan for the project, and the rest was financed by the local government. 
According to my interview with Mr. Cui, the central fund was offered to supply drinking 
water for rural residents. The local government also stated in official documents that the 
project was a part of the policy to supply water to rural residents who have no access to 
safe and clean water, with local media showing the pictures of rural residents receiving 
water from the project. However, the real purpose of the project is to send water to the 
county town, according to Mr. Cui. The water transfer project sends about 9.1 million  
𝑚  of water to the city in a year. The total volume of water could irrigate 6,000 hectares 
of farmland if one hectare of farmland uses 1,500 𝑚 . If drip irrigation is applied, it could 
irrigate at least two times more, i.e., 18,000 hectares.  
 
In addition to the water transfer project, the county government built a dam in a river near 
the county town to create a water scene for urban real estate. This blocked farmland in 
the downstream from access to any water in the river. Walking on the river bank, I found 
the dam created two distinct scenes: on the one side is a beautiful lake-like water scene, 
but on the other side is the dried riverbed without a drop of water. This resembles the two 
faces of water use policy in the county: while agriculture is squeezed and must use less 




In short, as water has become increasingly scarce in Northern County, the county 
government has used water funds to build projects to save water from agriculture but to 
expand water use for the city. Although it appears legitimate to promote water-saving 
agriculture in the county, the increasing demand from urban expansion for water would 
push the county further into a water crisis. It is very likely that the largest river in the 




The central government has greatly increased water investment since the 1990s. The 
1998 summer floods prompted it to allocate water funds for repairing and fortifying river 
embankment and reservoir dams. Under the strategy of “Building a New Socialist 
Countryside,” the government also allocated fund for strengthening agricultural 
infrastructure including irrigation facilities. The 2011 No.1 Document that focused on the 
water system has led to a new wave of water investment, and the total water investment 
in recent years has been more than ten times that in the 1990s. Scholars and officials 
remarked that the Chinese government is paying the debt it owed to the agricultural water 
system in the first two decades of the post-reform period. However, despite the large 
amounts of water funds reported by the central authority of water resources, it should be 
noted that more than 80 percent of water funds are not targeting the agricultural water 
system directly, and the funds for hydropower, the South-North Water Transfer project, 
and other projects to supply water to industries and cities assume a large share in all 
water investments.  
137 
 
In addition, most of water investments at the local level were also diverted to urban and 
industrial sectors. It is particularly so for areas like Southern County that derives 
economic growth much more from nonagricultural sectors than from agriculture. In 
Southern County, agricultural water funds have been diverted to building dams and water 
facilities for urban areas and tourist sites. And the local government refused to match 
counterpart funds for central agricultural water funds. In Northern County, agriculture 
assumes a relatively important position in the local economy. Central water funds and 
local efforts created a frenzy rush for tube wells in the first decade of this century. 
However, this has strained the water system and caused the water table to sink. In recent 
years, large central water funds were allocated to install drip irrigation. While water has 
been saved from agriculture, it is diverted to the city as the county relies on urban real 
estate development for economic growth and local revenue. As a result, water investment 
in the county is pushing the local water system toward a water crisis.  
 
In a nutshell, the structural dilemma between food security and economic growth has 
shaped central-local relations in water investment. As compared with the central 
government, local governments are much less concerned about food security and grain 
production than economic growth and local revenue. As a result, while the central 
government invested heavily in agricultural water use, local governments often divert 
central funds to supply water for profitable urban and industrial sectors. This has 
undercut water funds for the agricultural water system in Southern County, and diverted 




Nevertheless, as the central government poured funds into the agricultural water system 
and employed policy tools to create incentives for local governments to get in line, funds 
for agricultural water use have increased from both central and local sources. The next 
two chapters will examine how villages and farmers have responded to water investment 
from the government and how the contradictions between grain production and nonfarm 




















Who Tills the Land? 




, 2010, Wen Jiabao, the then Chinese Primer Minister, came to visit Southern 
County for a collapsed dam and assess the progress of reconstruction. The dam, built in 
1964, is positioned in one of the major rivers in the county and functions to divert water 
from the river to nearby farmland. A serious flood, following days of heavy rain, caused 
the dam to collapse. The premier’s visit to the disaster-struck area worried provincial 
officials because it would expose the problems of water infrastructure. However, county 
officials were upbeat as they hoped to seize this opportunity to showcase their 
demonstration projects such as a modern grain-production base. Therefore, local officials 
made careful arrangements for the premier’s visit to the dam. Nothing unanticipated had 
occurred. However, the event took a surprising turn after the visit. On the way back to the 
county town, a group of peasants stood beside the road and waved to the minibus that 
was carrying the premier. As usual, Premier Wen wanted to show his approachability to 
ordinary people and thus he asked the bus to stop. Mr. Chen, a middle-aged peasant, 
came forward to report that excessive coal mining in his township caused land subsidence 
and damaged houses and farms. However, households that were affected could receive 
little compensation. After the premier intervened, the problem was solved, but local 
officials lost the opportunity to flaunt the demonstration projects. Moreover, they were 




The event unfolded when I was doing fieldwork in the county. After obtaining more 
details, I found that what occurred was at odds with two popular assessments of China’s 
agricultural water. The first assessment is that agricultural water is crucial to peasant 
livelihood and peasants pay much attention to it. The second is that peasants are unable to 
take collective action on irrigation because they are not organized (as noted in the 
introduction chapter). Both assessments cannot account for the event. Peasants in the 
township are much less concerned about irrigation than about nonfarm activities. The 
collapse of the dam affected 20,000 mu of farmland (1,333 ha.), but it did not cause an 
outcry from peasants since farming was not a major source of their income. Peasants 
were working in factories, running shops, driving trucks, doing construction work nearby 
and/or migrating elsewhere for jobs. Mr. Chen, for instance, owned a vegetable store in 
the central town of the township. In addition, the encounter with the premier was 
carefully plotted.  Peasants knew that they could not get close to the premier at the scene 
of the dam due to the tight control by local officials. Thus they planned to intercept the 
motorcade on the road to the county town. After the premier got off the bus, a 
representative came forward with others supplementing his account. I learnt that a group 
of peasants had planned these steps carefully and created a scene of random encounter 
with the premier so that they would not be punished by local officials later. This 
demonstrates that peasants in some cases can organize and take collective action. 
 
This chapter examines micro dynamics of agricultural water use at the sub-county level 
in Southern County, and details how rapid rural transformations in the past three decades 
have rendered the rural society inadequate to meet the challenge of reviving the 
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agricultural water system. I argue that social differentiation and the diversification of 
rural economic activities in the countryside have sharpened the contradiction between 
food security and profitability for peasants and rural communities. As a consequence, 
some rural households are much less interested to take effort to improve irrigation 
facilities than others. In addition, although it is true that village organizations are 
weakened and often unable to organize peasants to maintain irrigation facilities, it is an 
outcome of social differentiation that generates varying degrees of interest in agricultural 
water. As I will show, villages and peasants are able to organize and take collective 
action on public projects if their interests converge, as in the case of rural road 
construction.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First, I will introduce the four villages 
where I carried out fieldwork and compare their social and economic conditions. Second, 
I will examine social differentiation and economic diversification in the villages and in 
the county at large. Third, I will show how social differentiation has affected households’ 
attitudes and behavior toward agricultural water use. Finally, I will make a comparison 
between roads and irrigation facilities to show how rural households can take collective 
action on road construction but not on irrigation, though both are rural public works.  
 
5.1 From County to Villages: Fieldwork and Micro-level Investigation  
The village is the lowest official administrative level in water management, and it is 
tasked to manage and maintain small-scale irrigation facilities such as canals, ditches and 
ponds, which store and carry water to farmland. In 2000, there were 915 villages in 
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Southern County, but the number was shrunk to 392 in 2004. By the time of my 
fieldwork in 2013, it declined further to 368. The decrease was a result of the village-
merging policy, which was widely practiced in China in the first decade of this century. 
The government merged two or three neighboring villages into one. After the merge, the 
population of a village usually increased to around 2,500 people. The upsizing of villages 
can reduce administration cost. In addition, the merging made it possible to fully 
incorporate village officials into the bureaucracy by reducing the number of village 
officials while increasing their salaries. Previously, village officials received a very low 
salary and they were supposed to work only part time. But the merging also brought 
problems for village governance. A major problem I found is the increased social 
distance between village officials and ordinary peasants as the officials focus more on 
orders from above than popular demand from below.   
 
Along with the merging of the villages was the expansion of urban neighborhoods in the 
county town. The number of urban neighborhoods increased from 12 in 1995 to 33 in 
2004 and further to 54 in 2013, testifying the rapid urbanization of the county. According 
to the population censuses, urban residents, including permanent urban residents and 
long-term migrants, accounted only for 15.6 percent in 2000, but it increased to 43 




I started to carry out fieldwork in Southern County in the summer of 2010, when I 
collected data on social and economic conditions of the county. In addition, I conducted a 
case study of Field Reservoir and performed interviews with peasants and irrigation 
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officials. In April 2013, I started another extensive fieldwork in the county. In addition to 
interviews with county officials, I purposively selected two townships and four villages 
(two in each township) to investigate how geographical locations and economic 
conditions shape community and household actions on the agricultural water system. Of 
the two townships, one township (Dragon Township) is located only eight kilometers 
from the county town whereas the other (Mountain Township) is 72 kilometers away 
(Table 5-1). In Dragon Township, there are booming nonfarm opportunities. An 
industrial park, which houses more than twenty enterprises, is located in it. In addition, a 
great number of its rural laborers are working in the county town. By contrast, nonfarm 
opportunities in Mountain Township are limited. To find nonfarm work, rural laborers in 
the township have to migrate outside the county, and many are working in Guangdong 
province as factory workers. Field Reservoir, on which I conducted a case study in 2010, 
is located in Mountain Township.    
 
Table 5-1 also shows that income per capita in Mountain Township (11,400 yuan, or 
1,781 US dollars) is much less than that in Dragon Township (18,300 yuan, or 2,860 US 
dollars). The difference mainly derives from nonfarm income. A modern grain 
production base is located in Dragon Township. The government stated that the base 
covered 30,000 mu of land (2,000 ha.), but my fieldwork found that the core area was 
about 3,000 mu (200 ha.). One of the villages in the township selected for my fieldwork 
is located within the core of the base, while the other is next to the village but is outside 
the core base. This provides a good case of comparison as the production base received 
much more irrigation funds than did the villages outside the base.    
144 
 
Table 5-1 The two townships in the year of 2013
56
 
 Dragon Township Mountain Township 
Distance to the county town 
(kilometers) 
8  72  
Number of villages 13  16 
Population (persons) 38,900  51,800  
Farmland (hectares) 2,140  2,655  
GDP (billion yuan) 1.42  1.07  
Annual income per capita (yuan) 18,300  11,400  
 
I use capital letters—Dragon A, Dragon B, Mountain C and Mountain D—to denote the 
four villages I visited. Dragon A and Dragon B are located in Dragon Township while 
Mountain C and Mountain D in Mountain Township. In addition, Dragon A is located 
within the grain production base. Within each village, I interviewed village officials for 
basic social and economic conditions, with a focus on policy implementations in the 
village. In addition, I randomly selected 25 to 30 households for a questionnaire survey 
and a semi-structured interview, and collected 105 questionnaires in total. The rest of this 
section will briefly describe the conditions of each village based on my interviews with 
village officials while the next three sections will report my findings from the 
questionnaire survey and household interviews.  
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Dragon A is located about 13 kilometers away from the county town, and situates at the 
center of the grain production base. The farmland totals 2,400 mu, mostly rice paddies, 
and land per capita is from 0.6 mu to 1.4 mu, depending on the production team to which 
one belongs. In any case, the size of land holding is very small in the village, so is in 
other villages. There are 701 households and 2,460 residents in the village, of which 
about 1,500 are counted as laborers. According to village records, about 380 laborers 
migrated outside the county in search of work, and amongst them, 130 crossed the 
provincial border. Most of migrant laborers went to Changsha, the capital of Hunan 
Province. In addition, village officials told me that dozens of people in the village went to 
work in coal mines in other provinces because wage rates were higher. A miner could 
earn more than 5,000 yuan a month. Most of the laborers in the village took nonfarm jobs 
nearby or in the county town, including taxi or truck drivers, small business owners, 
factory workers, chefs, construction workers, domestic workers, and etc. Most of them 
took care of their farms while working as nonfarm workers because it takes less than an 
hour to travel from their workplace to home. There were also nonfarm opportunities 
within the village. The villagers were running a rice factory, a cement factory, a gas 
station, a kindergarten, and a few restaurants and convenience stores. Peasants who work 
mostly on farms usually age above 50 years old. Many of them also took part-time 
nonfarm work nearby. Irrigation facilities within the village include a small reservoir, 40 
ponds and three kilometers of canals and ditches. Located in the production base, the 
village received millions of water funds, with which it cemented all canals and hired 
people to maintain all irrigation facilities on a regular basis. Thus I was surprised when 
some villagers complained to me that they could not irrigate their farms. Further 
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investigation revealed that the village was receiving water from the largest reservoir in 
the county. However, as major canals were crumbled due to poor maintenance, reservoir 
water could no longer reach the village in recent years. However, the village is located in 
the production base. Thus the county government invested millions of yuan in 2013 to 
construct a new canal to divert water from coal mines in the neighboring township to the 
village.  
 
Dragon B is located next to Dragon A, and peasants in the two villages are engaged in 
similar economic activities. Dragon B is slightly larger than Dragon A, with a population 
of 2,756 and 714 households. The farmland is about 2,700 mu. A major difference 
between the two villages is that Dragon B is located outside the core zone of the 
production base. This caused the divergent paths of irrigation investment as irrigation 
facilities were much underinvested in Dragon B than in Dragon A. As a result, villagers, 
both village officials and ordinary peasants, exhibited strong grievances toward the local 
government for the unfair treatment. The party secretary of the village complained to me, 
“In the grain production demonstration zone, roads and irrigation facilities are well built 
and maintained with millions. However, we did not receive any of those funds. As a 
matter of fact, our village is more supportive of farming rice. We are not in the zone, but 
most of our farms are growing double-cropping rice.”
57
 The secretary remarks came 
against the background that more and more peasants in the county gave up double-
cropping rice for single-cropping rice to save on labor. Peasants grow single-cropping 
rice for self-consumption rather than for sale in the market because their income mainly 
derives from nonfarm employment. To create the false impression for visitors from 
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upper-level governments, the local government ordered that all farms within the 
production base must grow double-cropping rice. Dragon B irrigated farmland with water 
from a nearby river, and a dam was used to divert water from the river to farms. However, 
due to sand mining in the river and poor coordination,
58
 the water level decreased to the 
point that the dam was no longer able to divert water to farms. In recent years, the village 
had to pump water from the river to the canals first. As the canals were also broken down, 
peasants must use electric pumps to move water from canals to their farms. This greatly 
increased irrigation cost and became a major source of complaints from the peasants. The 
leadership of Dragon B was reshuffled in 2010 due to the corruption of the former party 
secretary. The secretary contracted the project of village road to a company, and 
allegedly took bribes from the company. As a result, the newly built road was in a very 
poor condition. The corruption case had badly shaken the faith of villagers in village 
officials.  
 
Villages of Mountain C and Mountain D are located in Mountain Township. Mountain C 
is located in the downstream of Field Reservoir, and its farmland is irrigated by water 
from the reservoir. However, Mountain D is located higher than the reservoir, and it 
cannot take use of the water from the reservoir. Mountain C has a population of 2,764 
and 776 households. Farmland per capita in the village is 0.8 mu, similar to other villages. 
As the village is located far away from the county town, many peasants migrated outside 
the county in search of work. The major destinations of migration are Guangdong 
Province, Changsha and the county town. Previously 60 percent of migrant laborers from 
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the village went to Guangdong. In the recent decade, as economic opportunities in the 
county grew due to rapid urbanization and economic growth, some of the migrants 
returned and found nonfarm work within the county. At the time of my fieldwork, about 
40 percent of the rural laborers were working in Guangdong Province. Since many 
peasants were working far away, land transfer was widespread in the village. Village 
officials estimated that 60 percent of farmland was transferred to other households. The 
government project also accelerated the process. The village is located in the zone of 
tobacco farming. Two hundred and forty mu of land, about one fifth of the total, was 
transferred to seven households to grow tobacco. Interestingly, six out of the seven 
households were village officials while another received the government contract. The 
party secretary was farming 70 mu, the largest of all tobacco farms. According to him, 
the households that ran tobacco farms previously made a loss, and after that, no 
households wanted to take the risk. However, tobacco farming is a political task which 
must be fulfilled, thus village officials had to take over these farms themselves. The 
tobacco farms, which can generate much more local revenue than grain crops, also 
received generous funds from the local government. Around two million yuan were 
invested in the infrastructure (land levelling and irrigation) for tobacco farms in the 
village, and irrigation facilities for these farms are the best. In addition, the farms located 
near Field Reservoir can receive stable water supply, but those far away suffer irregular 
water supply due to the poor maintenance of canals and ditches. 
 
Mountain D is about 10 kilometers away from Mountain C. It has a population of 2,680 
and 672 households. Due to the construction of Field Reservoir, a significant proportion 
149 
 
of farmland was flooded in the early years. As a result, farmland per capita is small in the 
village, about 0.4 mu. In addition, the quality of land is substandard since the remaining 
land is usually located on hills. However, the village has large woodlands which can be 
used to grow medical herbs. And it is much more profitable than rice farming. A rich 
villager contracted 1,000 mu of woodland to grow medical herbs and was hiring 20 
villagers as seasonal workers, who were paid on a daily basis, 50-60 yuan a day. Many 
households also grow medical herbs themselves. The risk of farming herbs is high. The 
harvest comes three years after the initial sowing, and market prices are highly 
unpredictable in such a long period. As in Mountain C, many peasants migrated from 
Mountain D to elsewhere in search of work. The difference is that Mountain D is located 
near a market town and thus villagers can find some nonfarm jobs nearby. For example, 
there is a meat-processing factory near the village, and it hires about 50 local laborers. In 
addition, the village is also running a few stone mines that produce construction materials 
for the city. These mines, which are all leased to private investors, also employ a small 
number of local laborers. Irrigation in the village relies mainly on dozens of ponds, but 
most of the ponds are silted up and their irrigation capacity is substantially reduced. To 
irrigate their farms, some households use electric pumps to draw water from the reservoir, 
but it is very costly.  
 
In summary, the four villages differ from each other in terms of distance to the county 
town, migration patterns, local nonfarm opportunities and crop structure. There are also 
similarities. For instance, farmland per capita in all villages is small, and thus most rural 
households cannot rely entirely on farmland for income and must engage in nonfarm 
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activities. With respect to irrigation, all villages are tapping surface water, and their 
irrigation facilities have deteriorated to varying degrees in the past three decades. In 
recent years, the villages received funds from the government to improve irrigation 
facilities. Except for Dragon A, the funds are insufficient to repair all irrigation facilities. 
The four villages cannot represent all villages in Southern County, but the diversity 
enables me to investigate the actions of rural communities and households in a rapidly 
changing rural society. The findings from the four villages can also shed light on 
agricultural water use in the region, the Middle Yangtze Region, or the south at large, 
where farmland per capita is small and peasants engage in a wide range of economic 
activities. The next section will draw on my questionnaire survey and interview data to 
show the patterns of rural differentiation and stratification in the villages.    
    
5.2 Rural Differentiation and Stratification 
The aforementioned switch from double-cropping rice to single-cropping rice implies 
reduced effort on grain farming from peasants. According to my interviews with local 
officials, about half of the farmland in Southern County switched to single-cropping rice. 
The change derives from the diminishing share of agriculture, grain farming in particular, 
in both local economy and household income. In 1985, the share of agriculture (primary 
sector) in local GDP was 57.4 percent, but it declined to 19.1 percent in 2005 and further 
down to 10.9 percent in 2014. Meanwhile, the share of secondary sector (mainly 









The share of agriculture in rural income has also declined considerably. According to the 
county’s official statistics, rural income per capita in 2014 amounted to 19,500 yuan. 
However, only 4,224 yuan, 21.7 percent derived from agriculture, while wage income 
amounted to 9,155 yuan, 46.9 percent of the total and income from nonfarm business 
amounted to 13.2 percent. In other words, only one fifth of rural household income came 
from agriculture while more than 60 percent of income derived from wage employment 
or nonfarm business. The share of grain farming is even lower as agricultural income 
comprises incomes from animal husbandry and cash crop farming.  
 
My questionnaire respondents reported an even lower proportion of agricultural income. 
Table 5-2 shows that agricultural income accounts for only 14.8 percent, and farming 
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income was 8.1 percent. The numbers were probably underreported because some of the 
respondents excluded income from the grains that were self-consumed. The share of 
farming income should fall somewhere between 10 and 15 percent. At any rate, the share 
of farming in household income is low. According to an agricultural official, farming has 
become a sideline activity for peasants in the county.
60
 In addition, out of 105 
questionnaire respondents, only 26 reported that agricultural income, which includes 
income from both farming and animal husbandry, is important to their family. Only seven 
respondents stated that the importance of agricultural income had increased over the last 
30 years, while 52 answered that it had declined.  
 
Table 5-2 Composition of household income in Southern County
61
 





    Nonfarm         




5,839 4,794     61,104 71,737 
% 8.1 6.7     85.2 100 
 
Along with the declining importance of agriculture comes occupational diversification. 
Take the household as a unit of analysis. It is rare that a household engages only in 
agriculture. Of 105 respondents, only eight households were engaged solely in agriculture. 
Most of the households were engaged in agricultural and non-agricultural activities at the 
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 Data source for Table 5-2, 5-3, 5-4 and Figure 5-2, 5-3: survey data in Southern County.  
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same time. I further classify occupations within a household into four categories: farming, 
animal husbandry, wage employment and nonfarm business. Table 5-3 shows the number 
of households with different combinations of occupations.  
 
Table 5-3 Combination of occupations by rural households in Southern County 
Occupations within the households Frequency Cumulative 
percentage 
Farming; wage employment 24 22.9 
Farming; animal husbandry; wage employment 19 41.0 
Farming; wage employment; nonfarm business 13 53.4 
Farming; animal husbandry; nonfarm business 11 63.9 
Farming; animal husbandry; wage employment; nonfarm 
business 
8 71.5 
Wage employment; nonfarm business 7 78.2 
Farming 5 83.0 
Farming; nonfarm business 5 87.8 
Farming; animal husbandry 3 90.7 
No working member 3 93.6 
Animal husbandry; wage employment 3 96.5 
Wage employment 2 98.4 
Nonfarm business 2 100.3 
   




The table reveals that most of the households combine agricultural and non-agricultural 
activities. The largest category is the households that combine farming and wage 
employment, followed by those that take up the two plus animal husbandry. A large 
number of households run small nonfarm businesses, totaling 46 households or 43.8 
percent. In addition, 76 households are engaged in wage employment, accounting for 
72.4 percent, that is, nearly three quarters of the households have members who earn 
wage income. It should be noted that this survey may have underreported the number of 
households that had the entire family migrating to the city because the survey only 
targeted the households that still had members in the countryside.  
 
Within a household, the members whose age is above 50 usually take up agriculture, 
while the younger members work for wages or run small business. Mr. Chen
62
 in Dragon 
A village, 62 years old at the time of interview, was farming 14 mu of rice paddy, of 
which seven mu was leased from fellow villagers. The rent is 100 yuan per mu/year. He 
was living with his son’s family. His son, 40 years old, was working as a house 
remodeling worker in the nearby township. He earned about 200 yuan a day and worked 
for 320 days in 2012, which made his annual income 64,000 yuan. His daughter-in-law 
worked in a raincoat factory with a monthly salary of 2,000 yuan. By comparison, 
income from rice farming was much lower. Mr. Chen told me that the net income from 
one mu of rice was only 600 yuan. That is, he could only earn 8,400 yuan a year from 
growing rice. The largest expense of the household was children’s education. His 
granddaughter attended a high school in the county town, and all expenses added up to 
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15,000 yuan a year. His grandson was attending a middle school in Dragon township, 
which cost 6,000 yuan a year.  
 
In addition, the rural society was highly stratified, with rich households pulling far ahead 
of poor households. Figure 5-2 shows the distribution of income for the 105 households. 
Median income per capita was 15,333 yuan in 2012. The lowest was 650 yuan while the 
highest reached 40,700 yuan. There were one quarter of the households earned less than 
9,000 yuan while another quarter of the households earned higher than 24,400 yuan.  
 
















































Social stratification is highly correlated with occupations within a household. Figure 5-3 
shows that households with members engaged in nonfarm business receive the highest 
medium income. When a household is solely engaged in nonfarm business or combines 
nonfarm business and wage employment, the household is most likely to be among high-
income households. By contrast, households that are only engaged in agriculture are more 
likely to position in the low-income range. Figure 5-3 also shows that wage employment 
is highly stratified, and can result in either high income or low income, as implied by the 
income distribution of the households that are engaged in “farming and wage 
employment” or “farming, animal husbandry and wage employment.” 
 
Figure 5-3 Distribution of income by occupation 
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The survey above does not include two powerful and high-income occupations. One is 
the contractors (baogongtou), who contract large infrastructure projects such as road 
construction and irrigation projects. These contractors often have connections with 
government officials and can secure contracts through these connections. I did not 
interview any large contractors formally, but I met with a few of them when I was 
conducting interviews with government officials. In addition, my interviews with 
peasants also verified that they were among the richest in the countryside. The other 
group of rural elites are village officials such as party secretary and village head. Party 
secretaries are appointed by the township government while village heads are elected by 
villagers every three years. The salaries they receive from the government are low, 920 
yuan a month. This is even lower than the wage rate of a factory worker in the county, 
which was 1,500 yuan per month in 2013. However, party secretaries and village heads 
often own businesses. In addition, they can derive income from other sources, which are 
not acceptable by law or government regulation. My fieldwork found two common ways 
to do so. One way is to take kickbacks when contracting village infrastructure projects to 
contractors. For example, I was told that the former village party secretary of Dragon B 
took kickbacks when contracting out the project of village road construction. The other 
way is that they receive a percentage when they lease out common village resources such 
as land. In Mountain D, it was widely believed that village officials took money when 
leasing stone mines and collective woodland out. In recent years, village official 
corruption has become widespread. For example, it is an open secret that village officials 
take a cut when the village receives government funds. These blatant corruptions increase 
village officials’ income but undermine the trust of villagers on the village administration.  
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Other remunerative occupations in Southern County include factory owners, shop owners, 
enterprise managers, skilled technicians who own means of production such as trucks and 
excavators, and farmers who are engaged in large-scale animal husbandry and cash crop 
farming. These high-income occupations are often related to the booming industrial and 
urban sectors. For example, as the housing sector has expanded greatly in the recent 
decade, new high-income occupations such as excavator operators emerged. Mr. Wang
63
 
in Dragon A, 41 years old at the time of interview, has a family of five. He and his wife 
must support his mother’s eldercare and two daughters in middle school. In 2011, he and 
a fellow villager took loans and purchased a Japanese excavator, which cost them 1.1 
million yuan. They hired an excavator operator with a monthly salary of 4,000 yuan. His 
job was to find businesses for the excavator. As there are so many construction sites in 
the county, there is a high demand for the excavator. In 2012, the excavator brought a 
profit of 250,000 yuan. In addition, he purchased a used truck in 2012 to transport earth 
and stone for construction sites, and earned 30,000 yuan. His wife worked for six months 
in 2012 as a domestic helper in the county town with a monthly salary of 1,800 yuan. In 
2013, she must stay home because she had to take care of her mother-in-law. Thus the 
household leased five mu of farmland from fellow villagers and farmed eight mu of rice 
in total. 
 
Low-income households are mainly engaged in small-scale farming and low-wage 
employment. For example, Ms. Hu, 40 years old at the time of interview, stayed home 
and took care of farms and families.
64
 Her mother-in-law was 81 years old and her 
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159 
 
daughter was in middle school and son in primary school. The size of her farm is very 
small, only 2.8 mu. Her husband migrated with a construction team and worked in 
various provinces. He could earn about 30,000 yuan a year, given that he did not suffer 
any work injury. He was injured when working in coal mine previously, and after the 
incident, his physical conditions no longer allowed him to work as a miner. In 2012, the 
household was in the bottom quarter of the income distribution, 6,200 yuan per capita. 
 
With regard to farming, the farm size of most households that were surveyed was small. 
A third of the households farmed three mu or less, and two thirds of the households 
farmed 6.5 mu or less. In addition, 91.1 percent of the households farmed one hectare (15 
mu) or less. Only three households I interviewed in the county farmed more than two 
hectares, with the largest farm size being four hectares. The small size of land holding 
limits the amount of income from agriculture, and it is particularly so if the land is used 
for grain farming. Some households are able to generate a relatively high income by 
using the farm to grow cash crop. For example, Mr. He in Dragon B, 44 years old at the 
time of interview, leased 40 mu of land to grow vegetables.
65
 Previously, he was working 
in Changsha as a meat vendor. As the vegetable market was booming, he decided to 
return home and farm vegetables on a large scale. In 2012, his vegetable farm generated a 
profit of about 120,000 yuan. However, vegetable farming was also a high-risk business, 
depending on the market and weather. In 2011, his vegetable farms made a loss due to 
low market prices and an insect disaster.  
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In a nutshell, the rural society in Southern County is highly differentiated and stratified, 
with most of households taking up nonfarm economic activities. This has profound 
impact on the agricultural water system at the village level. The next section will 
document how social stratification and differentiation has affected the maintenance of 
irrigation facilities in the four villages.  
 
5.3 Diverse Interests in Agricultural Water  
Villages in Southern County are supposed to take responsibility for two kinds of 
irrigation facilities: small canals and ponds. There are 65,000 ponds in the county, that is, 
176 ponds for each village on average. These ponds store water from rain, which can be 
used for irrigation during the dry season. Small canals are the last part of a large 
irrigation system, which sends water from reservoirs, lakes, rivers through artery canals, 
large canals and small canals to farm field. If small canals were broken down, water 
would not reach farms even though other facilities are in good shape. They are called “the 
last mile” of the irrigation system in China. After the Chinese state invested enormously 
to fix large water facilities such as large reservoirs and river embankments, the problem 
of “the last mile” started to surface.  
 
The conditions of ponds and small canals in Southern County are no better than those of 
large facilities. Most of the ponds are silted up due to a lack of dredging. In the Mao 
period, villages organized peasants to clear mud out of the ponds every year so that the 
ponds could store more water for irrigation. In addition, the mud removed from the ponds 
was a good fertilizer and thus were taken to nearby farms. However, in the post-reform 
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period, villages were unable to organize peasants to dredge the ponds. This was primarily 
due to the aforementioned factor that farming was less profitable as compared with 
nonfarm activities. In addition, chemical fertilizers were widely used, and thus there was 
no demand for pond mud as fertilizer. As a result, nearly all ponds in the county were 
silted up, and their irrigation capacity was significantly diminished. Mr. Wang
66
 in 
Mountain D, 63 years old, farmed six mu of farmland. Besides farming, he and his wife 
were raising pigs and working for the large farm of herbal medicine in the village. He 
told me that a pond near his farm could irrigate 20 mu of farmland in the past. However, 
the pond was silted up due to lack of dredging, and it could irrigate less than 10 mu in 
2013.  
 
Small canals must be constantly maintained; otherwise they would be silted up, blocked 
or broken down. As these canals are an integral part of the larger irrigation system, the 
breakdown of a small canal upstream would affect a wide area downstream. Interviewees 
in all four villages complained about the poor conditions of small canals. Ms. Zeng,
67
 47 
years old, farmed nine mu of land, of which five mu were leased from a fellow villager. 
She and her husband owned a relatively large pig farm and raised 200 pigs a year. Their 
only son was working in Changsha after graduating from college. Ms. Zeng lamented 
about the poor conditions of canals. “Irrigation in our production team is the worst as we 
are located in the downstream of the canal. No one takes responsibility. Every household 
contributed a few workdays to maintain the canal in the past, but no one does it now. In 
the past four years, we had to use an electric pump to get water from the river, which is 
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100 meters away from the farm. The canal is blocked by mud and trash, and water cannot 
flow through. My neighbor leased his five mu of land to us because farming is too much 
a trouble due to poor irrigation.” 
 
Except for those in Dragon A, most of the households, 53 out of 74 respondents or 71.6 
percent, agreed that irrigation in their village had been getting worse in the past three 
decades. Only eight respondents, or 10 percent of the total, held that irrigation was 
getting better. This might due to the fact that the government allocated some funds in 
recent years to dredge the ponds, which I will discuss below.  
 
As noted in the introduction, a widely accepted notion is that the disintegration or 
weakness of village organizations is responsible for the decline of irrigation facilities at 
the village level. Some of my interviewees also blamed the problem on village officials 
who did not organize villagers to maintain irrigation facilities. However, village officials 
held that they did try to organize villagers, but many villagers resisted. Chinese scholars 
also attributed the problem to the policy that abolished the compulsory labor contribution 
(Luo 2005; Luo and He 2008). As noted in Chapter 3, the central government mandated 
in 1991 that each rural laborer must contribute a few workdays every year to public 
works including irrigation facilities. However, the policy was abolished in 2006, as a part 
of the policy shift under the Program of “Building a Socialist Countryside.” As a result, 
village officials were no longer able to force villagers to contribute workdays. Thus it 
was argued that the abolishing of compulsory labor contribution led to the decline of 
irrigation facilities at the village level. However, what happened in Southern County was 
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at odds with this argument. The fact that village officials were unable to mobilize 
peasants existed long before the policy was abolished in 2006. It was seen in the 1980s, 
and particularly so in the 1990s.   
 
My research revealed that the abolishing of agricultural taxes in 2006 had a negative 
impact on agricultural water system. It made it very difficult for water management 
agencies to collect water fees. Water management agencies were set up to manage large 
and medium-sized reservoirs, pump stations and artery canals so that water could be sent 
from reservoirs and rivers to farms. To cover the cost of water supply, peasants were 
required to pay. The rates were not high, however. It was 26 yuan per mu in Southern 
County, less than five percent of agricultural output. Previously, the township 
government collected water fees along with agricultural taxes. However, after agricultural 
taxes were abolished, water management agencies must collect water fees themselves. It 
is a very difficult task to collect water fees from every household. And a number of 
households refused to pay water fees. In 2010, I was told that the management agency of 
Field Reservoir could collect only one third of water fees. And the situation was getting 
worse since more households were following suit when they saw other households not 
paying the fee. By 2013, I was told that some water agencies stopped collecting water 
fees. Without water fees as an extra income, water management staff lost the incentive to 
maintain reservoirs and canals.  As a result, some large canals broke down. 
 
My research showed that the lack of collective action on agricultural water and the 
difficulty in collecting water fees had much to do with the differentiation of the rural 
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society. Although many rural households in Southern County are still engaged in grain 
farming, its share in rural income has declined to less than 15 percent, as noted earlier. In 
addition, the rural society is highly stratified, with the higher strata relying much less on 
agriculture than the lower strata do. Furthermore, even the lower strata must devote great 
efforts to nonfarm activities, notably wage employment, to avoid falling into poverty. 
This affects agricultural water at the village level in two ways: the importance of 
irrigation facilities has diminished as it contributes a marginal share of rural income; 
households have diverse interests in agricultural water as their degree of engagement in 
agriculture is different, and the divergence in interest has rendered collective action very 
difficult.   
 
Most of my interviewees, including village officials and ordinary villagers, agreed that 
the importance of irrigation had declined to the extent that peasants were unwilling to 
devote effort to it. However, there is difference between the four villages. Dragon A and 
Dragon B are located close to the county town and many of the villagers find nonfarm 
employment nearby. It is convenient for them to take care of farming while working as 
wage workers or small business owners at the same time. Therefore, a significant 
proportion of households were still engaged in farming and attached some importance to 
irrigation. In Dragon A, 14 out of 31 respondents answered that fellow villagers paid 
more attention to irrigation than 30 years ago, whereas six respondents answered that 
fellow villagers paid less attention. Others answered “no change” or “do not know.” In 
Dragon B, six respondents out of 21 chose “more attention” while eight chose “less 
attention.” The difference between Dragon A and Dragon B was derived from the fact 
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that Dragon A was located in the core demonstration zone and received a much greater 
amount of irrigation funding. The government intervention led some villagers unwilling 
to express their opinion for fear that it would jeopardize what they already had. Six 
respondents answered “do not know,” the highest proportion among the four villages.  
 
Table 5-4 Attention paid to irrigation over the past 30 years 
Village A B C D 
 Count % Count % Count % Count % 
More 
attention 
14 45.2 6 28.6 0 0.0 2 7.1 
         
Less 
attention 
6 19.35 8 38.1 18 72.0 21 75.0 
No 
change 
5 16.1 5 23.8 4 16.0 4 14.3 
Do not 
know 
6 19.35 2 9.5 3 12.0 1 3.6 
Total 31 100.0 21 100.0 25 100.0 28 100.0 
 
By contrast, Mountain C and Mountain D are located far away from the county town, and 
thus villagers must migrate in long distance to find nonfarm employment. As noted, 
many of the villagers migrated to Guangdong Province to work as factory workers. 
Therefore, there is a tradeoff between farming and nonfarm employment, and most 
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villagers have chosen nonfarm employment over farming. As a result, much less attention 
has been paid to irrigation in the villages due to long-distance migration, as compared 
with Dragon A and Dragon B. In Mountain C, no respondent agreed that fellow villagers 
paid more attention to irrigation than 30 years ago, whereas 18 out of 25 respondents 
opined that fellow villagers paid less attention. In Mountain D, two respondents 
suggested that more attention was paid to irrigation while 21 respondents argued 
otherwise.  
 
Despite the difference among villages due to the availability of local nonfarm 
employment opportunities, the interest in irrigation has declined generally along with the 
contribution of agriculture to household income. Mr. Yan
68
 in Mountain C, 66 years old, 
was farming four mu of land with his wife. His son worked in Changsha and supported 
them with 4,000 yuan a year. Other sources of income included farming income and 960 
yuan of pension from the government. He told me that his farm used to receive water 
from Field Reservoir. However, the canal was broken down in the past ten years, and he 
had to rely on ponds for irrigation. But the ponds were also silted up and lost much of 
their capacity. He said that it was difficult to organize villagers to repair the canal or 
dredge the ponds because most of the youngsters were working further away, and 
remaining villagers were unwilling to do it. The daily rate of wage was over 100 yuan, 
and no one wanted to work on irrigation for free.  
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 Household interview No. 81 on June 3, 2013.  
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Irrigation is of little importance to higher income households that are not engaged in 
farming. Mr. Li
69
 in Mountain D, 44 years old, owned a truck and drove it himself. His 
wife was running a hair salon in a nearby town. His family was among the highest 
income in the village and had not been engaged in farming for more than ten years. His 
answer was a definite “no” when I asked him whether he was willing to donate money or 
free workdays to irrigation. He has two daughters. One daughter was working in the 
county town as an accountant and the other was a student in middle school. The family 
owned one apartment in the county town and two houses in the nearby town. Their future 
plan for residence was open but definitely not returning to agriculture.  
 
Diverse interests in agricultural water have rendered collective action on irrigation very 
difficult. Some households did not farm at all. In Mountain C and Mountain D, it was 
estimated that one quarter to one third of households left agriculture for nonfarm sectors. 
In Dragon A and Dragon B, the ratio was less than one quarter, but the importance of 
agriculture declined significantly. Among the households that were still engaged in 
agriculture, many did not see agriculture as a substantial source of income but a source of 
food for self-consumption. Among 105 households I surveyed in the four villages, only 
26 household or 24.8 percent regarded farming as an important source of income, and 
among them, only six respondents regarded it as extremely important. These respondents 
were either specialized households that contracted farmland for large-scale farming or 
poor households that depended solely on farming. As many as 44 households regarded 
farming as an unimportant source of income, and the other 35 households took the 
position in between. In other words, rural households in Southern County have varying 
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 Household interview No. 69 on May 21, 2013. 
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  in Mountain C, 28 years old, was running a small business installing security 
doors, and earned an income much higher than that farming would generate. He had been 
a production team leader for two years at the time of interview. He told me that it was 
difficult for the management agency of Field Reservoir to collect water fees. Some 
households refused to pay the fee on the excuse that they did not use water from the 
reservoir. Some did not pay because they did not farm their land. More and more 
households followed suit and refused to pay water fees. As a result, no one maintained 
the canal in the past ten years, and the canal was broken down, cutting off irrigation for 
40 mu of land in his production team. Peasants had to give up growing rice and shift to 
drought-resistant crops.  
 
Therefore, the lack of collective action at the village level was derived from diverse 
interests in agricultural water. This is not to say that the disintegration of village 
organizations did not have any impact. My fieldwork observed a general decline in 
collective efficacy in the villages. As noted, the former party secretary of Dragon B was 
removed due to a charge of corruption. In the other three villages, peasants complained 
about the corruption and misconduct of village officials. The most common accusation is 
that the village officials embezzled government funds that were supposed to be used for 
public projects. This reflected a general distrust of village officials even though villagers 
did not have concrete proof of corruption.   
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However, the lack of trust does not suggest that the villages are unable to take collective 
action to pursue their common interests. The following section will examine the case of 
road construction. It shows that all villages were able to take collective action when their 
interests converged.  
 
5.4 Divergent Paths of Agricultural Water and Village Roads 
Roads, like irrigation facilities, are a kind of infrastructure requiring large investments 
and constant maintenance. However, unlike irrigation facilities, roads serve fast-growing 
sectors such as the automobile industry, transportation, commerce, tourism and real estate, 
and thus occupy a central position in the rural economy of southern China, which has 
been expanding its nonfarm sectors over the past three decades. This difference has 
produced divergent outcomes of investment in irrigation and road construction at the 
village level. 
 
After 2005, along with the overall strategy to stimulate the rural economy, the investment 
in rural roads increased greatly. Between 2006 and 2009, the central government invested 
166.1 billion yuan, which, together with other sources of investment, constructed and 
reconstructed rural roads in the length of 1.56 million kilometers (Xinhua Net 2010b). In 
the 12
th
 Five Year (2011-2015), the central government provided 326.5 billion yuan for 
rural roads, and mobilized other sources of funding for up to 1.3 trillion yuan, which 
mainly came from local governments and rural households. By 2015, 99.9 percent of 
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administrative villages nationwide had access to paved roads, and the length of all paved 
rural roads reached 4 million kilometers (Xinhua Net 2016).   
 
As a usual practice, the central government only provides partial funding for rural roads, 
and requires local governments and beneficiary households to supplement at least an 
equal amount of funding. According to an official at the Bureau of Transportation of 
Southern County, the central and provincial governments provided 100,000 yuan for the 
construction of every kilometer of village road, and the prefectural and county 
government supplemented 30,000 yuan and 10,000 yuan respectively.
71
 That is, a village 
can receive 140,000 yuan for every kilometer of road it builds. However, the cost of one 
kilometer of road was 300,000 yuan before 2010, and it increased to 350,000 yuan in 
2013. In other words, a village must invest 160,000 yuan for every kilometer of road 
before 2010, and 210,000 yuan in 2013. However, such a large cost did not dampen the 
enthusiasm of villages to upgrade their roads. In the five years of 2006-10, the county 
built 2,700 kilometers of village road. That is, the villages contributed 432 million yuan 
to village road construction. All four villages built paved roads when I conducted 
fieldwork in 2013, and nearly all households I interviewed contributed to road 
construction, and all of them agreed that the contribution was justified.  
 
There are four ways for villages to seek supplementary funds for road construction. First, 
a village may ask for donations on a per capita basis from every household in the village. 
Dragon A built its road in 2008-09, every resident in the village contributed 200 yuan, 
and some poor households were allowed to contribute less than the amount. The 
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 Government official interview on May 8, 2013  
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contribution in Dragon B was 15 yuan per person, but it asked the households near the 
road to contribute more. Each of these households contributed about 3,000 yuan, and 
some rich households contributed as much as 20,000 yuan. Mountain C built its road in 
2009, and every resident was asked to contribute 600 yuan, but the poorest households 
could waive the contribution. Mountain D built its main road in 2006 with a poverty 
reduction fund, and did not ask for contributions from villagers. But many households 
donated money to build branch roads, usually 100 yuan per person.  
 
Second, a village may ask for extra donations from wealthy villagers and former residents 
of the village, including business owners, civil servants and high-wage professionals. In 
Dragon B, a villager who works for a local bank donated 20,000 yuan while another 
former villager working as a policeman donated 10,000 yuan. In Mountain C, every 
former villager who work in the government was asked to donate 20,000 yuan. And the 
rich villagers who are usually business owners or professionals were also solicited for 
donations. Some villages erected a stone tab and inscribed on it the names of donors and 
donation amounts. These stone tabs were an honor and recognition for the donors, and 
would enhance their reputation in the village community.   
 
Third, a village seeks extra government funding to supplement the road construction cost 
through any social/political connection they could obtain. The party secretary of Dragon 
A told me that he spent 75 percent of his time nurturing good relationships with 
government officials in the county town or the capital city of the province in order to get 
more funding for his village. If the village has any former villagers who hold powerful 
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government positions, the village officials will ask him/her to help the village get extra 
government funds. This is commonly practiced in the county. In Dragon B, a former 
villager was promoted to the head of the Department of Armed Force (wuzhuang 
buzhang 武装部长) in a neighboring county, and he helped the village receive a large 
government fund to supplement the funding for road construction.    
 
Last, a village may take loans to build the village road, and pay off the debt later. Village 
B made a debt of 1.2 million yuan after it built its main road, and Mountain C made a 
debt of 500,000 yuan. In many cases, the village would not take loans from the bank but 
owed the payment to the construction company. Local construction companies often 
allowed late payment because they were eager to contract the project. These villages 
hoped to pay off the debt with future government funds.  
 
In a contrast to irrigation, villagers, no matter they are engaged in farm or nonfarm 
sectors, hold a common interest in roads. As the market has penetrated into the rural 
economy, households are in much need to transport people and goods. Farming 
households need a good road to purchase agricultural inputs and sell agricultural produce 
or farm animals. Roads are also crucial to non-agricultural activities such as rural 
industry, local commerce and labor migration, not to mention truck driving, which are 
among the most profitable undertakings in the county. Road transportation is thus in a 
much more central position than irrigation in the rural economy. In the 1990s and early 
2000s, well-off villages in Southern County started to pave their roads with hard 
materials such as cobble, asphalt and concrete. With increased funds from upper 
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governments in the past decade, more and more villages upgraded their roads to concrete 
roads. The enthusiasm for road was further fueled by the increased use of motorized 
vehicles. Of 105 households surveyed, 93 owned motorcycles, 30 owned a truck, and 19 
owned a car. 
 
All four villages were much more enthusiastic to build roads than to repair irrigation 
facilities. Of 105 respondents, 57 held that fellow villagers attached more importance to 
roads than to irrigation, and only nine respondents answered the other way around. And 
25 respondents suggested that fellow villagers paid equal attention to roads and irrigation. 
Many respondents remarked that they were not willing to donate for irrigation. However, 
when asked whether they were willing to donate for roads, 98 respondents gave a positive 
answer while only seven respondents answered otherwise. As a matter of fact, all four 
villages successfully mobilized villagers to contribute to the construction of the village 
roads.  
 
The divergent paths of agricultural water and roads in the four villages demonstrate two 
points. First, a major reason for the lack of collective action on agricultural water has 
been the divergent interests in irrigation in rural areas of Southern County. When 
villagers’ interests converge, they can take collective action toward a common goal, as in 
the case of rural roads. Second, although the decline of collective efficacy did take place 
in the reform period, it is still hasty to suggest that village communities are unable to take 
collective action. The four villages in this study, as well as many other villages in the 
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county, were able to mobilize villagers to donate for village roads and activate social 
resources through community and kinship networks.   
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Due to the dire situation of the agricultural water system at the village level, the central 
government in the past five years allocated funds for the reparation of small irrigation 
facilities, such as small reservoirs, branch canals and ponds. By the time of my fieldwork 
in 2013, every village in the county, including the four villages in this study, received 
government funding to dredge ponds and repair branch canals. This made a positive 
impact on agricultural water use. However, government funds fell far short of the actual 
demand. There are 176 ponds in each village on average. At the time of fieldwork, fewer 
than 10 ponds had been dredged in each of the four villages. Thus it would take many 
years to dredge all ponds. In addition, the policy has not addressed the fundamental 
problem of irrigation: diverse rural interests have rendered any collective action on 
irrigation very difficult.  
 
The diversity of rural interests has been derived from the pursuit of profitability. The 
imbalance in economic returns between farming and nonfarm sectors has led rural 
laborers to leave agriculture (grain farming) in masses. As a result, social economic status 
in the rural society is highly associated with nonfarm activities. Rural residents, including 
village officials, could gain little if they devote efforts to grain farming and irrigation. It 
is against this background that village officials are unwilling to organize peasants for 
irrigation and that peasants are unwilling to devote efforts to irrigation. The contrast with 
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roads throws this into sharp relief. Due to its central position in the rural economy, the 
construction of the village road would not only generate greater economic returns but 
also bring honor and reputation to village officials and the village community as a whole.     
 
The top-down push on grain production was also diluted at the village level. The local 
government concentrated water funds in a few villages (for instance, Dragon A) rather 
than distributed them equally and fairly. Villages that did not receive much funding 
support held strong grievances, and this further undermined their incentives in irrigation. 
I was told that village officials who asked villagers to donate for irrigation would be seen 
as incompetent and unqualified because they were not able to get government funds for it. 
This further prevented village officials from taking initiatives on irrigation.  
 
The situation in Southern County reflects in many ways the situation in much of southern 
China, where the expansion of nonfarm sectors in the rural economy has marginalized or 
is marginalizing agriculture and grain farming. However, it does not represent places 
where farming still assumes an important role in the rural economy. The next chapter will 
examine the case of Northern County, a water-scarce area where rural households still 
derive from agriculture a major share of their income.  
 







Deep Wells and Dying Trees: 




, 2013, I went to X village in Northern County to meet with the village 
party secretary, Mr. Feng, in his office. In the middle of our meeting, several farmers 
came to the office to discuss a plan to establish large family farms. I was surprised by 
how quickly they responded to the concept of “family farm” (jiating nongchang), which 
had been raised by the central government only a couple of months before.
72
 The farmers 
who intruded into our meeting were all rich farmers who already leased a few hectares 
and desired to further expand their farms. They saw the party secretary as their ally 
because he was a rich business man and wanted to expand his farm as well. These 
farmers regarded the policy of promoting family farms as a good opportunity. The 
obstacle, however, was low-income households in the village that did not want to give up 
their land. According to Mr. Feng, they accounted for about 30 percent of all households 
in the village. In the meeting, Mr. Feng and other rich farmers suggested that the 
government should terminate the land policy which contracted the village land to all 
households on a 30-year lease. They argued that the best way to develop agriculture was 
to consolidate all village land and lease the land to whoever bid for it with the highest 
price. As a scholar introduced by the county government, they saw me as someone who 
might be able to influence the local policy, thus Mr. Feng and these farmers tried to 
convince me that the local government should support their project of land consolidation 
                                                        
72 The term family farm (jiating nongchang) was raised in the 2013 No.1 Document.  
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because it was in accordance with central policy. In addition, according to them, after the 
land was consolidated, they could apply for government funds or use their own funds to 
sink tube wells and turn more farmland into irrigated land, which would further increase 
agricultural productivity. These farmers were drafting a proposal to be submitted to the 
local government while I was doing fieldwork in the village. As this chapter will show, 
the competition for land has intensified in Northern County as rich farmers who possess 
financial capability to control water resources have sought to lease in more farmland and 
expand the scale of production.   
 
This chapter examines the dynamics of agricultural water use within Northern County, 
and investigates how grain production and water use have interacted with social 
differentiation in the countryside. In addition, it will assess the impact of intensified grain 
production and water extraction on local environment, and examine rising water demand 
from industrial and urban sectors. The chapter shows that access to water is a crucial 
factor in social differentiation, and vice versa. Other scholars’ works argue that 
agricultural capital, embodied in large farms and agribusiness companies, has become 
increasingly powerful in Chinese agriculture sector (Andreas and Zhan 2016; Schneider 
2017; Yan and Chen 2015; Zhan 2017; Zhang and Donaldson 2008). This research shows 
that large farms and agribusiness companies are in a more advantageous position of 
controlling water, whereas small farmers tend to lose out and have to seek employment 
elsewhere. In addition, the demand for water in urban/industrial sectors in the recent 
decade has increased even in an agricultural county like Northern County, placing greater 
pressure on water supply.   
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The chapter is organized as follows. First, I will provide a brief description of two 
townships and three villages where I carried out field investigation. Second, I will 
describe social differentiation and various employment choices, including agricultural 
work, local nonfarm employment and long-distance migration. Third, I will investigate 
how a number of factors, particularly social differentiation, have affected access to water, 
setting in motion a downward spiral of water extraction. Finally, I will examine the 
impact of intensified grain production and water extraction on the environment and assess 
the effectiveness of the water-saving program by taking into account the growing demand 
for water from urban and industrial sectors.  
 
6.1 Profile of the Townships and Villages  
Like its southern counterpart, Northern County merged its villages in the early 2000s, and 
the number of villages decreased from 323 in 1998 to 228 in 2012, which are included in 
16 townships. As a result, the average population of a village increased to 2,200. The 
merging magnified intra-village variations because it sometimes combined two villages 
with very different geographical, economic and social conditions into a new one.  
   
Most of my fieldwork in the county took place from January to March in 2013. I selected 
three administrative villages in two townships for investigation. Of the two townships, 
one (New Township) is where the county town is located, and the other (Wood 
Township) is located 70 kilometers away from the county town. Many rural laborers in 
New Township took up nonfarm jobs in the county town. By contrast, nonfarm 
employment in Wood Township was very limited, and many laborers migrated long 
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distances to find employment. Table 6-1 shows that New Township has a larger 
population and slightly smaller per capita landholding than Wood Township. 
 
Table 6-1 Two townships in comparison 
 New Township Wood Township 




5 70   
Number of villages 26  16 
Population (persons)
 74
 58,150  37,091  
Total rural labor force 40,125 22,165 
Farmland (hectares) 19,408  14,452 
Farmland per capita (hectare) 0.33 0.39 
 
 
I selected one village in New Township (X village), and two villages in Wood Township 
(Y and Z villages) to conduct in-depth investigation. Similar to the research I conducted 
in Southern County, I interviewed village officials and selected about 30 households in 
each village to conduct semi-structured interviews and fill out a questionnaire. In total, I 
collected 96 survey responses in the three villages, covering various types of households 
with different combinations of undertakings such as farming, nonfarm employment and 
labor migration.  
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 For New Township, I use the distance of the village I visited to the county town urban area.  
74
 This only includes the rural population. 
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X village is located about five kilometers away from the center of the county town. The 
village comprises 14 production teams (zu) and 450 households with a total population of 
1,800. The net income per capita was 7,000 yuan in 2013,
75
 and the size of landholding is 
about eight mu per person. However, the size of landholding varies among the production 
teams, ranging from less than six mu to 11 mu per capita. The village owns another 
12,700 mu of woodland, some of which can be used to grow crops. However, farming 
income depends not only on farm size but more importantly, on the size of irrigated 
farmland. This is so because irrigated farms are much more productive than those with no 
access to irrigation. A total of 4,100 mu of farmland is irrigated in the village, less than a 
third of the total, 14,200 mu. Within the village, production teams 4, 5 and 11 have the 
largest share of irrigated farmland. Some households in these production teams can farm 
as much as 40 mu of irrigated farmland and they often concentrate their effort on 
agricultural production.  
 
For the households with less irrigated farmland, they usually have members taking up 
local nonfarm jobs or migrating outside the county. Approximately 20 percent of laborers 
in X village migrated while the rest stayed in the village farming or working in 
nonagricultural sectors nearby, mostly in the county town. Of those who took up local 
nonfarm jobs, many worked in the construction sector in the county town due to the 
booming real estate industry. The daily salary for an unskilled construction worker was 
more than 100 yuan in 2013, and skilled workers could earn more than 200 yuan a day. In 
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 This number was reported to the upper level government and was underestimated. The average income 
per capita among the surveyed households in the village was 14,717 yuan for 2012.  
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addition, villagers also worked as factory workers, miners, taxi drivers and small traders 
in the county.  
 
Some households in X village grew caterpillar fungus (chongcao) in greenhouses. A few 
households started this in 2006, and more households followed suit thereafter. At the time 
of my interviews, about 80 households built greenhouses for caterpillar fungus. Each 
household grew about 10,000 to 20,000 pots, and a few households, the village party 
secretary for example, expanded the scale to 60,000 pots. The fungus can be harvested 
four times a year, but the prices had been fluctuating widely, suggesting a high risk of the 
business. Between 2010 and early 2012, a pot of this fungus could bring a net income of 
three yuan, and one household could make a total of 120,000 yuan (18,460 US dollars) a 
year if it grew 10,000 pots, assuming four harvests a year. However, this business 
requires a very large investment, particularly in the initial stage. The investment covers 
building greenhouses with stable supply of water and electricity, seeding, planting, 
monitoring, and hiring seasonal labor for planting and harvesting. For example, planting 
and harvesting 10,000 pots requires six laborers working 16 days in one season. 
Approximately each labor-day cost about 80 yuan, thus the total labor cost alone could be 
as high as 7,680 yuan for one harvest. When the price of the fungus was high, every 
household could make a decent profit. However, the price sharply dropped in late 2012. 
By the time of my interview, the price decreased by 80 percent in a few months, and 
growing this fungus could hardly make any profit. The farmers were deciding whether 




Y and Z villages are located in Wood Township which is 70 kilometers away from the 
county town. Y village is inhabited by 520 households with a total population of 1,853. 
The village comprises eight production teams, of which two belong to a separate natural 
village, which I call the Reservoir-side village. The separate natural village is six 
kilometers away from the main village. Y village as a whole owns 8,600 mu of farmland, 
of which about 4,000 mu is irrigated. It also has 17,000 mu of woodland. Near the village 
is a medium-sized reservoir named the Green Mountain reservoir. The village can use 
water from the reservoir for irrigation, but the Reservoir-side village has much better 
access than the main village due to its proximity to the reservoir. In the Reservoir-side 
village, each person has six mu of irrigated farmland on average, while in the main 
village the figure is less than three mu. The Green Mountain reservoir was built in the 
1970s. Due to low levels of precipitation, the overuse of water and chronic silting up, its 
irrigation capacity greatly declined in the past decade. The reservoir could still irrigate 
the farmland of Y village in the spring but it often ran short of water in the summer. Y 
village has a total of nine tube wells, which are all privately owned. The wells can irrigate 
about 2,000 mu in the summer when there is no sufficient water from the reservoir. 
Sinking these tube wells, which are approximately 40 meters deep, is very expensive, 
with each well costing more than 30,000 yuan. In actuality, many shallow wells were 
sunk in the village, but they were quickly abandoned as these wells were no longer able 
to supply water due to the falling groundwater table. The nine deep wells were mostly 
sunk in the recent years. At the time of interview, the villagers were planning to sink even 
deeper wells to reach underground water. The use of reservoir water for irrigation was 
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priced at 50 yuan per mu, but the cost of well irrigation was 80 yuan or even more in 
2013.  
 
Whether a village can have access to water has an effect on migration. The Reservoir-
side village, where more farmland is irrigated, saw much less out-migration than the main 
village where one third of households left the village, and most of the remaining 
households had members migrating long distance. Their main destinations are cities such 
as Chifeng (the prefectural city), Shenyang (the capital of neighboring Liaoning 
province) and Beijing. Although farming grain crops such as corn is the main undertaking 
for the remaining households, they also took up other economic activities. Many 
households were engaged in animal husbandry, such as raising sheep and pigs. More than 
20 households raised pigs on a relatively large scale. Some households grew cash crops 
such as sugar beets and medical herbs. 
 
Z village has 520 households with a population of 2,000. It has been recognized as a 
model village by the county government due to its strong village leadership and 
economic performance. As a model village, it has received more government funds than 
others, and this has further improved its agricultural conditions. The median annual 
income of my sample from the village was 20,600 yuan per capita, significantly higher 
than the previous two villages, which had a median income of 10,750 yuan (X village) 
and 9,333 yuan (Y village) respectively. Z village was merged with another smaller 
village in 2006, which is named the Hillside village in this paper. The main Z village is 
located near a river, but the Hillside village is five kilometers away and located on the 
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hills with no access to river water. As I will show below, this has made a crucial 
difference between the two.  
 
The economic success of the main Z village should be attributed to multiple factors. The 
first and foremost is access to irrigation water. The village has 7,700 mu of irrigated 
farmland. With a population of 1,300, each resident in the village has nearly six mu of 
irrigated farmland. The village can irrigate its farms with both surface water from the 
river and groundwater. According to my interviews with irrigation experts, being located 
near the river contributes to the availability of groundwater in the village.  
 
The success of the village should also be attributed to government development funds. 
Although all villages in the county received some funds, the main Z village was 
particularly favored. It received 500,000 yuan in the early 2000s, with which it sunk 11 
tube wells. These 11 collective deep wells, plus another two collective wells sunk in the 
1990s, provided a stable water supply for its farmland. In addition to multiple small funds, 
it received another large fund, two million yuan, to develop greenhouse vegetables in 
2008.  
 
Last but not least, the village has a strong and stable leadership. Unlike the previous two 
villages where village officials did not win broad support and had a high rate of turnover, 
the leadership of the main Z village had not changed since the late 1990s. The village 
head, Mr. Zhang, is famous for his agricultural knowledge and acumen in marketing. He 
organized the households to grow profitable commercial crops and raise domestic 
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animals on a relatively large scale, while establishing a village cooperative to provide 
technological and marketing support for all households. In the past decade and a half, 
households in the village grew tobacco, corn seeds, sugar beets, rice and greenhouse 
vegetables, and raised farm animals such as pigs, chickens, geese and sheep.  
 
Some of the villagers also migrated, but the proportion of migrants was smaller compared 
with the other two villages. Rural laborers who migrated accounted for about 15 percent 
in the main Z village, whereas this figure was more than 40 percent in Y village. In 
addition, the main Z village hired hundreds of seasonal workers from nearby villages to 
harvest commercial crops such as tobacco and greenhouse vegetables. The main Z village 
is also a contrast to the Hillside village, where farmers have very limited access to water, 
with less than one mu per person of irrigated land. This is because the village is located 
far away from the river and does not have much underground water. Many people in the 
village migrated out to look for jobs. Similar to Y village, one third of households left the 
village, and most of the remaining households also had family members working as 
migrant workers. The proportion of migrant workers accounted for half of the labor force 
in the village.  
 
The comparison of the three administrative villages (X, Y and Z) as well as natural 
villages within (such as Reservoir-side village and Hillside village) reveals patterns of 
inter-village differences in the county. First of all, access to water has the most significant 
impact on a village’s economy and household income. As compared with its southern 
counterpart, the size of landholding in Northern County is relatively large. With irrigation, 
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farmers can grow profitable commercial crops such as high-yield corn. Second, the 
variation in access to irrigation also affects out-migration: while rural households in 
villages without sufficient irrigation must seek employment elsewhere, those with good 
irrigation can choose not to migrate and concentrate on agricultural production. Finally, a 
village’s economy is also influenced by the distance to the county town and the strength 
of the village leadership. The villages such as X that are near the county town would find 
more local nonfarm opportunities, and a strong leadership could help a village improve 
agricultural conditions and compete in the market, as was seen in Z village.  
 
The next section will draw on my questionnaire surveys and interview data to describe 
economic differentiation and social stratification at the household level.    
 
6.2 Social Stratification and Occupational Diversification 
Agriculture provides a main source of household income in the county. According to 
official statistics, annual income per rural resident in the county amounted to 5,707 yuan 
in 2011, of which 3,192 yuan came from farming and animal husbandry, accounting for 
56 percent. In addition, rural households derived 1,792 yuan from wage employment, of 
which 654 yuan came from out-of-county migration and 1,138 yuan from local wage jobs, 





My respondents reported a similar proportion of agricultural income (Table 6-2).  
Agricultural income from both farm and animal husbandry accounts for 59.8 percent of 
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the total, of which farming alone accounts for 39.3 percent.
 77
 Both numbers are much 
higher than those in Southern County, 14.8 and 8.1 percent respectively. In addition, out 
of the 96 questionnaire respondents, 73 said that agricultural income was important or 
very important to their family, accounting for 76 percent. Only 11 people, or 11.5 percent, 
held that agricultural income was unimportant. Further, 46 respondents stated that the 
importance of agricultural income had increased over the last 30 years. All these numbers 
revealed that agriculture was a much more important source of income in the county 
compared with its southern counterpart.  
 
Table 6-2 Composition of household income in Northern County
78
 
 Northern County (N=96) 
 Farming 
Income 
Income from  
Animal Husbandry 
Nonfarm Income Total 
Amount (yuan) 23,273 12,117 23,816 59,226 
Percentage (%) 39.3 20.5 40.2 100 
 
Within agriculture, farming is the most important to rural households’ livelihood in 
Northern County. My survey data shows that 93 out of the 96 households were engaged 
in farming, which contributed an annual income of 23,273 yuan, 39.3 percent of 
household income, 59,226 yuan per household (Table 6-2 & Table 6-3). Animal 
husbandry is another important undertaking. The county has a large area of woodland and 
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 It should be noted here that the income from growing the fungus is considered as income from animal 
husbandry. The Chinese caterpillar fungus is hard to decide whether it is plant or animal, but the reason 
here that I categorize it as animal husbandry is because households normally build the house to grow the 
fungus in their front or back yard without using much of their farmland.  
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 Data source for Table 6-2, 6-3, 6-4 and Figure 6-1, 6-2: survey data in Northern County.  
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grassland for grazing sheep and goats. In addition, farmers raised pigs, chicken and cows. 
Table 6-3 shows that 48 households engaged in animal husbandry, 50 percent of the total. 
On average, animal husbandry contributed 12,117 yuan, 20.5 percent of household 
income for the 96 households.  
 
Wage employment and nonfarm business constitute other sources of income. As we can 
see from table 6-2 above, the 96 households earned 23,816 yuan on average from 
nonfarm sources, 40.2 percent of the total. Table 6-3 shows that 60 households were 
engaged in wage employment and 17 in nonfarm business.  
 
Table 6-3 below classifies the households into different categories based on a 
combination of jobs that members in each household were taking. Of the 96 households, 
26 were engaged in agriculture exclusively including both farming and animal husbandry. 
In addition, 93 households engaged in farming, with 67 households involved in both 
agricultural and non-agricultural activities at the same time. This suggests that agriculture 
is still of crucial importance to households in the county. It is a contrast to Southern 









Table 6-3 Combination of occupations by rural households in Northern County 
Occupations within the household Frequency Cumulative 
percentage 
Farming   14 14.58 
Farming; animal husbandry   12 27.08 
Farming; wage employment    21 48.96 
Farming; nonfarm business   4 53.13 
Farming; animal husbandry; wage 
employment 
 
  30 84.38 
Farming; animal husbandry; nonfarm 
business 
 
  4 88.55 
Farming; wage employment, nonfarm 
business 
 
  6 94.8 
Farming; animal husbandry; wage 
employment, nonfarm business 
 
  2 96.88 
No working member   1 97.92 
Wage employment   1 98.96 
Nonfarm business   1 100 
   
Total  96  
 
Of various occupational combinations, the largest category is the one that combines 
farming, animal husbandry and wage employment, accounting for 30 households. The 
second largest category of the households took up farming and wage employment at the 
same time, accounting for 21 households. This suggests that the rural households tended 
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to diversify their economic activities and combine different sources of income. Such a 
strategy can increase household income and reduce economic risks as the loss from one 
source of income could be offset by others. This is similar to my findings in Southern 
County as well as many other studies (Zhan and Huang 2013; Knight and Song, 2003). 
However, behind this similarity lies the crucial difference between the two counties, that 
is, agriculture accounted for a much large share of rural income in Northern County than 
in Southern County.  
 
My data also shows a highly unequal income distribution among the households in the 
county, with rich households pulling far ahead of poor ones. The figure 6-1 below shows 
the distribution of income per capita for the 96 households. It has a median income per 
capita of 11,750 yuan. However, the lowest is only 500 yuan while the highest reaches 
63,333 yuan. The lowest quarter of the households earned 7,000 yuan or less while the 
highest quarter earned 21,667 yuan or more.  
 
Figure 6-1 Distribution of income per capita (yuan)  
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The combination of occupations within one household is also an indicator of its economic 
status. Figure 6-2 below shows that households with members engaged in farming, wage 
employment and nonfarm business at the same time received the highest median income, 
21,667 yuan. In general, households that combine farm and nonfarm sources of income 
are most likely to be among high-income households rank. By contrast, those that only 
engaged in farming are more likely to be positioned in the low-income range. However, 
the figure also reveals that the farming-only households can also reach a high income. 
And the variation of income from farming is due to farm size, particularly the size of 
irrigated farmland, as I will discuss below.  
 





My interviews further corroborate the importance of agriculture in income generation. 
According to the party secretary of Y village,
79
 who was in his middle 50s and had 
previously worked as accountant for the village committee, there were three types of rich 
households in his village: the households that farm a large size of irrigated farmland, the 





 for example, a 33 years old farmer in Z village, farmed 91 mu irrigated land 
including 75 mu leased from others in 2012. He cultivated 45 mu of corn, 26 mu of 
tobacco, 10 mu of sweet beets and another 10 mu of sorghum, from which he earned a 
net income of 80,000 yuan. He told me that farming could be more profitable than doing 
migrant work in the city. Mr. Jia had been staying in the village farming ever since he 
was 22. His success was due to the fact that he was able to farm a substantial size of 
irrigated farmland. In addition to his own land, he leased 75 mu of irrigated land from 
other households in the village.  
 
Farmers in the county can lease land from three sources. First, they lease farmland from 
the villagers who migrate out. Around 30 percent of the households farmed little or no 
land and instead concentrated on migration. Second, they lease collective land from 
villages or state owned farms. In Northern County, many villages still own a certain 
amount of collective land, mostly woodland and grassland, some of which have been 
reclaimed for farming. These lands are all in large size, but they usually do not have good 
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access to irrigation. Some rich farmers have sunk wells to irrigate this kind of land if 
groundwater is available. Finally, due to the declining level of surface water, land near 
rivers and reservoirs, which were previously submerged under water, had become 
available for reclamation. This kind of land is ideal for farming since it is generally large 
in size with good irrigation access.  
 
The importance of irrigation has motivated farmers to extract more water for irrigation. A 
common way to do so is to sink tube wells. The next section will show the correlation 
between irrigation and household income as well as examine how rural households 
compete for water in the villages. 
 
6.3 Deep Wells: Unequal Water Access and Intensified Water Extraction  
The extraction of groundwater for irrigation has been the major contributing factor to the 
increase in grain production in the county. The adoption of high-yield crops, most 
importantly, hybrid corn, as well as profitable cash crops such as tobacco and sugar beets, 
is highly dependent on well irrigation. As noted in Chapter 4, Northern County started to 
sink tube wells on a large scale in the 1990s and intensified well sinking in the past 
decade due to the growing profitability of farming. By 2014, the irrigated area of 
Northern County reached 76,000 hectares, nearly four times that in 1986.  
 
The return from farming irrigated land is much larger than that from farming the land 
without irrigation, which is called “dry land” (handi) in the county. Dry land only permits 
drought-resistant crops, which are usually of low yield. These crops include millet, 
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buckwheat, sorghum, beans (including red beans, black beans, mung beans, etc.). The 
return from farming the dry land is usually less than 300 yuan per mu. It would even 
incur a loss if the level of precipitation is particularly low. Thus the risk of farming dry 
land is very high. By contrast, farming irrigated land can generate a high income and is 
less affected by the weather. One mu of high-yield corn can produce approximately 1,000 
yuan in net return, and it could reach as high as 2,000 yuan if the land was used to grow 
tobacco.  
 
The importance of irrigation in Northern County had prompted active responses from 
farmers. My survey data shows that 84 out of the 96 households, 88 percent, held that 
fellow villagers had been paying increasing attention to irrigation over the last thirty 
years, compared to only 21 percent in Southern County. When asked if they were willing 
to contribute money or labor to constructing or repairing collective irrigation facilities, 76 
percent answered they would donate money, and 78 percent answered that they would 
donate labor, whereas these figures in Southern County were 58 percent and 68 percent 
respectively.  
 
Farmers in Northern County also attached more importance to irrigation than to roads, 
whereas the opposite was true in Southern County. Of the 96 responses, 63 were more 
willing to invest in irrigation facilities than in road construction, and only seven held 
otherwise. Similarly, 61 interviewees held that irrigation played a more important role 
than roads in their livelihoods, but only 10 people held otherwise. Miss Lu,
81
 38 years 
old, from Y village, cultivates 75 mu of farmland including 20 irrigated farmland. Her 
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husband worked as a migrant laborer but had to return due to a work injury to his waist. 
They have two school children and an elderly to support. The household relies on 
agriculture exclusively. Of their irrigated farmland, ten mu is irrigated by the reservoir 
and the other ten by a well jointly sunk by her family and another three households. Each 
household contributed more than 4,000 yuan to sinking this well. Miss Lu said, “It is fine 
as long as the road is walkable or drivable, but water is so important, especially to people 
like us who cannot migrate, since we completely depend on agriculture, and agriculture 
completely depends on irrigation.” 
 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, irrigation in Northern County still overwhelmingly relied 
on the facilities harnessing surface water such as reservoirs and pumping stations, most of 
which were built in the Mao Era. This started to change in the mid-1990s, with increasing 
attention and effort devoted to groundwater. My fieldwork showed that farmers were 
keen on pumping groundwater and turning dry land into irrigated land. However, whether 
a village or a household is able to do so depends on three factors: geographical location, 
the conditions of the village irrigation system, and financial capability. The first two 
factors contributed to variation at the village/production team level while the third factor 
contributed to variation at the household level. 
 
Geographic location   
As noted previously, well irrigation is only possible in places where ground water is 
available. Thus the location of a village or a production team has a strong effect on its 
access to irrigation. The contrast between the main Z village and the Hillside village, and 
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the contrast between the main Y village and the Reservoir-side village, and the 
differences among production teams within X village, all point to the importance of 
geographical location. Among all villages I visited in the county, the main Z village and 
the Reservoir-side village are the most fortunate in that they are located near surface 
water sources. Thus the villages not only could tap surface water for irrigation, which is 
usually less expensive than well irrigation, but are also endowed with good groundwater 
sources due to the proximity to the river or the reservoir. By contrast, the Hillside village 
is the least fortunate being located in an area where there is neither access to surface 
water irrigation nor much groundwater. The village had tried to sink more wells, but 
could not find any good location with adequate groundwater. The village has the largest 
size of landholding, 20 mu per capita, but there was only 600 mu of farmland which had 
access to irrigation, less than one mu per capita.  
 
Access to collective irrigation facilities 
Another factor is whether a village or production team has built collective irrigation 
facilities, and this is particularly important to farmers who do not have financial resources 
to sink wells themselves. In the 1980s and early 1990s, farmers in the county relied on 
the collective irrigation system built in the Mao Era, which mainly delivered surface 
water from reservoirs or rivers to farms. Although the supply of surface water had 
decreased since the mid-1990s due to the wearing down of irrigation facilities and the 
shrinking of surface water sources, this old collective irrigation system, including 
reservoirs, pump stations and canals, has continued to benefit a number of villages, 
including Y and Z villages where I conducted fieldwork.   
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A new collective irrigation system, which exploits groundwater, started to emerge in the 
county after the mid-1990s. The new system was built with government funding. Starting 
from the mid-1990s, the government of Northern County shifted attention to underground 
water, and provided funding for villages to sink tube wells. For instance, the main Z 
village received funds to sink two tube wells in 1996. The financial support from the 
government increased greatly in the early 2000s. On the one hand, a severe drought in 
1999-2001 had made underground water irrigation more important than ever; on the other 
hand, the central government had increased financial support for Western regions like 
Inner Mongolia under the project of “Develop West” (xibu dakaifa) and for rural 
development under the strategy of “Building a Socialist Countryside.” As a result, the 
county government was able to finance a large number of tube well projects with funds 
transferred from the central government. As noted in Chapter 4, irrigation capacity in the 
county had expanded rapidly between 2003 and 2010.  
 
Government funds were usually allocated to a village or a production team, and the tube 
wells built with these funds belonged to residents in the village collectively. All villages I 
visited received government funding to build collective wells, but the amount of funding 
varied among the villages. The main Z village sank 13 collective tube wells, the Hillside 
village two tube wells, Y village three, and X village nine. All farms that are located near 
these collective wells could receive irrigation. Farmers only need to pay direct cost of 
irrigation such as electricity and management fees since the cost of construction was 
covered by government funds. However, the new collective system only lasted a few 
years, and it broke down in many villages due to the privatization of collective wells. 
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Among all villages, only the main Z village still maintained a collective system of well 
irrigation at the time of my fieldwork. The main reason of privatization in the other 
villages was that village officials wanted to sell collective wells for money to cover 
administration cost or repay village debt. For instance, Y village received government 
funds to sink three tube wells, of which only one well was usable. The village owed 
300,000 yuan in debt by 2013 and had to cover administration costs on their own (about 
50,000 yuan a year). Thus village officials sold the usable well to a farmer in the village 
for 80,000 yuan in 2011. In X village, the village officials also sold all nine wells at the 
price of 50,000 yuan a well to repay the village debt. In the Hillside village, the village 
officials controlled both the wells and the well-irrigated land, which was about 500 mu. 
They leased the irrigated land out to the villagers at a rate of 100 yuan a mu per year, and 
the rent (50,000 yuan a year) was used to cover the administration cost of the village. The 
system in the Hillside village was the costliest for farmers because they had to pay not 
only for irrigation but also for the use of the land, whereas farmers in other villages only 
need to pay for irrigation.  
 
The main Z village still maintained the collective irrigation system. The village assigned 
the management of the 13 collective wells to 13 individual farmers, who were responsible 
for the daily maintenance of the wells and the coordination of irrigation. Water prices 
were set by the village, and a manager received 3,000 yuan a year for their work. As a 
result, farmers in the village only needed to pay for the direct cost of irrigation. Water 
prices were the lowest compared with other villages. Famers in the main Z village paid 
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50 yuan a mu for irrigation, whereas those in other villages had to pay at least 80 yuan a 
mu, and some even paid 200 yuan per mu.  
 
Access to irrigation is more equal under this collective system than in a private irrigation 
system. This is because the collective system delivered water to the farms of all rural 
households at relatively low costs. In the main Z village, for example, every villager had 
four to six mu of irrigated land, depending on the production team to which he or she 
belongs. As a result, all rural households, including poor households in the village, could 
farm irrigated land. This is a main reason why the village had maintained a stable 
leadership since the late 1990s. By distributing water equally to all households, village 
officials had won wide support among villagers. Access to irrigation at relatively low 
costs has allowed a number of households to derive a substantial income from 
agriculture. In some cases, this income was even more than that one would earn from 
working in the city as a migrant worker. For example, Mr. Li
82
, 52 years old, farmed 30 
mu of irrigated land with his wife: 20 mu of corn and 10 mu of sugar beets. They have 
three daughters: two daughters were married living in the county town while the youngest 
daughter was working for a bookstore in Beijing. The couple did not rent in any 
additional land. With 30 mu of irrigated land, they earned 40,000 yuan from farming in 
2012. In addition, they raised 70 sheep, which generated 50,000 yuan in the same year. 
Mr. Li told me that they could not possibly earn such an income if they worked as 
migrant workers in the city. He spoke highly of the collective irrigation system, and 
regarded it as the main reason for people like him to stay farming in the village.  
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In a private irrigation system, however, access to water depends very much on a 
household’s financial capability. This is the third factor behind unequal access to water.  
 
Financial capability 
In the county where the collective irrigation system broke down, irrigation is provided by 
the private system, under which individual farmers own tube wells. Those who do not 
own wells have to buy water from private well owners if the latter have extra water for 
sale. Otherwise they would have no access to irrigation. Access to water under the private 
system is unequal because it depends on one’s financial capability to sink (and in some 
cases purchase) tube wells. Sinking tube wells requires a large investment, ranging from 
50,000 yuan to 200,000 yuan for a well, depending on the depth and quality of the well. 
Only those who are already better off can afford to sink a tube well. The more financial 
resources a household possesses, the more likely it can harness the benefit of well 
irrigation. Based on financial capability, I classify agricultural producers in Northern 
County into three categories: small farms, large farms and agribusiness companies.   
 
Small farms are still the largest category, accounting for more than 70 percent. A small 
farm usually cultivates less than five hectares (75 mu) of land. Although this is larger 
than the national average, only a small portion of its land, less than one quarter, has 
access to irrigation. Among the 96 households I surveyed, 70.1 percent farmed five 
hectares or less and 43.8 percent farmed two hectares (30 mu) or less. Unless small farms 
had access to the collective irrigation system, such as those in the main Z village, they 
possessed limited financial resources to secure irrigation in the private system. Among all 
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the small farms I surveyed, 29.4 percent had no irrigated land, and 58.8 percent had less 
than one hectare (15 mu) of irrigated land. Under the private system, small farmers have 
to pay water fees to private well owners or have no access to irrigation at all. For example, 
Mr. Bo in X village,
83
 46 years old, farmed 20 mu of land, of which five mu could be 
irrigated by private wells. The cost of irrigation was 200 yuan a mu. Mr. Bo felt that this 
was too expensive, thus the household decided not to irrigate the farm at all in the past 
two years before the interview, and grew low-yield sorghum instead. The household had 
other sources of income. Mr. Bo was working as part-time skilled construction worker, 
earning 150 yuan a day, but he could only work for four months a year. His only son 
migrated to Shanghai working as a car painter.  
 
However, some small farmers have financial resources to sink tube wells, and aspire to 
expand the farming scale. Their irrigation investments are derived not from farming but 
from nonfarm sources of income. As noted earlier, most farming households also 
engaged in wage employment or nonfarm business. This also suggests that households 
running small farms do not necessarily earn a low income. My survey data reveals this 
pattern. I divided all households into four quarters based on the farm size, and computed 
average household income for each quarter (Table 6-4). The first quarter of the 
households whose size of farm was between 0 and 20 mu earning an average household 
income of 65,609 yuan, which was similar to the income of the second quarter whose 
farm size was between 21 and 35 mu. Interestingly, the third quarter of the households 
earned the lowest income, 54,259 yuan despite a relatively large farm size. This was so 
probably because these households did not earn a high nonfarm income. However, 
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household income would increase significantly if a household expands its farm size to a 
large farm. The average income of the fourth quarter was the highest, 80,072 yuan, 
demonstrating that a sufficiently large farm size could generate a substantial income.  
 




















65,609 68,062 54,259 80,072 
 
There have been a growing number of large farms in the county. The size of a large farm 
is usually above 100 mu (6.7 hectares). The advantage of large farmers is that they can 
sink tube wells themselves and turn a dry land into an irrigated land. This will increase 
the return from farming considerably. As both central and local governments have 
promoted land transfer and offered support for large farms in the recent years, these 
farms have been further empowered and their scale of farming would further expand. 
Large farmers in the three field villages all expressed the desire to lease more land. In X 
village, for instance, large farms have controlled a growing share of irrigated land by 
sinking tube wells. Mr. Fu,
84
 45 years old, is such an example. He and his wife farmed 70 
mu of irrigated cropland, of which 30 mu was leased from other households, and 
cultivated another 200 mu of land for fruit trees. All 70 mu were irrigated with their 
                                                        
84
 Household interview No.179 on March 25, 2013 in X village.  
203 
 
private tube wells. Mr. Fu worked in the city as a migrant worker in the 1990s. After he 
saved a substantial amount of money, he returned to the village in 1997 and sank a tube 
well to irrigate his land (about 40 mu). With the well, he and his wife were able to grow 
high-value commercial crops while at the same time engaged in profitable sideline 
activities such as growing caterpillar mushroom. In 2012, the household invested 120,000 
yuan to sink another two wells, which were to irrigate its 200 mu of fruit trees. At the 
time of interview, he was planning to lease another 500 mu of land. He is one of the 
villagers who came to the village party secretary’s office to discuss how to use the new 
central policy to establish large family farms.   
 
Another player is dragonhead companies. Based on county policy documents and my 
interviews with local officials, it can be seen that the local government enthusiastically 
promoted dragonhead companies which specialize in all kinds of agricultural products 
including grains, beans, vegetable, sugar beets, tobacco, medical herbs and animal 
products. In 2010, there were nine prefecture-level dragonhead companies in the county, 
and this increased to 21 in 2015. If county-level dragonhead companies were included, 
the total number would increase to 66 in 2015. Most dragonhead companies in the county 
entered contracts with farmers and did not engage in agricultural production directly. 
Some dragonhead companies in the county leased farmland and engaged in production, 
but they usually chose to lease collective woodland or unused land rather than lease land 
directly from rural households because this way required less coordination and opposition 
from farmers. Thus I did not find any dragonhead companies in the three field villages. 
However, I learnt from official interviews about such land-leasing dragonhead companies. 
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As compared with farming households, the dragonhead companies usually receive more 
favorable policy and financial support from both local government and central 
governments. In terms of access to irrigation, these companies possess sufficient financial 
resources to sink tube wells. In addition, they could apply for government funding to do 
so. It can be imagined that dragonhead companies will become increasingly powerful and 
would lease land directly from small farmers in the future.  
 
As groundwater irrigation has become such a crucial condition for profitable farming in 
Northern County, farmers, large or small, have striven to turn dry land into irrigated land 
by sinking tube wells. In addition, villages in the county actively applied for government 
funding to sink tube wells. This has intensified the extraction of groundwater. According 
to Mr. Cui,
 85
 an official of the County Bureau of Water resources who has worked for the 
agency for more than 20 years, the number of large tube wells in the county with a supply 
of 20 cubic meters of water per hour reached more than 9,000 in 2012. However, this 
omitted small tube wells whose number could be several times the number of large wells. 
In addition, many more wells have become unusable and been abandoned due to the 
falling ground water table. In both X and Y villages, dozens of wells had been abandoned. 
In only one decade and a half, the water table had fallen by dozens of meters in the 
county. The degree of falling varies. As a general rule, the water table falls faster in 
places where underground water is less abundant. Among all villages I visited, the table 
fell in the main Z village at a slower pace than that in the others. The most rapid fall took 
place in X village. It was estimated that the table had fallen by more than 50 meters. For 
instance, production team No.11 in X village had only one well in 2000, 30 meters deep, 
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which could irrigate up to 400 mu of farmland. At the time of my interview, the team had 
three deep wells that were all more than 80 meters deep, but the irrigation capacity of the 
three wells combined is smaller than that of the old 30-meter well. In addition to the three 
deep wells, there are dozens of other wells in the team, which were sunk in different 
years. The wells that were sunk more recently were deeper than the earlier wells. The 
neighboring production team No. 12 faced a much direr situation. The team sunk a 
collective well with government funding in 2001 and the well dried up after a few years 
of use. Farming households of the team had tried to sink private wells but had to give up 
because no water could be pumped out of the ground even when the wells reached down 
to more than 100 meters. The farmers blamed factories nearby for the shortage of water 
because these factories had sunk a few very deep wells (more than 200 meters deep), 
causing the sharp fall of the ground water table. As I will detail below, the competition 
for water between agriculture and industry in the county has become increasingly intense.  
 
As the water table fell, farmers in the county sank wells deeper and deeper to reach for 
water. It has become a “race to the bottom”. In some places, the depth of wells exceeded 
200 meters, and many wells in the county reached down for more than 100 meters. This 
race to the bottom in well irrigation has adversely impacted the environment and 
consequently agriculture in the county.   
 
6.4 Dying Trees: Environmental Impact and Water-Saving Program 
Northern County was historically a pastoral area. Many immigrants from the North China 
Plain settled in and turned parts of the grasslands into farms in Qing Dynasty (1644-
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1911) and the Republic period (1911-1949). The county’s total population increased from 
a few thousand two centuries ago to more than 200 thousand by the end of 1930s. 
However, as more and more grassland was reclaimed into farmland, desertification and 
sand storms started to spread, and the situation did not improve in the Mao period, when 
population growth put great stress on the environment. Sandstorms in the spring became 
so severe that sand often blanketed farm fields, destroying crops and causing harvest 
failures.  
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the county launched a number of campaigns to restore the 
environment through scaling back farming areas and reverting them to grasslands and 
woodlands. The county was designated as one of the key locations by the State Council in 
the national Three-north (north-west, north-china, north-east) defensive forest project 
(sanbei fanghulin), which was initiated in 1979. The forestation rate in the county had 
risen up from 11.2 percent in 1977 to 35.3 per cent in 1994, and the frequency of 
sandstorms was significantly reduced.
86
 According to my interviews with farmers and 
local officials, ecological improvement are widely regarded as one of the most important 
changes in the history of local development.  
 
This ecological restoration in the 1980s and 1990s to some extent improved agricultural 
conditions of Northern County. However, the intensification of grain production, as noted 
previously, has placed the still vulnerable environment in peril. The increase in grain 
production has been achieved mainly through over-extracting water resources. This 
section will show how the intensification of grain production based on the overuse of 
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water has led to a number of environmental problems and undermined the foundation of 
future grain production. I will also introduce the recent water-saving program pushed by 
the local government and assess its effectiveness and constraints, considering not only 
agricultural water use but also the extraction of water for urban and industrial purposes.  
 
The intensification of grain production first affected surface water sources. For example, 
the river running by the main Z village used to run out of water for only a couple of 
months in a year in the 1990s. However, over the last ten years, it has been dry for six 
months a year. Y village has been using water for irrigation from the Green Mountain 
reservoir since the 1970s. The water storage of the reservoir had diminished over the past 
10 years to the extent that the farmland of the village could not receive water during the 
summer. The drying up of surface water sources has been a widespread phenomenon in 
the county. Many rivers in the county have dried up and so have small reservoirs and 
swamps, which provided the source of irrigation as well as a factor sustaining the 
ecological system. The other consequence of intensified grain production is the falling of 
the ground water table, which has already been discussed. Moreover, as the surface water 
is exhausted for crops, it does not recharge the water table. In addition to water-related 
environmental problems, the intensification of grain production has led to soil 
degradation and environmental pollution due to the increased use of chemical fertilizers, 
pesticides and plastic mulches.  
 
The drying-up of water sources has also threatened the survival of trees, bushes and grass 
that were planted in the 1980s and 1990s. The trees have started to wither and it is 
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estimated that one third of the trees in the county have died or are dying due to lack of 
water. When I was in the county, I saw many withered trees. In Y village, for example, 
the party secretary told me that the trees in the village had withered on a large scale. 
Bushes and grass, which are less vulnerable than trees, were also affected. The party 
secretary was concerned about this worrying trend because the trees and bushes played a 
crucial role in fighting desertification, preventing sand storms, and preserving local 
environment in the county. In the past decade, the desertified area in the county had 
started to expand, reversing the trend in the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
The drying up of surface water sources and the falling of the ground water table have 
affected grain production and farmers’ livelihood. The first group of people that bore the 
brunt were small farmers who could not afford sinking deeper tube wells. For example, 
Mr. Fu in X village,
87
 39 years old, was married with two children. The household farmed 
24 mu of land, of which 10 mu used to have access to well irrigation. Due to the falling 
of the groundwater table, however, the well had dried up and was no longer able to 
irrigate his land since 2012. Desperate to find irrigation for his land, the household, 
together with another three households, spent 18,000 yuan to sink a 66-meter well in 
2012, but the well was still too shallow to tap sufficient groundwater. Mr. Fu had to grow 
low-yield sorghum in his farm ever since. The shortage of water has also affected large 
farmers, although the impact is modest. For instance, Mr. Hu in the main Z village
88
, 43 
years old, leased 800 mu of land in another village prior to 2012. With the land he grew 
500 mu of sugar beets, which is a profitable commercial crop. He hired two full-time 
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workers to manage his farm as well as dozens of seasonal laborers. He told me that the 
number of hired laborers had reached as high as 120 in the harvest season and paid these 
workers 60 yuan per person per day. However, due to the falling water table, he had to 
give up this large farm, and returned to Z village to run a much smaller farm, 120 mu in 
2012. Mr. Hu told me that he was looking for more land to lease and would rent more 
land if he found a good farmland. Mr. Hu is among the richest farmers in the county. The 
annual income of his household was 190,000 yuan in 2012, even though his farm size 
was reduced. He was married with a 21-year-old son, who worked as a skilled excavator 
operator in the county town. 
 
Water saving program 
The rapid depletion of water in the county has alarmed the local authorities. As noted in 
Chapter 4, the county started to introduce drip irrigation in 2010. By 2015, the farmland 
that adopted drip irrigation had increased to 917,000 mu, 80.6 percent of the total 
irrigated land. My interviews with farmers and village officials showed that the drip 
irrigation is effective in saving water, and many rural households were willing to adopt 
this method.  
 
However, drip irrigation is a costly investment. After the initial installment, every year 
farmers need to replace the drip tape, which costs another 120-130 yuan per mu. At the 
time of my fieldwork, the county government subsidized 100 yuan for the replacement of 
drip tape per mu, and individual households only needed to pay 20 yuan. However, once 
the subsidy stopped, farmers would have to bear the cost on their own. This would be an 
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economic burden on low-income households. Thus the application of drip irrigation 
favors large farmers over small ones because the costs are less of a financial burden for 
the former than for the latter. For example, the aforementioned Mr. Fu,
89
 a rich farmer in 
X village, held that drip irrigation is the future of irrigation and agriculture in the county. 
He planned to install drip irrigation for his 200 mu of fruit trees. The cost of drip 
irrigation did not appear to be a problem for Mr. Fu, but he would welcome subsidies 
provided by the government. In addition, drip irrigation is more efficient when being 
applied to farmland on a large scale, and it requires that the land with the equipment to be 
sowed and harvested at the same time. This again favors large farms over small farms. It 
is likely that the local government will push to turn small farms to large farms in order to 
maintain the system of drip irrigation.  
 
However, even if drip irrigation is successfully implemented, it is unlikely to solve the 
long term problem of water shortage in the county. On the one hand, the structural 
dilemma identified in this dissertation has not been solved. If grain production continues 
on the current scale or even expands, the shortage of water can hardly be alleviated. On 
the other hand, agriculture is only one sector that exploits water in the county, and in 
recent years the use of water for urban and industrial purposes has increased greatly, 
placing further stress on the water system.  
 
Industrial growth has accelerated in the recent decade. The expansion of the local 
industry can be attributed to two factors. On the one hand, the local government issued 
policies to draw industrial enterprises from outside to invest in the county. On the other 
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hand, mineral resources in the county attracted external investors. The industrial GDP 
increased from around 230 million yuan in 2000 to more than 5.98 billion yuan in 2015. 
In the meantime, the share of industrial sectors in total GDP increased from 15 percent to 
36 percent (Figure 6-3). Agriculture still accounts for a significant share of local GDP, but 
the percentage decreased gradually from 46 percent to 25 percent for the same period.  
 












The largest industry in the county is mining. Factories that process gold, iron, phosphorus, 
copper, coal, lead, zinc and nonferrous metals have flourished due to the growing demand 
in the domestic market. The chemical industry, including the mining and refining of oil 
shale deposits and fluorine chemicals, and the industries related to urban real estate, such 
as cement and furniture, have also been growing. Because the county produces large 
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amounts of grains and animal meat, the food and meat processing industry occupy an 
important position in the local economy. To attract more investors, the county 
government offers built-up land and generous tax exemptions or deductions. It has built 
two large industrial parks to house industrial enterprises with good infrastructure such as 
water supply, electricity and roads. In addition, seven townships built their own 
“development districts” to house industrial enterprises.   
 
Rapid industrial growth has exerted extra pressure on local water resources. Industries 
such as mining, refining and chemicals all require the use of a large amount of water. In 
X Village, as noted previously, farmers complained that cement and beverage factories 
nearby sank deep wells causing the groundwater table to fall beyond the reach of 
irrigation wells. Many industrial activities such as mining and the production of 
chemicals have polluted water and soil. The county has a large molybdenum ore mine. 
The villagers nearby complained that trees stopped growing in the area. I was told when I 
was doing fieldwork in X village that working in the mine would even harm one’s 
reproductive capability.  
 
Water demand for urban uses has grown even faster. As noted in Chapter 4, the county 
government has enthusiastically embraced urbanization and promoted the real estate 
industry with great vigor in the recent decade. According to official statistics, investment 
in real estate in the county was 30 million yuan in 2000, and this increased dramatically 
to 300 million in 2011. Rapid urbanization has pushed up demand for water considerably, 





Therefore, although the implementation of the water saving program enables the county 
to economize on water consumption for agriculture, it cannot reduce water use overall 
because of the increasing extraction of water for urban and industrial uses. The water 
transfer project will continue to intensify water extraction in the county. Thus, it is safe to 
say that, unless the county is able to cut back the overall water consumption, it will 
continue slipping toward a water crisis. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter shows the dynamics of agricultural water use in Northern County under the 
structural contradiction between economic growth and food security. The case of 
Northern County, in sharp contrast to Southern County, has seen the intensification of 
grain production under the pursuit of food security. This is because the county has a 
relatively large farming area while urban and industrial sectors are less developed than 
those in its southern counterpart. However, the county, like many other northern regions, 
is severely short of water. The intensification of grain production has thus led to the over-
extraction of groundwater. The process is closely related to the economic interests of 
farmers in the county. As farming irrigated land can generate a substantial income, which 
in some cases is even higher than income from labor migration, villages and farmers have 
competed to sink tube wells to tap groundwater. This has led to a race to the bottom in 
water extraction. In this race, large farmers are in an advantageous position because they 
have financial resources to sink tube wells or purchase collective wells. Small farmers 
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tend to lose out and are forced to migrate. However, some small farmers are able to earn 
money from nonfarm businesses or jobs, with which they can invest in well sinking to 
expand the scale of irrigated farming.  
 
The case of Northern County reveals another dimension of the agricultural water crisis in 
China. While the crisis in the south is characterized by the breaking down and negligence 
of water facilities, in the north it is caused by the over-extraction of water for grain 
production. However, as this dissertation shows, these different manifestations of the 
agricultural water crisis have been derived from the same structural contradiction 
between the pursuit of profit and food security. The over-extraction in the north has not 
only undermined the water system but also exerted adverse impacts on the environment 
as a whole. As this chapter has shown, the drying up of surface water and the dropping of 
the groundwater table have affected trees, bushes and soils, rendering animal habitat and 
human environment unsustainable in the long term.  
 
Besides the differences between the two county cases, the comparison also reveals two 
similar trends. On the one hand, despite different levels of urbanization, both counties 
have accelerated the pace of urban expansion in the recent decade as a measure to 
promote economic growth and boost local revenue. This has drawn resources including 
money, water and labor into urban sectors. In both counties, water investments were first 
allocated to urban sectors or to serve the purpose of urban development. In addition, both 
give priority to water supply for urban sectors. This has seriously affected agricultural 
water use in Northern County, as water is a scarce resource. On the other hand, large 
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farms, including agribusiness companies, have become increasingly powerful in both 
counties. In Southern County, the government tried to replace small farming households 
with large farms because the former have not devoted sufficient efforts to grain 
production. In Northern County, large farms and agribusiness companies possess more 
financial resources to control water resources and thus out-compete small farms. These 
two common trends hold implications for the future development of the agricultural water 



















Chapter 7     Conclusion 
 
In nearly seven decades since the founding of People’s Republic of China in 1949, the 
agricultural water system has experienced tremendous changes. As noted in the 
introduction, this long period can be roughly divided into two periods: the 
developmentalist era (1949 to 1978) and the neoliberal era after the market reform (1978 
to present). In the first period, the agricultural water system experienced rapid expansion, 
with irrigated area increasing from 15.93 million hectares in 1949 to 48.05 million 
hectares in 1978. In addition, the country completed 50,000 multifunctional large water 
projects and 20 million small irrigation projects. Such an impressive record of expansion 
was impossible without the intervention of the Chinese state. Although irrigation 
expansion occurred in many countries in this period, which can be regarded as a feature 
of the developmentalist era, the progress made in China was particularly dramatic given 
its low level of economic development, lack of foreign aid and the magnitude of 
expansion. The achievement should be attributed in large part to the collectivist system in 
the Mao period under which the state was able to mobilize millions of rural laborers to 
participate in water infrastructure construction and maintenance.  
 
As it shifted to the neoliberal era, however, this expansionary trend stalled, and the 
agricultural water system declined. In the first decade of the market reform (1980s), the 
Chinese state withdrew much of its support for the agricultural water system by cutting 
irrigation investment and relegating the responsibility of agricultural water to local 
governments, rural communities and farmers. This also fits into the global trend of 
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irrigation stagnation in the neoliberal era. The main cause for this is that the pursuit of 
profits has become the dominant principle that governs the behavior of the state and 
private investors while other development goals such as welfare, wellbeing and food 
security are downgraded and even sacrificed. In the 1980s and 1990s, the agricultural 
water system in China was underinvested, and many of existing irrigation facilities were 
worn out or broken down. This was particularly the case in coastal and southern 
provinces where the profitability of urban and industrial sectors far outstripped that of the 
agricultural sector, and thus the investment in agricultural water made little sense under 
the neoliberal principle of profit maximization.  
 
However, as the agricultural water system declined, the capacity of grain production was 
also threatened since irrigation has been a crucial factor for China to feed such a huge 
population (20 percent of the world population) with such a limited area of farmland 
(seven percent of the world total). Thus the concern for food security forced the Chinese 
state to increase investment in agricultural water. In the past two decades (1998-2017), 
the investment in agricultural water has been multiplied. If only taking into account 
monetary investments, the share of agricultural water in total infrastructure investment in 
recent years has been on par with that in the developmentalist era.  
 
This contradiction between profitability and food security constitutes what I call the 
structural dilemma of agricultural water in China. However, shifting back to food security 
in the neoliberal era suggests in no way that it would reverse the declining trend of the 
agricultural water system. Rather, it has produced mixed results at best, with more 
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investment in irrigation facilities but less attention to the sustainability of the system, as I 
showed in this dissertation. To illuminate this issue, I conducted a multilevel analysis and 
examined the changes in agricultural water over the past four decades at national, local 
and community levels. In what follows, I present main findings, theoretical implications, 
and a discussion of important issues that would merit future research.  
 
Summary of Findings 
The manifestations of the structural dilemma and its impacts are different at national, 
local and community levels. At the national level, I focused on the changes in 
government investment in agricultural water, and the regional impact of these 
investments. At the local level, I examined the response of local governments at the 
county level to the shift in central policy. At the community level, I analyzed the impacts 
of rural transformations, particularly the transformation to agricultural capitalism, on the 
incentives and actions of villages and farmers on agricultural water.   
 
There are three main findings at the national level. First, the central government has 
greatly increased water investment in the past two decades, but only a small proportion, 
about 10 to 20 percent, was devoted directly to agricultural water. The majority of water 
investment was either allocated to enhancing the comprehensive water system such as 
large rivers and lakes or used to finance water supply to the city or hydropower. Thus the 
increase in agricultural water investment is not as large as official data suggests.  
 
Second, the increase in agricultural water investment has facilitated the northward 
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movement of grain production, exacerbating the grain-water mismatch. The water-scarce 
north has produced a growing share of grain due to the investment in irrigation 
infrastructure. If grain is seen as commodities containing virtual water, it is the water-
scarce north that exports water to the water-rich south rather than the other way around. 
This mismatch has caused the falling of water tables and the depletion of aquifers in 
many northern regions. In other words, the concern over food security has intensified 
grain production in northern regions where the contradiction between food security and 
profitability is less intense than that in economically developed southern regions, leading 
to the over-extraction of groundwater in the north.   
 
Finally, both the pursuit of profit and the concern over food security contributed to water 
pollution, another serious problem with the agricultural water system. In regions where 
urban and industrial sectors are developed, for example, many coastal provinces, water is 
polluted by urban and industrial waste discharges. In regions where grain production is 
intensified, such as northeast provinces, the overuse of pesticides and chemical fertilizers 
has also polluted both surface and ground water. Thus, from the perspective of water 
pollution, a shift of priority back to food security would not alleviate the problem. This is 
so because the official perception of food security in China is still to produce more grain 
to meet growing demand rather than to develop a sustainable agricultural system that is 
premised on the sustainable use of water, land and other natural resources.  
 
The strong push from the center to increase agricultural water investment has met 
different responses from local governments. Some local governments have followed this 
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central policy more closely than others depending on the degree to which their interest is 
in line with the center. This dissertation used two case studies to illuminate the difference. 
In Southern County, the county government gave priority to urban and industrial sectors 
rather than agricultural water because the latter could contribute relatively little to 
revenue. The local government refused to provide the counterpart funds to match 
agricultural water investments from upper-level governments. In addition, it allocated 
water funds to build facilities serving urban and industrial interests. In Northern county, 
by contrast, the government made great efforts to promote agricultural water use and 
grain production, but this caused the over-extraction of groundwater. In recent years, the 
county started to promote water-saving technologies based on the funds received from the 
central government. This suggests that the county has largely followed the central policy 
on grain production and agricultural water development. However, there are signs that the 
interest of the county started to diverge from the center. As the real estate boom and 
urban expansion became a major way of local revenue generation, the county started to 
promote real estate development and expanded the size of the county town. To meet the 
water demand of a growing urban population, the county implemented a large water 
transfer project to transfer water from agricultural areas to the county town. This will 
further stress the local water system and reduce the availability of water for agriculture 
and grain production.  
 
In short, the interest of local governments is oriented toward economic growth and 
revenue generation in the neoliberal era. In such a context, the central government has 
tried using incentive funding, administrative order and political control to bring local 
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governments into the line of central policy. However, this is not always effective. Local 
government has a certain degree of leeway to adjust central policy based on local 
conditions.  In the case of agricultural water, the central policy is often diluted at the local 
level. That is to say, although the central government has raised the funds for agricultural 
water considerably, it remains an open question to what degree the funds have been 
channeled to improving the agricultural water system at the local level.  
 
At the community level, this dissertation research investigated seven villages of diverse 
conditions, four in Southern County and three in Northern County. In general, I found 
that the rapid transformation of the rural society exerted profound impact on rural 
households’ incentive and action on agricultural water. Three main findings are 
discovered. First, the efficacy of the villages to take joint action on agricultural water has 
declined. A major cause for the decline is that rural households have engaged in diverse 
economic activities. A growing proportion of rural households rely on nonfarm 
employment rather than farming for the main source of income. This is more so in 
Southern County than in Northern County. As a result, while some households would like 
to have better access to agricultural water, others are reluctant to contribute because 
agriculture is of little importance to their livelihood.  
 
Second, although there are still a significant proportion of rural residents who rely on 
farming for food supply and livelihood, their perspective is different from either the 
pursuit of profit or the official definition of food security. On the one hand, many rural 
households do not regard farming as the most important source of income. Thus they do 
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not pursue maximizing profit from farming. On the other hand, many households do not 
produce grain for the market but for self-consumption, thus they tend not to produce a 
maximum amount of grain for the country’s food security. In other words, these 
households either engage in subsistence farming or use farming to absorb their surplus 
labor such as the elderly and women who must at the same time take care of children. 
This kind of small-scale farming assumes many social functions and is a manifestation of 
household economic strategy, but it is at odds with the capitalist logic of profit 
maximization or the state’s goal of food security. With regard to agricultural water, these 
households hope to have a good agricultural water system, but they can only contribute a 
limit amount of money or labor to maintaining the system.  
 
Third, farmers are differentiated. While there are part-time subsistence farmers as noted 
above, a small but growing number of large farmers emerged to take on capitalist farming. 
This is more so in Northern County where farmers could lease large tracts of land, but 
this trend is also emerging in Southern County. Capitalist farming fits into both the 
neoliberal principle of profit maximization and the government goal of food security 
because these capitalist large farms pursue the maximum output from the land, be it 
either grain or commercial crops. With regard to agricultural water, these large capitalist 
farms are also in an advantageous position: they could either invest in agricultural water 
themselves or apply for government funding to do so. However, the expansion of 
capitalist farms does not necessarily have a positive effect on the agricultural water 
system. On the one hand, the profit-motivated extraction of water resources would 
damage the already vulnerable water system, as is seen in the case of Northern County. 
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On the other hand, the expansion of capitalist farms would exclude small farms from 
accessing agricultural water, thus exacerbating the problem of unequal distribution of 
water.   
 
Finally, the governments at both central and local levels have increasingly seen capitalist 
large farms as a reliable agent of policy implementation for it could both promote the 
growth of agriculture and produce more grain to meet the goal of food security. Thus the 
shift of government support toward large farms would put small farms at a disadvantage 
in accessing agricultural water. However, the government must ensure the livelihood and 
food supply of small farmers, thus it will have to provide some protection of these 
farmers’ access to water. As was seen from the village case studies, all the villages have 
collectively received some amount of government funding for building or improving 
irrigation facilities.   
 
Theoretical Implications 
My dissertation research challenges as well as adds nuances to existing theories, and 
contributes a new perspective to understanding the agricultural water crisis worldwide. 
The community organization theory emphasizes the importance of effective organizations 
at the village level. This study has shown that the villages with effective organizations are 
indeed more capable of maintaining the collective irrigation system and distributing 
water equally and fairly. The main Z village in Northern County is such an example. 
However, the effectiveness of collective organizations is affected by large political and 
market forces. In the developmentalist era, the effectiveness of village organizations in 
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China was derived from the support of a socialist state and the collective system. As a 
result, village organizations could mobilize millions of peasants every year to participate 
in large-scale irrigation campaigns. However, as it shifted to the neoliberal era, the 
Chinese state dismantled the collective system, and most Chinese villages were no longer 
able to mobilize peasants to contribute to irrigation. Furthermore, social differentiation in 
the post-reform period diversified interest in agricultural water, which made intra-village 
collective action even more difficult. Many rural households shifted attention to nonfarm 
activities that could generate greater economic returns, while paying little attention to 
agricultural water.  
 
The marketization theory approaches the issue from the angle of property rights. It argues 
that water problems are caused by the ambiguity of property rights and that the solution is 
to privatize irrigation facilities. However, the theory is based on two assumptions that are 
often untrue even in the neoliberal era. One is that the users of agricultural water are 
rational actors who pursue the maximization of economic interests. This study found that 
many rural households, particularly those in Southern County, are subsistence farmers in 
that they only farm their land for food for self-consumption while deriving main income 
from nonfarm sources. As a result, they do not aim to maximize the output from the land, 
and thus do not regard irrigation water as a commodity. The other assumption is that 
agricultural water is a factor of production that can generate profit. However, the use of 
agricultural water is often unprofitable. And this is the case even in the United States, one 
of the largest exporters of agricultural commodities. In many cases, the agricultural water 
system, and the farm sector at large, is highly subsidized by the state. In this study, I 
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found that many peasants are reluctant to shoulder the cost of agricultural water due to 
the low profitability of agriculture.  
 
The Marxist theory of capitalist transformation predicts the demise of the peasantry and 
the rise of large capitalist farms. Along with this process, the irrigation system that serves 
the peasantry would decline while a new system that serves capitalist farms would 
emerge. This dissertation did find that the class differentiation of the peasantry and 
outmigration of rural laborers have greatly undermined the village-based irrigation 
system. However, the demise of the peasantry has not led to the emergence of a working 
class in much of the Global South. Rather, the displaced peasantry was turned into 
precarious workers in the city without formal wage jobs or the sufficient support of social 
security (Standing 2016). This is also the case in China. In view of uncertainty and 
precariousness of employment in the city, most rural households are reluctant to sever the 
relations with land (Andreas and Zhan 2016; Zhan 2017). My fieldwork shows that, 
although the village-based irrigation system is undermined, many peasants still want to 
maintain the rights to the land and hope to have access to village-based irrigation. Thus 
the replacement of the village-based irrigation system by one that serves only capitalist 
farms would be a process fraught with struggles and resistance. It is very likely that the 
triumph of the capitalist system would not be a natural outcome but one forced through 
by the power of the state (Luo, Andreas and Li 2017). This brings our attention to the 




The urban bias theory focuses on state-class relations and argues that the state would 
issue policies favorable to urban and industrial classes because of the latter’s political 
influence. This dissertation also shows that the Chinese state’s urban-biased policies 
diverted human, material and financial resources away from agricultural water to urban 
and industrial sectors. However, the theory has not paid enough attention to the 
contradictions within capitalist development. With regard to agricultural water, although 
profitability has been a key principle determining the actions of the state, the concern for 
food security as well as for subsistence has pulled state policy toward agricultural water 
and grain production. Thus, it glosses over the tensions between profit and state 
legitimacy and complex central-local relations.   
 
My dissertation foregrounds the contradictions of capitalist development with regard to 
the agricultural water system in the neoliberal era. It reveals how agricultural water has 
caught in the structural dilemma between profitability and food security. The research 
would make three contributions to the literature. First, it advances the Marxist analysis of 
agricultural water by highlighting the contradictory role of the state. In the Chinese case, 
the agricultural water system experienced great expansion in the developmentalist era due 
to state intervention, but it was neglected in the initial decades of the neoliberal era. As 
capitalist development undermined agricultural production and pushed up the demand for 
food, the state was forced to support the agricultural water system again.  
 
Second, it draws attention to the spatial dynamics and uneven development of capitalism 
with regard to agricultural water. The pursuits of profitability and food security do not 
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impose on localities uniformly. Rather, it pushes low profitable grain production into less 
developed regions, in many cases causing the over-extraction of water resources and the 
degradation of environmental conditions. This also entrenches the previously uneven 
patterns of economic development, perpetuating spatial inequalities.  
 
Finally, although it largely holds true that the Chinese countryside has been undergoing 
capitalist transformations characterized by the rise of large farms and agribusiness, it is 
not a natural outcome as indicated in much of the literature but pushed strongly by the 
state due to both the pursuit of profitability and the concern for food security.  In addition, 
the rise of large farms and agribusiness companies would be hampered by the existing, 
village-based agricultural water system. To overcome the obstacle, they must rely on the 
state to transform it to one serving capitalist farms, which requires the state’s enormous 
sums of financial investments and strong arms to break the resistance from small farming 
households.  
 
Issues and Future Research 
Two important issues have arisen. One is the transition of the community-level irrigation 
system; the other is the spread of urbanization nationwide and its impact on agricultural 
water.  
 
Rise of a capitalist irrigation system 
The Chinese rural society consists of tens of thousands of villages, and the irrigation 
system at the community level is designed to meet the need of irrigation for the village as 
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a whole. Such a system is essentially a collective system, and it was also built with 
collective effort.  
 
Rise of large capitalist farms entails the transformation of the collective system into a 
new one. The preliminary investigation of this issue in this dissertation research shows 
that there are two ways for large capitalist farms to control agricultural water. The first 
way is to rely on the government to consolidate farmland and build a new irrigation 
system. As noted above, the government supports large farms for their role in both 
economic growth and food security. The case of tobacco farms in Southern County shows 
that the government can consolidate small plots of land into a large farm and build an 
irrigation system for it. The other way is to privatize village irrigation facilities and use 
these facilities to serve private large farms. Many villages in Northern County have 
privatized collective wells, and as a result, the previous collective wells are now 
controlled by private owners and irrigate private farms.  
 
The transformation to a capitalist irrigation system would solve the problem of collective 
coordination on agricultural water. However, this change will raise at least two questions 
that merit future research. First, the rise of the capitalist irrigation system would take 
decades to complete. Thus there will be a long period when the capitalist system coexists 
with the village-based system. It is worth investigating how the two systems interact with 
each other, and this will provide a novel perspective on agrarian transformations in the 
Chinese countryside. Second, the rise of the capitalist irrigation system would not be 
possible without the support from the state, which provides the institutional framework 
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and funding for the former to emerge. It is worth investigating the interactions between 
the state and large farms with regard to agricultural water in the neoliberal era. This 
would challenge the popular perception that the neoliberal state tends to withdraw from 
building public infrastructure. In the case of China, however, the state has actively built 
water infrastructure in the new phase of the neoliberal era, but it is only large capitalist 
farms that have privileged access to the infrastructure facilities.  
 
Urbanization and agricultural water 
The Chinese state has so far paid much attention to the encroachment of urbanization on 
farmland to maintain a sufficient grain production. For example, the central government 
set up a red line which requires maintaining at least 120 million hectares of farmland. 
However, as the case of Northern County shows, water is an even more scarce resource 
for grain production. Urbanization in the north has already placed great stress on the 
water system. For example, megacities such as Beijing and Tianjin have exhausted water 
resources in the region, forcing the Chinese state to initiate the South-North Water 
Transfer Project to quench the thirst of these cities.  
 
The further urbanization in areas such as Northern County will transfer water from 
agriculture to the city, which will undermine grain production in the north. The impact of 
urbanization in China’s northern and hinterland regions on agricultural water use has not 
received adequate attention. Thus further research should be conducted to assess the 
impact, and evaluate whether water-saving programs, which are widely practiced but 
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largely aimed at saving agricultural water in the north, is effective if taking into account 
growing demand for water from urban and industrial sectors.  
 
In addition, if grain production in the north and hinterland regions is undercut due to a 
shortage of water resources, China would have no other areas at home to relocate grain 
production. As such, it will have to further increase food imports from the international 
food market and/or increase overseas agricultural investment to secure food supply. Thus 
the linkage between water scarcity in north China and the country’s reliance on overseas 
resources for food supply can be further explored in future research.  
 
Finally, urbanization has interacted with the rise of a capitalist irrigation system. On the 
one hand, urbanization will move a growing rural population to the city, causing the 
further disintegration of the village-based irrigation system; on the other hand, the rise of 
the capitalist system will transfer agricultural water from small to large farms, 
accelerating the concentration of farmland. As a result, small farmers are forced to leave 
for the city due to the cutoff of access to agricultural water. Further research should be 
conducted to examine how the policy of promoting urbanization and the expansion of 
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